Daily Report

East Europe

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-022 *1 February 1996*

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Albania: Serbia Said Financing Paper, Socialist Party

AU0102115796

[FBIS Report] The Albanian press between 24 and 28 January gives extensive coverage to the controversy over allegations, first raised in the pro-government papers RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and ALBANIA on 24 January, that the Socialist Party [PS] and the independent paper KOHA JONE are financed by Serbian sources. KOHA JONE and the Socialist paper ZERI I POPULLIT denied the charges, and on 28 January the independent GAZETA SHQIPTARE reports a statement by the League of Journalists protesting alleged "systematic threats" made by KOHA JONE director Nikolle against Ylli Rakipi, chief editor of ALBANIA.

Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian on 24 January carries a 600-word unattributed report on page 3, entitled: "Serbia Finances the PS and KOHA JONE Through the Former Secret Police." The report states: "Serious accusations have arrived this time from across the Adriatic over the PS and KOHA JONE in a document sent to our editors by Pietro Zannoni's press office, which denounces the ties between the PS, KOHA JONE, and the secret police. The information, obtained from a former Sigurimi employee and published by Pietro Zannoni's press office, concerns almost $100,000 a year spent by Serbia to fund the PS deputies and KOHA JONE. Citing the former Sigurimi employee, Zannoni writes that, after the overthrow of communism in the former communist countries, links were formed among former secret police forces working for and financing a restoration of the communists to power. The former secret police, among other things, meddles in the present relations of the Albanian Government and institutions with the West. Zannoni's report, always on the basis of the statements of the former Sigurimi employee, denounces the ties with the PS and KOHA JONE. It is not ZERI I POPULLIT that receives the greatest assistance, but the independent daily KOHA JONE. KOHA JONE was created with the aim of providing the Albanian public with a newspaper having an outwardly independent appearance, but which would indirectly and more effectively turn the public against the government. KOHA JONE is merely a mask for the opposition Socialists to hide their maneuvers against the government, because it appears to lack the seal of the Socialist daily ZERI I POPULLIT." The report continues, "It is Serbian communists who finance the secret police, the Socialists, and the dailies KOHA JONE and ZERI I POPULLIT. Zannoni tells how the former Sigurimi employee described the route of the finance: 'The Socialist deputies are paid extra salaries for their work in the parliament. The money passes from Serbian hands to those of the former secret police, to be later distributed to...'"

Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian on 24 January also carries a 1,000-word unattributed report on page 3 about similar charges, under the headline, "Serbia Finances the Socialists and the Newspaper KOHA JONE."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 25 January carries a 250-word statement on page 1 by a spokesman of the Democratic Party [PD] issued in Tirana on 24 January, under the headline, "Monstrous Political Crime." The statement calls for the creation of a "parliamentary committee of investigation," whose three tasks will be:

"1. To verify all the facts and figures in Mr. Zannoni's report.

"2. To audit and make public all the property and earnings of senior leaders of the PPSh [former Albanian Workers Party], the PS, and other political forces.

"3. To investigate all the current accounts of KOHA JONE, whose directors live in Tirana's most luxurious hotels, and those of ZERI I POPULLIT."

Responding to the charges, Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian carries on 25 January a 1,000-word article on page 1 by Chief Editor Aleksander Frangaj, entitled, "A Mad Italian Sends the PD on an Adventure." The article states, "The 23-year-old fantasist Pietro Zannoni, through his phantom office with an Albanian address, has sent the greatest invention of the year to two newspapers without readers." The report also states, "Yesterday's statement by the PD is ridiculous, a total political scandal that displays the ignorance of the party's leadership. Blindly trusting the inventions and fantasies of an adolescent who is pleased to see his name in some Albanian paper, and without checking any facts concerning him, the party that has shouldered Albania's destiny demands the parliament, the procurator, and the National Intelligence Service [ShIK] to prove absurdities."

The report continues, "According to the PD statement, it was necessary for the psychopath Zannoni to intervene for ShIK 'to take steps to prevent this criminal activity,' thus crediting an Italian fantasist with the discovery and ignoring the work of the ShIK agent who we have with us every day as a 'staff member.' It is understandable that the statement is more for propaganda purposes, in order to insult the largest Albanian newspaper. KOHA JONE is the newspaper with the highest circulation and the highest revenue from advertising, and is not only able to survive without financing, but in its turn is able to finance other little newspapers such as RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and ALBANIA. We have shown this by financing AKS [ARTI

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KULTURA SPORTI, a weekly newspaper, originally a KOHA JONE supplement], and SPORTI EKSPRES. The directors of the government press, because they put on the market newspapers that do not sell and require thousands of dollars in subsidy every month, perhaps find it hard to imagine that a newspaper can finance itself. So, they fall prey to such idiocies as alleged Serbian financing."

Continuing, the report states, "These masters of diversion would not have fallen victim to infantile fantasy if they had performed a very simple reckoning on the basis of our circulation of about 25,000 copies at a price of 30 leks [L]. Knowing the cost of printing and other editorial expenses, they would see that KOHA JONE, far from requiring finance, is in a position to relieve the state budget of financing RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and ALBANIA. The gentlemen of the PD must realize that the sum of 4 million lira a month, or L250,000, over which we stand accused, would not even pay our monthly telephone bill. If you write what an anonymous Sigurimi agent says, then we also have the right to say that, according to a certain ShIK agent, the newspaper ALBANIA is financed to the tune of thousands of dollars by Sali Berisha or Saudi Arabia."

The article continues, "KOHA JONE, respecting the trust of thousands of readers and the weight of its words for the Albanian public, declares that it has never been involved in secret financial trickery. Our daily communication with thousands of readers has sufficed, and we hope will suffice, to cope with the newspaper's expenses. If we sink to the circulation of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE or ALBANIA, we will need sponsors, although we do not believe we will ever fall to the ridiculous and mediocre level of the servants of the state today. There is no reason why we any more than anybody else should refuse assistance, but we will never accept financing from terrorist organizations, arms traffickers, oil smugglers, and pimps, or from the dirty money of 'Shqiponja' [PD-owned oil company]. The pressure the PD is trying to exert by ordering the procurator and the ShIK to investigate and prevent this criminal activity is infantile. Our documents, thanks to dozens of inspections and incessant state and party pressures, are kept more tidily than is necessary."

ZERI I POPULLIT on 25 January carries on page 1 a 150-word editorial statement under the headline, "Slander Not Even Believed by Those Who Contrived It," which states: "This is not the first time that ALBANIA and RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE have become platforms for inventions and disgraceful slander against ZERI I POPULLIT. However, yesterday's case was the most flagrant and base ever concocted in their special disinformation offices. Seven months ago, the accounts of ZERI I POPULLIT were subjected to minute inspection, and the attentions of experts under particular instruction from the procurator not only failed to reveal any illegal financing from Serbia, as the government papers claimed yesterday, but there was not the slightest irregularity. It is others who receive illegal financing, as not only ALBANIA and RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE but no doubt the ShIK itself know full well."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 26 January carries on page 1 a 400-word editorial entitled, "Serbian Financing for KOHA JONE," repeating the original charges. Referring to Aleksander Frangaj's article in the previous day's KOHA JONE, the editorial states: "Before attacking RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, the chief editor of KOHA JONE would do well to explain how a newspaper with a circulation of 15,000 copies (and not 20,000 as he claims) [figure as published, Frangaj above claims 25,000], can pay more than 150 staff average salaries of L200,000 [old]. Let him explain the origin of the thousands of dollars the directors of KOHA JONE spend every month in the Hotel Rogner, the most expensive in Albania, escorted by their bodyguards."

ZERI I POPULLIT on 27 January carries on page 1 a 500-word article entitled, "With Pietro Zannoni's Brains?," which comments on the source of the allegations of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and ALBANIA. The article states, "For an entire year, an individual from Italy sent every week to ZERI I POPULLIT's number about 10 meters of fax that consisted of nothing but his own photograph and the signature, 'Pietro Zannoni, Press Office, Bari, Italy.' 'Who has presented us with this psychopath?' we used to say. When we insisted on the phone that he should stop sending us faxes, he turned up himself, unkempt, dressed in a jogging suit, with a walkman from the black market at his waist and headphones around his neck. This was the Pietro Zannoni who had used up 30 rolls of our fax paper. However, with a little effort we were able to turn off the fax machine, even though he was ready to testify to ties between many members of the Albanian Government and the cosa nostra Mafia, political murders, large-scale thefts by members of the governments of both countries, and whatever else this adolescent could dream up in his eagerness to become a somebody in the Albanian press."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 27 January carries on page 3 an 80-word unattributed report entitled, "Yugoslav Embassy Defends KOHA JONE." The report states: "At a news conference yesterday, the Yugoslav Embassy hastened to reject the accusations of Serbian financing for KOHA JONE. This prompt response from the embassy is surprising, when one remembers

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that it has failed to organize news conferences about much more important events. It is interesting that the embassy staff are much more interested in defending this newspaper than their state, giving the impression that they represent the newspaper and not Belgrade. Comment would be superfluous."

GAZETA SHQIPTARE on 28 January carries on page 3 a 200-word unattributed report entitled, "Rakipi Accuses: 'Lesi Threatens Me'." The report states, "The press is divided. Relations between the directors of KOHA JONE and ALBANIA have now become extremely bitter. In a statement by the Journalists League, Nikolle Lesi [director of KOHA JONE] is accused of threatening the director of ALBANIA. 'Three men went to his office, demanding that the paper should no longer write about the scandal of Serbian financing for the Socialists and KOHA JONE. Systematic threats were also made to Rakipi at his home telephone.' Immediately after the Journalists League's statement, which states that 'Those accused of Serbian financing responded negatively,' Nikolle Lesi denied the new charges against him. 'It is all groundless slander. Why did the league not react when a bomb was laid in my home?' The aim is to force the bankruptcy of our firm Press Transport and for ALBANIA to take over its business,' Lesi said. However, the league's statement does not stop there. 'This resort to terror in response to the charges of financial ties with Serbia makes Pietro Zannoni's accusations more plausible,' it states, and calls for investigations. 'The Journalists League asks the Albanian parliament to create a temporary parliamentary commission to conduct investigations of the charges and put an end to the terrorism against journalists who are trying to write the truth about this scandal, which also affects our national dignity,' the statement concludes."

Albania: Republican Leader on Protecting Electoral Law

AU3101135396 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 29 Jan 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Sabri Godo on New Electoral Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past four years, Albania has shown that it is far away from genuine democracy. The fact that the Democratic Party [PD] ruled parliament alone, with no one trying to stop its hand, has led us to many cases of arbitrariness and to the monopolization of political and economic life. Thus, to halt the PD's hand for the benefit of all and for the benefit of Albania and democracy, and if we really wish free elections to be held in Albania, and the people, through their parties, to send the representatives they want to parliament, so they can make the laws the people want, then the existing Electoral Law should remain effective. This law is good for us and should be protected by us, too. By defending this law, we Republicans are defending democracy in Albania.

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Bulgaria: Pirinski Notes Results of Brussels Visit

AU0102091796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 31 January Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski returned from Brussels, where he took part in the meeting of the Council on Bulgarian EU Association.

The most important results that were achieved, according to Minister Pirinski, were: processing Bulgaria's application on full-fledged membership in the EU; confirming the intention to conduct serious talks in Sofia in February on emigration and everyday problems; adopting, in the next weeks, measures on additional liberalization of Bulgarian textile goods for the EU. Those measures will equalize Bulgaria's situation to that of the associated members from Central Europe; greater understanding for the problems of Bulgaria's power supply, nuclear reactor safety, and the necessity to maintain a dialogue on those problems.

Mr. Pirinski refused to comment on the statement of Academician Blagovest Sendov in Moscow and said that he still does not have the necessary information on this case.

Regarding President Zhelev's statement on Bulgaria's Balkan policy, Mr. Pirinski said that he responds to arguments, not to claims.

Bulgaria: Two More Ministers Could Resign in Feb

AU3101143396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 27-28 Jan 96 p 1

[KONTINENT staff report: "Ilcho Dimitrov and Lyubomir Nachev Reportedly To Resign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] National Assembly deputies of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] have announced that Education Minister Academician Ilcho Dimitrov and Interior Minister Lyubomir Nachev will hand in their resignations at the end of February, citing health grounds. Lyubomir Kolarov, Stanka Velichkova, Rumen Ovcharov, and Professor Georgi Popov are among the favorites tipped for the vacant ministerial posts.

Prime Minister Zhan Videnov is reported to be already working on a structural reform of his cabinet, which will be discussed at the BSP Supreme Council plenum in February. It envisions splitting the monster Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology into two ministries. Yuriy Borisov, chairman of the Parliamentary Education Ministry was offered the Education Ministry, but declined, according to a source from the left. Now BSP Deputy Stanka Velichkova is being urged to accept the same post. Socialist Deputy Professor Georgi Popov is reported likely to head the new ministry of science and technology.

According to a source at BSP headquarters, Nachev's report on his ministry's campaign against crime will be examined at a cabinet session that will be held behind closed doors, not only for reasons of secrecy. The Interior Ministry chief is expected to be roundly criticized for his ministry's poor work and advised to find a plausible explanation for his return to the back benches in parliament. His state of health is most likely to be given as the reason for his resignation.

Zhan Videnov's plan reportedly envisions changing the Committee on Power Supply into a ministry, but, for the time being, the ministry is not to control the National Electricity Company. According to a Socialist deputy, Rumen Ovcharov, the present first deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply and the son of Stoyan Ovcharov, is tipped to take charge of the new ministry. The deputy added that, in power industry circles, the young Ovcharov has the reputation of being a brilliant specialist.

Lyubomir Kolarov will also become a minister, because the Posts and Telecommunications Committee is supposed to be turned into a ministry of communications, according to our source at BSP headquarters. Kolarov's closeness to Mikhail Danov and the involvement of the two of them in the Orion affair will allegedly not harm Kolarov's career, and he continues to be one of Videnov's closest confidants, although most of the Socialist deputies hold poor opinions about him.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Dismisses Interior Ministry Secretary

AU0102143996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 1 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a closed meeting today, the Council of Ministers adopted a decision to release Major General Mincho Bengarski of his post as secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Issues related to Bulgarian policy regarding regional stabilization and regional security and cooperation were also discussed. The discussion of those issues will continue at another closed cabinet meeting tomorrow, which will be followed by a news conference.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Says BSP Rule 'Dangerous' for State

AU3101171896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Attracting foreign investment has been the greatest failure of Zhan Videnov's eco-

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nomic policy. In no other area has the cabinet's failure been as great as in the field of agriculture and land reform. The government has also failed in its struggle against crime.

This is a part of the conclusions, accompanied by many facts, that President Zhelev made at his news conference today at the Boyana Residence, entitled, "Where Is Bulgaria Heading After the First Year of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Government?"

BSP rule is becoming dangerous for Bulgaria, its national security, and its national interests and future, President Zhelev said and added that Bulgaria needs a new democratic government. Some 100 journalists attended the news conference.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Record, Renewed Candidacy Criticized

AU0102103096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with Rumen Vodenicharov, chairman of the All-People Committee on Defense of National Interests, by Valeriya Markova; place and date not given: "Zhelev's Presidential Mandate Is Fully Exhausted"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Markova] Mr. Vodenicharov, it is a tradition for our newspaper to present your assessment of President Zhelyu Zhelev's performance as president. Was his fourth year in office any different?

[Vodenicharov] I would not say so. After the victory of the Socialists in the December 1994 parliamentary elections, he became a "lonely soldier" of sorts. He is an individual member of the Liberal International and he has been abandoned by the basic political forces and ridiculed by the leftist and rightist satirists. Zhelev is the United States' last hope that liberal democracy "will gain ground in Bulgaria."

[Markova] What could you say about Zhelev the man and his great moments as president, opposition leader, diplomat, administrator, etc.

[Vodenicharov] Look at his New Year's message and you have your answer. In November 1966, in addition to the 10 commandments, the rulers will also have to take Zhelev's 10 wishes into consideration, which include returning the land within its real limits, joining NATO, imprisoning at least one Mafia boss... everything well known ad nausea. However, there is also something new. Since he decreed amnesty for the recidivists, Zhelev did not do anything special as a defender of the law. Now he appears as a defender of the freedom of speech and the seven radio journalists who were fired. This is pure populism! Why did he not say anything in 1992 when Asen Agov purged the television, which affected hundreds of journalists? Because he was not facing an election then. When Mr. Vulkanov and I lost the second round of the presidential elections on 20 January 1992, we requested five minutes television time to publicly thank those 2.4 million Bulgarians who said "no" to Zhelevism with their vote. Do you know what Boyko Stankushev, one of those who are now weeping for democracy, said to us then? "This is not topical any longer!" Since then—four years now—I have not been on television. I was only able to exercise my freedom of speech in the southern park and on the pages of ZORA. Have you heard me crying on Radio Free Europe? One should not wonder if people abroad really get the impression that there is no freedom of speech in Bulgaria if the Bulgarian president had to travel to Portugal to announce this fact.

[Markova] "There is no other alternative to national security except regular NATO membership.... Everything else is national treason...." How does the philosopher interpret national treason?

[Vodenicharov] In 1995 the president was NATO's main megaphone, despite the fact that his name is last on the list of Atlantic Club members. According to the alphabet, first place belongs to Ahmed Dogan, and the names of Solomon Pasi, William Colby, and Sol Polansky are somewhere in the middle. In the past, when ships with emigrants were heading for America and the weather was foggy, the captains used to pinch the tail of a pig so his squeal would act as a horn. It turned out that the pig was the only animal that could squeal for hours without any interruption. I have the feeling that our president is being squeezed by a great power to squeal all the time for NATO, and this prevents him from stopping his wailing on time, despite the fact that Russia categorically declared, both through Andrey Kozyrev and General Grachev, that it is against NATO's eastward expansion. Bulgaria's well-being depends a lot more on Russia than the United States.

Our president also describes active neutrality as "national treason," and it is up to the Bulgarian people, not their president, to decide on this with a referendum. [passage omitted]

[Markova] Zhelev's candidacy for president has been assessed by Ivan Kostov and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] leadership as an "indecent political move." Which Bulgarian politicians do you think will support Zhelev for another mandate as president?

[Vodenicharov] The Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] is the only certain presidential political force right now. However, the DPS is declining and its voters are now half of what they were in 1992.

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Now Zhelev is sweeping the democratic stables in an attempt to collect more votes. He is touring mixed regions populated by Turks and Bulgarian Muslims. His caretaker, Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova, turned him into a friend of the People's Union, especially its leader Anastasiya Mozer, known for her dual citizenship and family relations with the CIA. If William Montgomery's heir applies the necessary pressure and Filip Dimitrov and Edvin Sugarev are blocked, one should not be astonished if the SDS traitors, who would sell their own mothers, would support him again. The bugle sounded for a roll call during the visit of the main anti-Communist, Zbignew Brzezinski to Bulgaria in 1995. Brisk and smart boys like Emil Koshlukov and Ivan Krustev, who certainly are on a dollar payroll, will help Zhelev create a new image, which is so necessary after the failure of Lech Walesa in Poland and the upcoming fiasco of Boris Yeltsin in Russia. If we add to this a few idiots from the Christian Agrarian Union, several drunks from "New Choice," several imbeciles from the Alliance for Social Democracy, a few Greens, several compatriots of Manush Romanov [Gypsies], a few supporters of Ivan Kalchev [chairman of the Union of Free Democrats], and most criminals, he could gather approximately 1 million voters, for whom Bulgaria is only a geographic concept. This will not be enough. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Russian Arms Shipment Expected in Mar

AU0102100696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The first shipment of Russian armored equipment that Bulgaria will be receiving from the Russian Army stocks will arrive in Bulgaria at the beginning of March. At present, the routes through which the arms are to arrive are being studied and the operation coordinated.

Bulgaria: Adviser Explains Long-Term Energy Strategy

AU2901171596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 20 Jan 96 p 13

[Commentary by Ivan Angelov, economic adviser of Prime Minister Videnov: "We Need No New Generating Capacities Until the Year 2010"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria has no future if it continues to develop an economy based on high energy consumption. At present, the country imports 75 percent of its primary energy sources. We have to develop a thrifty economy; in this case, we will not need to build any new generating capacities before the year 2010.

In Bulgaria, 1.62 metric tons of nominal fuel (expressed as petroleum) is needed to manufacture products worth $1,000. In the Central and East European countries, the average amount required is 1.49 tons. The figure for the OECD countries is 0.40 tons, and for Japan—0.26 tons. This is why we have to develop an energy-saving economy.

However, this does not mean that we do not need to invest in the energy industry. The existing capacities must be updated. In addition, we need new plants to replace the Maritsa-Iztok and Varna Thermoelectric Power Plants. Money is also needed to improve the safety of the reactors at Kozloduy.

In 1996 we expect our GDP to grow by 3 percent, and growth rates of 4-5 percent are predicted for the following years. If we retain our economy's branch structure in its present form, we will indeed require more energy.

We will also need new generating capacities if we succumb to the West's pressure and close down the four old reactors at Kozloduy. A group of scientists, of which I am a member, does not oppose completing the Belene nuclear power plant. However, provided that we need no more energy before the year 2010, we will not require any more nuclear power either. If it becomes necessary to build the Belene plant, the reactors should have capacities of 600 megawatts [MW], not 1,000 MW as planned. Under the safety system that is planned, 600 MW is a suitable figure for our national energy system.

Bulgaria: Kurdzhali Mayor-Elect on Election Results

AU3001140496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 Jan 96 p 3

[Interview with Kurdzhali Mayor-Elect Rasim Musa by Vulcho Milchev; place and date not given: "An Attack Against Me Aggravates the Situation in the Municipality"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Milchev] Mr. Musa, the commentaries and claims that you are illegally occupying the mayor's seat have become a constant fixture in the municipality in the last few months. How do you feel about this, since a judicial decision on your post as Kurdzhali mayor still has not been made?

[Musa] I live and work as Kurdzhali's legally elected mayor. The problem emerged after Mr. Angel Naydenov, regional administrator, did not convene a meeting of the newly elected municipal council within the prescribed 14-day period. I suppose he did this on the basis of his own interpretation of the law and the petitions contesting my election. [passage omitted]

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[Milchev] Do you think the law has been violated?

[Musa] The court will have its say on this matter. As far as I know, there are seven or eight other municipalities that are in a similar situation. However, the regional administrators in each municipality convened a municipal session. The question is which regional administrator is right. [passage omitted]

[Milchev] The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the matter by 23 January. What do you want from the highest judicial body?

[Musa] I hope that the Supreme Court cancels the silent refusal of Mr. Naydenov to convene the new Kurdzhali Municipal council, something he was supposed to do within 14 days.

[Milchev] The people are saying that you are losing your party's confidence? What do you think?

[Musa] Actually, precisely the opposite is happening. I feel that there is an increase in confidence because in my actions as a mayor, I adhere to the party program. This irritates certain people who are trying to create the opposite impression. Recently I had meetings with the leaders of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] Okrug and Central Councils. My last meeting with Mr. Dogan was two or three days ago. [passage omitted]

[Milchev] If the court cancels the elections results, are you prepared to repeat the marathon?

[Musa] Absolutely. I have no doubt that if the election is canceled, we will be even more prepared and the victory will be even greater.

[Milchev] Could the DPS request autonomy in the Eastern Rhodopes?

[Musa] Such claims are absolutely irresponsible. The DPS administered the region for four years, and throughout this time we functioned as a Bulgarian party, working to overcome the economic crisis in the country and the region and for the benefit of our motherland, Bulgaria.

[Milchev] Dr. Nedim Gendzhev demanded the inclusion of Muslims in the higher echelons of the executive power. Will you join in this demand of his?

[Musa] I do not accept advice from a person who became chief mufti on the basis of patronage. In politics, one obtains his post through elections, not patronage. Nevertheless, I think that people from all ethnic groups should be in the government organs.

Bulgaria: Kurdzhali Court Reviews Election Legality

AU3001183196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The conclusions of the experts study conducted by representatives of the Main Administration on Civil Registration and Administrative Services in Sofia have been submitted to the Kurdzhali Okrug Court. The experts study has been requested by the Kurdzhali Court in connection with the judicial case regarding the legality of the Kurdzhali municipal elections.

According to the experts' conclusion, it was not 731 voters who voted in violation of the law as was initially reported, rather 1,385 violations of the law were allowed.

The next sitting of the Kurdzhali Court on the so-called mayorship trial has been set for 5 February.

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Slovakia: Meciar Interviewed on Visit to FRY

LD3101143696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Bibiana Gunisova; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Meciar] We believe in balanced relations with Yugoslavia: A similar or the same delegation will visit Croatia within two weeks.

[Gunisova] You and your partners have already spoken very positively about the results of your talks in the FRY. Were there any issues the Yugoslav side found harder to accept than the rest?

[Meciar] I do not think so. [passage omitted]

The only aim of this visit was to create a cooperation model. It will be followed by further financial talks, agreements, and contacts between enterprises.

One of the issues that will have to be discussed further is the use of the Slovak koruna in mutual trade and the acknowledgement that it is externally convertible. Our partners looked at this issue favorably, but it is still not settled. We still have to persuade the other side that the Slovak koruna can be a stable convertible currency. We are having talks of this kind elsewhere also. [passage omitted]

[Gunisova] Does it mean that if the FRY acknowledges the Slovak koruna as a convertible currency there should be no problems with the system of payments, including payments for the old debts?

[Meciar] The bankers held talks today, and they claim that this should not be a real problem. The mechanism of payment is, naturally, still not quite ready, and the bankers have to continue working on it. Mr. Kozlik and Governor Masar have been working on this project. Some further work is still necessary, but this is not a crucial problem.

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Hungary: Editorial on NATO Expansion, Moscow Reaction

AU0102115096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Jan 96 p 3

[Editorial by Pal Lederer: "Sufficient Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We should not panic. With the help of dozens of Moscow-experts, the White House in Washington took a close look at Russia and decided it was expedient to slow down the process of NATO's eastern expansion; on the other hand, it is necessary to accelerate the process of institutionalizing the strategic partnership developed with the bear. In other words, Washington has confirmed that it continues to want to avoid any step that might estrange Moscow from the West.

It is too soon to tell what form this slowdown will actually take; it is probably not connected with a slowdown manifested in concrete practical steps; it is probably more a political message. The NATO die is cast.

The Washington strategists addressed their message to Boris Yeltsin who, with the approach of the elections, has found it increasingly necessary to declare that he strongly opposes NATO's expansion. After politically committing itself to this process and repeatedly making it clear to Moscow that at most it can have consultation rights and no veto rights on this matter, Washington cannot allow itself to retreat now (and it does not intend to either); nor can Washington choose a confrontation course with the Russians on this issue. (Perhaps Washington could have done so earlier, but now it seems that it is forced to adjust to Yeltsin's whims and try to keep him on the reform course, or at least on the course they call reform, by occasionally appeasing him.)

One who thought or hoped that NATO's expansion to the East could accelerate dramatically before this year's Russian and U.S. presidential elections entertained false illusions. Since Dayton, or the decision on the U.S.-Russian joint peacekeeping venture in Bosnia, the repeated declarations of Central European countries claiming to be on the verge of reaching the security Canaan called NATO have become downright grotesque. Patience. Everything in due time.

Nor is the Hungarian argument particularly fortunate either, namely, that Yeltsin and his company would quasi-condone Hungary's NATO membership. They would not condone it because, for the time being, NATO expansion is incompatible with Moscow's security philosophy. Therefore, we are not talking about condoning or not condoning here. The issue is rather that, while NATO expansion has already been decided, implementation is taking place with the technique of realpolitik: occasionally, they take the Russian quibblings into consideration. At most, we cannot see the forest for the trees: with the U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] bases, Hungary has become an organic part of the world's most efficient security system. For the time being, let us be content with this much.

Hungary: DZVM Leader Views Autonomy Concept, Kosovo

LD3101220196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Madarasz reports on the position of the chairman of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina [DZVM, Andras Agoston] regarding autonomy.

[Madarasz] The DZVM's autonomy concept continues to be the only model to guarantee political autonomy to Hungarians in Vojvodina, Andras Agoston told the deputy of the French charge d'affaires in Yugoslavia.

The DZVM wants to create personal autonomy gradually and with international assistance, if necessary. Autonomy will guarantee material security and professional and political freedom for the Hungarian intelligentsia working in education, culture, and communication and will provide an opportunity for all the Hungarians in Vojvodina to elect their political leaders, who would bear political responsibility toward them and not the Serbian power, Agoston emphasized.

Regarding the Kosovo Albanians' demands, Agoston is of the view that if the international community does not support their endeavor for independence, then the best solution for Kosovo would be to join the new Yugoslav state federation as a separate federal unit.

Hungary: Government Praises Deceased Communist PM

96CH0031A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Karoly Grosz Died"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karoly Grosz, Hungary's former prime minister, died. He was 66. The family of the deceased informed MTI [Hungarian News Agency] yesterday that Karoly Grosz had died Sunday evening at his home in Godollo, after a lengthy, serious illness. Funeral arrangements will be announced later. Yesterday afternoon our editorial office received the following announcement from the Communications and Press Section of the Prime Minister's Office:

"The Government of the Republic of Hungary has learned with deep regret that Karoly Grosz, the former

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prime minister, died 7 January 1996, after a lengthy, serious illness.

"As prime minister in 1987-88, Karoly Grosz recognized that Hungary's political system and economy required fundamental changes. Karoly Grosz was a controversial yet significant personage of the period of transformation. He strove to start reforms, in the interest of improving the country's situation and expanding our relations with the West. Karoly Grosz participated in the efforts to renew the country.

"The Government of the Republic of Hungary remembers the one-time prime minister with reverence, expresses its sympathy to the relatives of the deceased, and shares their grief.

"The Government and the family of the deceased will jointly make arrangements for Karoly Grosz's funeral."

Hungary: Parties Criticize Government Stance on Grosz

96CH0031A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Jan 96 p 4

[Article by Bertok et al., including brief interviews with leaders of the opposition parties: "FIDESZ Deputy Chairman on the Government's Announcement: 'A Political Provocation in Bad Taste'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Requesting anonymity, a top-ranking government official informed our paper that it was customary in European countries to say something about a head of government when he or she passes away. He added that the government announcement of Karoly Grosz's death was nothing more than "a political gesture." Before the announcement's release, several members of the cabinet felt that an expression of regret, solemn in tone and praising the service that the deceased had rendered, was appropriate six years after the political system's change. The staff member of the Prime Minister's Office said that, for the above reasons, the government had acted correctly.

We have been informed that, besides Prime Minister Gyula Horn, Balint Magyar, minister of Culture and Education, also had given his blessings to the released text. Gabor Kuncze, the coalition's deputy prime minister, and the other SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] ministers had been on leave and, therefore, the top official who released the announcement had been unable to contact them.

In conjunction with this matter, we contacted the previous government's prime minister, Peter Boross of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. He sent word through his secretary that, in his opinion, it would be pointless for him to comment.

From the Workers Party Executive, however, our editorial office received a statement that read in part: "In Karoly Grosz, the Hungarian and the international labor movements are mourning one of their outstanding figures. The Party Executive wishes to express its deepest sympathy to Karoly Grosz's immediate family, relatives and friends. The Workers Party intends to pay its respect to Karoly Grosz by arranging a party funeral for him."

Zsolt Nemeth (FIDESZ) [Federation of Young Democrats]: "With this announcement, the government is placing the opposition in an extremely difficult situation by raising the expression of regret for a tragic death to the level of party politics. Of course, Karoly Grosz's relatives are entitled to humane expressions of sympathy. At the same time, as an opposition politician, I am unable to remain silent about the consternation that the government's announcement has caused. First, because the reasons for issuing the announcement are incomprehensible. Second, because my assessment of Karoly Grosz's historical role is diametrically opposite to the assessment contained in the text. Third, because the announcement sets a precedent, on the basis of which the so-called democratic government could rate any politician of the past forty years as worthy of a state funeral. My emphatic apologies to the relatives of the deceased, but I regard the government announcement as a political provocation in bad taste."

We wanted to also interview Ivan Peto, the chairman of the SZDSZ. In response to our request, the party's chief of public relations, Endre Schindler, gave us the following statement: "In present-day Hungary, Karoly Grosz's death is not a political issue. The Alliance of Free Democrats does not wish to comment on the former prime minister's death. In our opinion, the former prime minister's death is not a reason for the SZDSZ to assess his historical role once again. We have already assessed it on several occasions. But we think it is understandable that the government has certain obligations in conjunction with a former prime minister's demise."

Jozsef Torgyan (Independent Smallholders Party): "By giving Karoly Grosz a state funeral, the government acknowledges that it regards itself as the legal successor of the party-state governments. In other words, as the legal successor of all those who, beginning with Rakosi, tyrannized the people. I believe the Creator summoned the late prime minister to judgment because Grosz was one of those reactionary politicians who talked of White Terror in response to any move by the opposition, even though the communist nomenklatura was in no physical danger. Yet he upheld sentencing by the party-state, advocated the suppression of human rights and the preservation of communist privileges. The Good Lord was

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unable to tolerate any longer Grosz's crimes against the nation. I am deeply shocked that the government, which regards itself as a democratically elected one, extols a personage of the party-state. Because of the government announcement, the Independent Smallholders Party intends to file a protest against this falsification of history."

Janos Latorcai (Christian Democratic People's Party): "Grosz was indeed a controversial figure in Hungary's transformation, but unquestionably a decisive one. For instance, the opening of Hungary's borders to the [East] Germans was also a positive act on his part, because all that required his approval as party chairman. But the controversial side of his personality was evident in that he clung rigidly and tenaciously to CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] and the Warsaw Pact. Every government has to pay tribute in some form to a former prime minister, and the government announcement underscores Grosz's controversial nature. But it is also noteworthy that, with this announcement, the government is also accepting legal continuity to some extent."

Andras Kelemen (Hungarian Democratic Forum): "As the member of parliament for Szekesfehervar and one of the founders of the local MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] organization there, I am somewhat shocked that the government is making arrangements for Karoly Grosz's funeral, 'jointly with the family of the deceased.' In other words, that it is arranging a state funeral for the one-time first secretary of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] and prime minister under the one-party system. The government is associating itself with the man who, referring to the 1990 elections, declared that he 'has lived to see the political system's change as a personal tragedy,' and who repeatedly cited the elections as an example of 'development in the wrong direction.' Nor am I able to forget what happened in 1988 when, amidst great secrecy, the MSZMP convened specifically in Szekesfehervar what was to become its notorious meeting. There, on behalf of the leadership, Karoly Grosz linked the prospects of democracy and a market economy with the danger of the resurgence of White Terror. He threatened with this a society which still felt in its every pore the fear of previous years and decades, in the wake of the terror that, of course, was of a different color. I also remember very well how much determination was needed to organize the opposition circles in the late 1980's. Karoly Grosz attempted to blast that hopeful mood by declaring that what we wanted might produce terror, rather than freedom. The answer to that terror, the ominous statement suggested, would of course be Red Terror. Naturally, one does not confront a vanished shadow of a bygone era and is no longer even angered by it. One merely finds it strange that a government which claims to be democratic would regard such a shadow as a close kin."

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B-H: AFP Profiles New Federation Government

AU3101171596 Paris AFP in English
1647 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Report by Edina Neretljak]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 31 (AFP) — Bosnia's Moslem-Croat federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] appointed a fresh cabinet Wednesday [31 January], with both main parties placing loyalists in key posts in the last major reshuffle expected before Bosnia's first post-war elections later this year.

Notable by their absence are ministers close to former premier Haris Silajdzic, as the federation's two main power-brokers — the Moslem Party of Democratic Action (SDA) of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) — closed ranks.

The new government also contains a number of hard-line Croats who held prominent positions in the self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, which ruled Croat-controlled areas of Bosnia during the Croat-Moslem war.

The full cabinet list follows:-

Prime minister: (Moslem — new) Izudin Kapetanovic takes over from Haris Silajdzic, who until Tuesday was premier of both the Bosnian Republic [Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the Croat-Moslem federation.

A 43-year-old electrical engineering specialist, Kapetanovic headed the Electricity Enterprise in the northeastern Tuzla region and was a member of the regional government there.

Observers here said Kapetanovic was the choice of Edhem Bicakcic, an SDA vice-president, who is also head of the State Electricity Enterprise.

Vice-premier and finance minister: (Croat — new) Drago Bilandzija, a 47-year-old economist from Travnik, central Bosnia, is a newcomer nominated by the HDZ.

Defence minister: (Croat) Vladimir Soljic, is a 53-year-old machine-engineering specialist, born in Siroki Brijeg, in the southwestern Herzegovina region. The Croat mini-state's defence minister, he also sits as a deputy in the parliament of the neighbouring Croatian Republic, following general elections there last autumn.

Interior minister: (Moslem — new) Avdo Hebib, 60, is a psychologist who has spent virtually his entire career working in the police. His last post was as an advisor to the Bosnian Defence Ministry.

Justice minister: (Croat) Mate Tadic, a 44-year-old lawyer, has been the justice minister since June 1994. Before the war he held a number of positions in the country's judicial system.

Energy, industry and mining minister: (Moslem — new) Enver Kreso, electrical engineer, 50, is a president of the SDA deputies' club in parliament. Also considered a member of the Bicakcic clan.

Transport and communication minister: (Moslem — new) Rasim Gacanovic, a 46-year-old electrical engineer from Sarajevo, is a newcomer to government.

Social policy and refugees minister: (Moslem — new) Ferid Alic, a 40-year-old dentist from Zenica in central Bosnia, he was in charge of refugees in the same region before becoming a minister.

Health minister: (Croat) Bozo Ljubic, a 47-year-old orthopaedic surgeon, has been federation health minister since June 1994. A surgeon at Sarajevo's Kosevo Hospital at the beginning of the war, Ljubic left the city in 1993 to become the Health Minister of Herzeg-Bosnia, based in southern city of Mostar.

Education, science, culture and sports minister: (Moslem — new) Fahrudin Rizvanbegovic, 51, professor of South-Slavic languages and literature, a former professor of the Mostar University Rizvanbegovic was in Croat detention camp in Dretelj near Mostar during the Moslem-Croat war in 1993. Also a new face in the government.

Trade minister: (Croat) Nikola Grabovac, a 53-year-old economist, has been trade minister since June 1994.

Environmental planning: (Moslem — new) Ibrahim Morankic, a 48-year-old architect from Tuzla is also a new member of the cabinet.

Agriculture and forestry: (Moslem — new) Ahmed Smajic, 38-year-old agriculture engineer, is also a new face.

Minister without portfolio: (Croat) Martin Raguz, a 37-year-old political scientist, has been deputy minister for refugees since June 1994.

In Bosnia's first war government created in June 1992 he was minister for labour and social welfare. He quit the post at the beginning of 1993 to become refugee minister in the Croat mini-state.

Minister without portfolio: (Serb — new) Nedeljko Despotovic is the only Serb in the government. A 48-year-old lawyer, he was one of three ministers without portfolio in Silajdzic's first government from October 1993 to June 1994.

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B-H: Kapetanovic Delivers Inaugural Address

AU3101164296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Inaugural address by Bosnian Federation Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic at the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 31 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, deputies, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, I wish to present the objectives and direction of the government's future activity and its concept of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the strategic commitment in the struggle for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its integration into the international economy, markets, democratic principles, and general development. The arrival of peace is a great challenge for all of us in the future struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina, its independence, and sovereignty. The great sacrifices that we have made for the defense of our homes and honor in the struggle against the darkest fascism oblige us to use our intelligence and work to secure a better life and future for us and the coming generations.

The circumstances under which this government is taking over are characterized by an almost entirely devastated economy and infrastructure, in particular the limited and inadequate accessibility of communication routes, accumulated welfare problems, and the outstanding problem of demobilized troops, refugees, and displaced persons. On the other hand, there is the activity of the international community and its political and economic factors, who are ready to help Bosnia-Herzegovina and its reconstruction and development.

Less than two years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the process of strengthening the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the building of trust among its constituent nations have still not yielded the expected results. A strong federation that functions in its entirety is an essential prerequisite in Bosnia-Herzegovina leading towards continuous sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because of all this and with the objective of realizing a political, social, and economic integration in the federation, an agreement was signed in Dayton on 9 November 1995 on the revitalization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and decisions were made on the separate responsibilities and organization of the Federal Government and that of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ladies and gentlemen, deputies, in order to realize the goals and tasks that the government has set itself, it is necessary to secure certain prerequisites that are essential for its work. First, a congenial political climate, the full realization of decisions and deadlines as provided in the Dayton Agreement; the separation of functions and domains of the Federal and Republican Governments; the passing of appropriate legislation, the taking over of exclusive power at the level of the federation, cantons, and municipalities throughout the territory of the federation within the limits of its responsibilities; the transfer of all functions of the local civilian authorities and bodies of authority on the territory of the Federation that are under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to federal institutions, the transfer of all functions of civil authorities on the territory of the federation under Croatian Defense Council control to federal institutions, and the abolition of these authorities and bodies of authority; the integration of the entire territory of the federation and the integral functioning of the Federal Government; the consolidation of a single payment system within the federation that will use the German mark as a joint calculation unit; the establishment of a federal customs administration within the Bosnia-Herzegovina customs system by abolishing all internal customs checkpoints in the federation; and the establishment and realization of full freedom of movement.

Third [as heard], we need to draft an agreement on the central bank; fourth, initiate the work of a tax office. Fifth, we need to secure the organization and functioning of political authority in all cantons as soon as possible. Sixth, we need to speed up the process of establishing a legislative, judicial, and executive authority in the cantons as prerequisites for the establishment of a positive and favorable political climate, which is a basic requirement for the functioning of the federal government. Seventh, we need to secure for all refugees and displaced persons, pre-war residents, the free, unhindered, and speedy return to their homes, creating at the same time appropriate conditions for this. Eighth, we need to pass the federal defense law; ninth, particular attention must be devoted to the reintegration of Sarajevo and its economic revival with the goal of allowing all citizens, members of the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb peoples, to live in freedom and equality, and tenth, we must solve the issue of Mostar.

In addition to securing the above prerequisites, the government may be tasked with the following goals and tasks that will be incorporated into the program of measures and activities of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

First, the further strengthening of the country's defense ability, and guarantees for the citizens' personal safety and the safety of their property, the setting up of a professional army and police, while at the same time

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solving the existential status of their members. Second, the reconstruction, revival, and development of the economy through the strategic development of Bosnia-Herzegovina as follows: by using the funds provided for reconstruction by the EU mission, the World Bank, and so forth; the securing of basic energy resources, the production, acquisition, and distribution of electric power, coal, oil, and natural gas; the reestablishment of communication routes by restoring road, rail, and air traffic; securing the integral functioning of the market in those segments that do not threaten the citizens' existential minimum; the organized reception of demobilized troops and their employment; the privatization of companies, the updating of companies' technology; the strengthening of market economy and entrepreneurship; the payment of labor; and relieving the economy of high taxes and social security contributions.

Furthermore, we must increase and broaden the existing production level and establish criteria for the revival and financing of those investments that can be completed in a short time. In this, we must give priority to the reconstruction of the infrastructure and production programs of a humanitarian nature. Third, we must increase agricultural production by realizing the plan for the spring and fall sowing, as well as the advancement of the village infrastructure, particularly in border areas of the federation.

Fourth, we must ensure the functioning of a single system of the commodity, capital, and labor markets.

Five, we must establish small and middle-sized companies.

Six, we must develop efficient social policy programs in all social domains, particularly in the domain which pertains to the protection of the most threatened citizen categories, that is, families of killed troops, war and civilian invalids, pensioners, refugees, and displaced persons. Particular attention will be devoted to the payment of foreign currency pensions to Bosnia- Herzegovina citizens who worked abroad.

Seven, we must create conditions for the return of exiled persons and refugees, their speedy reintegration into social and economic activity, and the improvement of living conditions for those whose return we shall not be able to secure within a set time limit.

Eight, concerning employment, we need to create the cadre basis for the revival of the economy, stimulate the existing cadre, and provide existential conditions for those who should return. We need to [words indistinct] of the cadre according to the territories and according to the branches of economy. We should work faster on the training of the new cadre, include war disabled in the labor process through retraining, and employ members of the families of fighters who were killed.

Nine, we need to revise the organization and retrain staff in the state administration and state organs at all levels.

Ten, we need the rational, operational, and inexpensive organization of the ministries, entities, and services. After 15 days, we should carry out the reorganization of the ministries and fill vacant places according to the criteria that include ethnic structure that must reflect the make up of the population.

The development of the institutions of the financial system of the Federation are the activities that should be realized immediately. The order of these activities should be as follows:

First, set up institutions in the payments transactions and banking system. These should be: The Institute for Financial Transactions of the Federation and the Agency for Supervision and Control of Banks. Regarding the Institute for Financial Transactions, work should begin immediately as there are federal laws on it. The government will appoint the director and deputy director of the institute. After that, all branches on the territory of the Federation would be integrated into a single service.

Regarding the agency in the banking system, a law that is already being prepared should be adopted as soon as possible. We should embark on the integration of banks and the entire system of financial transactions in the Federation. In this way we would ensure the free flow of funds throughout the Federation, and this would represent a strong integrating factor.

Second, a unified customs service of the Federation, a unified taxation administration of the Federation, and the financial police will begin to work within a period of 10 days from [words indistinct] of the organization of ministries and the appointment of the management. There is a legal framework for the customs service and the financial police of the Federation.

Third, parallel to establishing the institutions of the financial system, it will be necessary to draft the budget and set up the funds of the Federation, the pension and health service funds, in the shortest possible time, one month after the election of the government at the latest. In addition to these two very important funds, there is also a need to set up funds for education and unemployed persons.

The Ministry of Finance will take care of the macroeconomic policies necessary to set up and maintain a balanced budget in the very difficult economic conditions. In the first half of 1996, it will be necessary to

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establish a system of organization of the state administration and the cantonal and municipal levels. The size and content of public expenditure at the federal, cantonal, and municipal level of authorities will only be possible to determine after the cantons and municipalities have been set up. The [word indistinct] structure of the budget's income and expenditure at the federal level in 1996 is transferring a large part of obligations to the cantons and municipalities. It is necessary to view this process as a dynamic progress, as changes in the size and content of revenues, as a process of defining the obligations of the Federation, cantons, and municipalities.

In the transitional period, it will be necessary to chose between the only two possible models: A) that all revenues at the level of the Federation be pooled together, and then allocated according to the level of organization of the authorities at the federal level, and the newly formed cantons and newly formed municipalities, and B) to retain the model of [word indistinct] and revenues according to the existing model of financing and the organization of the state administration.

Ladies and gentlemen, the work of the Ministry of Energy, Mining, and Industry in the period ahead will be marked by attempts to develop the energy system of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the conditions in which we will need to rebuild economic facilities, and provide employment for demobilized fighters in a relatively healthy market system that will provide the social security of those in employment.

(?The production) of electricity and energy in 1996 define the most important tasks of the Power Industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period ahead: First, connect transformer stations in all the territories without electricity with the electric-energy system, and repair the relevant distribution network. The first priority will be to supply electricity to Gorazde, which has been without electricity since the beginning of the war. Second, improve the quality of electricity supply to the Bihac region, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Petrovac, and Kulen Vakuf by repairing the power plants and generators that are currently out of order, and by repairing the distribution network, transformer stations, and distribution facilities in all parts of the free territory. Three, link up with the European (?PTT) [Post, Telegraph, and Telephone] network.

The total production in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is planned to be 3,641 gigawatts, which is 72.5 percent more than in 1995. We plan to obtain 370,000 metric tonnes of coal for the work of the Tuzla thermopower plant, 620,000 metric tonnes of coal for Kakanj, which is 60 percent more in the case of Tuzla and 24 percent more than in the case of Kakanj in comparison with this year [as heard]. The planned production requires 2,860 metric tonnes of oil, and 1,800 metric tonnes of mazut. The electricity generating industry will pay its liabilities to the coal mines and the Bosnia-Herzegovina railroad organization for the transportation of coal with the proceeds that will be proportional to (?their use) of electricity and their share in the production of electricity. The difference [words indistinct] for the mines will be provided from the budget, donations, taxes, and long-term loans with a low interest rate.

Regarding the work of the Federation's most vital facilities, it is necessary to secure some 213,000 metric tonnes of oil derivatives for the production of coal and electricity, the maintenance and construction of roads, and starting up industrial production.

The sale of mazut is planned to increase most, by as much as 1,250 percent. This is based on the assessment that many production facilities will start to work.

There will also be a significant increase in the sale of diesel D1 and diesel D2 fuel. This is 526 percent more in comparison with the sale realized in 1995. All this is based on the assumption that 10 gas stations will be opened in the Una-Sana Canton and that the gas stations around Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla will be revitalized.

In 1996, it will be necessary to secure around 546 million cubic meters of natural gas. In comparison with 1995, this represents a rise of 230 percent.

In industry, the assumption is that it will be relatively easy to start production in the wood, textile, leather, and construction material industries by obtaining financial funds and other resources from various sources: donations, [words indistinct], joint investments, sale of parts of companies, goods credits, loans, and the combination of the above-mentioned sources of finances.

Regarding long-term tasks, one should work out and adopt the strategy of development of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that will set the direction of development in the energy and mining industries, and the industry as a whole. The priority task is to abolish the property that does not belong to anyone, create a political climate with changed psychology, and create conditions for the adoption of privatization legislation.

The World Bank representatives propose that settling the obligations toward the citizens be archived through privatization of enterprises, that is, that the old foreign currency savings and the restitution become an obligation of the state, to be resolved with the issue of compensation vouchers by which the citizens would be able to purchase stocks, apartments, and other. As for possible

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solutions for some of the social and economic consequences of the war, we propose that these not be sought in the process of privatization directly but indirectly, namely, that the socialized funds providing for the war veterans, handicapped, the families of fallen soldiers, and the unemployed, apart from domestic and foreign sources also be financed by a portion of income accrued in the privatization. The above questions remain open for political decisions.

The program of privatization of the apartments in Bosnia- Herzegovina will allow the transfer of apartments owned by the public companies and the state, that is, the municipalities, to the private owners. The current estimate is that there are 190,000 housing units and apartments with an average size of 56 square meters available. [Word indistinct] the law on privatization of apartments supports the primary goal of a faster privatization and transformation of economy in the direction of prevailing private ownership and market economy relations. The aim of this process is to allow the current bearers of housing rights to purchase apartments for a relatively low price. It also includes proposals that act as social justice correctives for the consequences of the war through the allocation of apartments. Apart from the [word indistinct] pertaining to the apartments, there are also some realms in which privatization of apartments touches upon other parts of the program. The government will make efforts to engage international, competent institutions from individual [word indistinct] to learn about (?comparable) processes and the experiences of the Central European countries, especially the experiences of eastern Germany.

As a young country in a postwar period of reconstruction and development, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be economically stable and survive, must as a part of its overall policy of reconstruction and development give priority to the development of agriculture, food industry, and [word indistinct], which the experiences of the developed countries support. Bosnia-Herzegovina can produce sufficient quantities of food to feed its population. Some of the important directions of the country's overall policy for the development of the agricultural bodies are: Transformation of [word indistinct] in the sense that each citizen realizes that the production of food is of vital importance for the survival of the population and the normal (?demographic increase) and development of the population in the future, and, thus, also the survival of the state. The state must ensure comprehensive development of villages and financing of the infrastructure facilities, roads, electricity and water systems, schools, medical centers, [word indistinct], veterinary medicine, and others. It must also secure constant training of farmers in modern production and new approaches in the construction of housing and economic buildings in the village, with their possible use for alternative production as well as development of small, extremely adaptable industrial facilities to meet the requirements of the market and link up with individual industrial branches.

The war and the war activities resulted in considerable degradation of forests, which are a unique form of our natural assets. To prevent further depletion of forests and ensure their protection we must apply the law on forests more consistently, work actively on the forestation of the depleted forests [words indistinct], and pass new programs of forestry's long-term development. In the realm of water management, we must operationalize the water supply system, capacitate the abandoned springs and open new ones, and also install new pumps, especially in the newly liberated areas.

In the realm of transport and communications it is inevitable that we develop strategic and program documents for the reconstruction and organization of development and repair of the infrastructure, roads, railroads, air transport, and postal services. In 1996 we are planing a railroad transport of 4.9 million passengers and 2.2 million metric tonnes of goods. To realize these tasks we must inevitably secure approximately 120 million German marks. In the realm of road transport we must rebuild and develop republican, regional, and local roads, listed and unlisted, as well as the adjacent installations, bridges, and tunnels. The funds for these activities will be secured from the European Commission aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the realm of telecommunications, our priority tasks will lie in the development of buildings and purchase of equipment. This is one, to set up a digital, radio-relay system that would link-up Bosnia-Herzegovina; two, to install a system of several [word indistinct] telephone exchanges with a capacity of 60,000 telephone lines; three, to build a part of the main digital optical system which would be (?linked) to the telephone exchanges in Zenica; four, to restore the postal traffic; five, in the international realm, to establish direct links with Germany, Sweden, France, Hungary, and Croatia.

The government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will also propose passing a law on radio diffusion which will regulate the radio-diffusion system in the Federation and the cantons and will correspond to the republican law on telecommunications [word indistinct]. The government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will secure financial means for the construction of the infrastructure and the transmission network of a unified system on the following main routes: Sarajevo-Mostar, Sarajevo-Tuzla, and Sarajevo-Bihac. It will also purchase the diffusion equipment that

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would cover the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation with the television signal. The government will also support the development of the cantonal radio-diffusion systems.

The education system and the system of scientific institutions on the territory of the federation still have not been unified. Two parallel systems exist in practice. The formation of the Federation and the cantons will create conditions for building a decentralized, academic, and scientific system. The government will try to [word indistinct] a modern system, both in terms of [words indistinct] and technology, (?as close as possible) to the EU systems, but a system that in matters of national essence will open the door to complete freedom. [sentence as heard] The government is committed to creating an open academic system, and we shall try to make it flexible to accommodate the highest standards in human rights [words indistinct]. As far as education is concerned, the government will develop a strategy of higher education by strengthening the universities in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar, and by establishing academic institutions in the Una-Sana Canton. This must be based on realistic assumptions which will unite personnel and space conditions and will secure a solid level of modern equipment, laboratories, and computers. In a shortage of personnel, we have to selectively fill the positions with younger personnel, and at the same time create conditions for the return of our highly qualified personnel from abroad. The material position of people in education must be urgently [word indistinct].

Culture is significantly neglected, and institutions in this domain have sustained substantial damage. The government will try to secure for professional institutions professional work conditions, and will try to help amateur societies and initiatives.

Many significant natural and cultural monuments have been destroyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The government will give full priority to the [word indistinct], categorization, drafting of documentation for reconstruction projects, and the revitalization and protection of cultural monuments.

Sports and physical culture are domains of great importance for the improvement of health policy, and our image worldwide. This is a domain to which we need to devote very serious attention, and the government will do so. The government will [words indistinct] infrastructure which will correspond to nongovernment institutions and will try to unite sports and physical culture into competitions and other institutionalized forms of activity, not only at the federal level, but at the state level, and to establish ties with international government and nongovernment institutions.

The government will apply for grants for the reconstruction of universities, libraries, cultural heritage, and the restoration of cultural monuments. One of the important and urgent tasks that the federal government faces concerns resolving the problems in health care and accompanying services. Health care is a domain of particular social interest and the adequate organization and functioning of health care is a lasting objective of all organized social systems. Health care accentuates [words indistinct] of a society. Oversights in this domain have extremely adverse effects on other domains. Although the cantons have jurisdiction over the main part of organizing health care, the drafting of a global concept of the organization and functioning of health care is a significant task for the federal government, that is, appropriate authorities. Significant help from abroad, which would encompass a three-year financing program for salaries, medicine, instruments, equipment, and interventions in the domain of public health care, rehabilitation for the victims of war and the reconstruction of institutions and equipment, are [words indistinct] with the help of the World Bank and WHO.

Keeping in mind the significance of the judiciary in a state, the government will devote particular attention to strengthening the personnel and material base in the judiciary. We need to stop the depletion of expert personnel, courts, and [word indistinct] by stimulating their work, adequate salaries, and other stimulations which they objectively deserve. This is particularly important from the point of view of the criteria applied when appointing the judiciary in the future federal and cantonal legal systems, as well as from the aspect of securing a high level of [words indistinct] protection of citizens' personal safety and that of their property.

In addition to legislation that will define the organization of the judiciary in the Federation, the government will work on improving [words indistinct] and the regulation of court procedures which will enable [word indistinct] and timelier legal system. All dilemmas pertaining to the separation of jurisdiction between the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be resolved at the start, so that the [words indistinct] functions of the state administration can function smoothly.

Deputies, at the end I wish to stress — without detailed elaboration — the global concept of the government's work in the domains that are currently of vital importance for all of us. With a view to maintaining continuity, the federal government will implement the program of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina, because it presents a good base for the incoming gov-

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ernment for the realization of its own program and the [words indistinct].

Ladies and gentlemen, I call on all those whom you have elected to the government, and all those who will participate in its work to invest maximum effort into solving problems and the realization of set goals. Without any doubt, I can say that this government comprises experts in the domains of the various ministries, experts who are capable of realizing the set goals irrespective of the circumstances in which they will be active.

If we had the strength and knowledge to defend ourselves from an enemy many times stronger, I am certain that we shall know how to tailor our country to suit our citizens. Thank you. [Applause]

B-H: Commentary Analyzes Federation-Republic Balance

AU3101184396 Paris AFP in English 1745 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Commentary by Edina Neretljak]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 31 (AFP) — Izudin Kapentanovic became premier of the Bosnian Federation on Wednesday [31 January], with hardline Croats a key feature of a power-sharing cabinet dominated by loyalists picked by the main Moslem and Croat parties.

Under the arrangement Moslem Kapentanovic gets the premiership while a Croat, Drago Dilandzija, is named his deputy and becomes finance minister.

The new government reinforces the power-base of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Moslem Party of Democratic Action (SDA), but doubts remain whether they two sides have healed wounds caused by their fratricidal year-long war.

The federation, whose creation in March 1994 ended their conflict, although designed to united the two peoples has since its inception been dominated by the relationship between the biggest Moslem and Croat parties.

With the cabinet approved Wednesday the federation finally separates its government from that of the Bosnian Republic, a division that had been set for six months after the Moslem-Croat federation agreement was signed March 1994.

In the interim period, which lasted for two and half years, the republic government headed by former premier Haris Silajdzic acted as the federal one as well.

The U.S.-brokered Dayton peace accord for Bosnia, signed in Paris in December, called for an acceleration of the separation of the governments, a move finally completed at the beginning of January.

On Tuesday the Bosnian Republic's parliament approved a new cabinet for the central government headed by Hasan Muratovic, the former minister in charge of relations with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

Dayton creates two largely autonomous entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Croat-Moslem federation and a Serb Republic. The central government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will sit on international bodies, but the central authorities will only retain control over foreign policy.

The federation and Serb entity will be in charge of everything else including defence and the police. Under the federation, Croats control defence and the police is placed in the hands of Moslems.

However, it remains a moot point whether ministers will exercise power throughout federation territory, with Moslem ministers lacking credibility in the Croat-majority areas and vice-versa.

Four ministries — trade, industry, education and transport — are due to move their offices from Sarajevo to the Croat-controlled district of the divided southern city of Mostar.

Some of the former Moslem ministers refused to move to west Mostar, an indication that two and half years after the creation of the federation deep mistrust between the parties remains.

Both sides will retain their separate armies with a joint coordinating body but not a joint command. Federal defence law remains at the draft-stage.

However, one thing is certain — the cabinet is packed with party loyalists with a strong nationalist bent.

Almost all the Croat ministers were at one stage prominent in the self-declared Herzeg-Bosna mini-state of Croat hardliners.

The Moslem ministers, old and new, are all faithful SDA members.

Ministers close to ex-premier Haris Silajdzic, who quit two weeks ago citing the SDA's totalitarian tendencies, were noticeable by their absence.

Silajdzic opposes the Croat attempt to weaken the central government, a battle he lost after SDA capitulated to HDZ and which sparked his resignation.

Observers here said the SDA's gave in to HDZ's demands stems frcomes because the SDA is content to

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rule Moslem fiefs like the Croats rule theirs. [sentence as received]

B-H: Muratovic Expects NATO to Stay On in Bosnia

MS0102120196 London THE EUROPEAN in English 1-7 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Askold Krushelnycky and Ali Moghnie, incorporating interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, date not given: "I-FOR's Problems Multiply by the Day"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo — Hasan Muratovic, the new Bosnian prime minister, has told The European that he expects Nato peacekeeping forces to stay on for much longer than the year-long timetable envisaged in the Dayton peace accord.

Muratovic said: I don't think that Nato will leave very soon. They have come to stay for many years."

His warning will dismay President Bill Clinton and some European leaders who promised that their nations' contingents in the Balkans Nato mission (I-FOR) would stay for only a year.

But the remarks also reflected the problems faced by Nato troops as they implemented the peace. One of the biggest challenges comes next month when Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo are due to be handed over to the Muslim-dominated government.

Bosnian Serb leaders are resisting the unification of the capital because many of the 35,000 Serbs living in those areas fear that they, will become victims of persecution. Thousands say they intend to leave Sarajevo before their homes come under government control.

In the past week an American and a British soldier have been wounded by sniper fire in the Serb-held suburb of Ilidza. The shooting incidents were probably individual shows of anger by the gunmen and not carried out on Bosnian Serb army orders. But Nato officials, who complained to Serb authorities, are concerned that attacks on their forces will increase as the handover deadline approaches.

Momcilo Kradsnik, head of the Bosnian Serb parliament, has said that his government will not deliver these areas to the Muslims".

Although shelling ceased last October, there is still sporadic sniping and last month Serb police abducted 16 Muslims from a bus.

Muratovic said Nato faced a host of problems that were likely to prolong its stay. "We have problems in the accomplishment of the Dayton agreements on all fronts," he said. "These include reconstruction, demobilising armies and the release of prisoners of war."

The prisoner of war issue is turning into an enormous headache for those trying to implement the peace. The Bosnian government has accused the Serbs of still keeping thousands of Muslim prisoners and of witholding information about the fate of 20,000 others.

In Tuzla, headquarters of the American Nato contingent, hundreds of refugees from the former Muslim enclave of Srebrenica ransacked Red Cross and UN offices. They demanded to know the fate of thousands of Muslims who were taken away by Serb forces when they captured the enclave last summer.

Most of the evidence available indicates that the prisoners were executed.

B-H: Danish FM on Possible Longer IFOR Stay

BR3101105296 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jan 96 p 6

[Report by Bent Winther: "Helveg Goes Easy on Bosnia Plan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo — The task of the 60,000-strong NATO-led IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia is so huge, and the lack of security among sections of the population so great, that it is becoming steadily more likely that the force will have to stay in the country for more than one year.

Even though the timetable of the Dayton peace plan seems at present at least to be being observed, very few people still believe that peace can be secured before December — the deadline which U.S. President Bill Clinton in particular has remained firm on.

Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen (Radical Liberal Party) arrived yesterday in the bombed-out Bosnian capital of Sarajevo after heavy fog had prevented the big Danish Air Force Hercules plane from landing in Tuzla.

At Sarajevo airport the foreign minister said, among other things, that IFOR will stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina "for a year at least.."

"At the present point in time it is impossible to say when it will be able to withdraw. There is still a long time to go, but it is agreed that we will all withdraw at the same time – together with the Americans," the foreign minister said.

It Will Be Possible

Even though sources say that there are ongoing discussions on the length of IFOR's stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the countries involved, Lieutenant

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General Michael Walker said the following at a short briefing this evening at IFOR headquarters in Sarajevo:

"I believe that it will be possible to complete the mission in one year. That is our vision. But establishing peace is a very long-term process. Others will have to take over when we leave."

Today Niels Helveg Petersen will meet the foreign ministers of Switzerland and Hungary which together with Denmark make up the so-called OSCE troika.

The OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — is in the process of setting up its largest mission to date. Over 200 people will prepare elections in the Serb republic and the Bosnian-Croat federation.

The elections are supposed to be held before December this year. There are no parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no democratic tradition, and the distrust and insecurity are enormous.

Police Force Lagging Behind

The international police force, which was supposed to reduce the tension and insecurity, is still far behind schedule. Only about 200 men of what is ultimately supposed to be a force of 1,700 have arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite promises of greater security caravans of Serbs are seen leaving Serb quarters of the city which are supposed to be transferred to Bosnian-Muslim control in March.

"They have no confidence that they will be treated fairly. Those who can pack up and leave," said Deputy Police Superintendent Poul Christiansen, one of the eight Danish policemen who have arrived thus far in Sarajevo.

This evening Niels Helveg Petersen visited the first police station set up in the city.

B-H: OSCE 'Troika' Creates Election Commission

BR0102125096 Copenhagen POLITIKEN in Danish 31 Jan 96 p 9

[Report by Jens Holsoe: "Threats to Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo — There are two serious threats to the peace in Bosnia. The first is the growing conflict between the two ethnic groups in the Bosnian-Croat federation. The second is the U.S. plan to train and arm the Bosnian Army. Both could seriously threaten the fragile peace.

This was the message Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen received from General Michael Walker, the British commander in chief, when he arrived in the Bosnian capital yesterday. He is on a two-day visit, partly to visit Danish troops in northern Bosnia and partly to take part in a meeting of the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In 1997 Denmark will take over the presidency of the OSCE, which currently has Switzerland in the president's chair. Up to the beginning of this year it was Hungary who held this post. The meeting of this "troika" has been placed in Sarajevo, because it is here that the OSCE faces its biggest mission to date.

Bosnian Elections

"According to the Dayton agreement, no less than seven different elections are to be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Niels Helveg Petersen said. Over 200 OSCE observers will come to the country. They will lead 25 subgroups, which will monitor and make sure that democratic elections can be held.

According to the agreement, the elections are to be held before 15 September — something that even the most optimistic doubt is feasible.

Niels Helveg Petersen arrived in Bosnia on Monday [29 January]. According to the plans, he should have landed in Tuzla and visited the Danish battalion, DANBAT, but because of fog his plane had to continue on to Sarajevo, where there was then time for a meeting with General Walker.

Yesterday he met Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti and Hungary's Lazlo Kovac, and they launched an "interim election commission," which is to prepare the full election apparatus. He also visited Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic. And finally, outside his official program, Helveg Petersen met with Haris Silajdzic, who resigned as Bosnian prime minister yesterday, probably in order to form his own political party before the election.

Danish Demonstration

With this last meeting Niels Helveg Petersen demonstrated that an opposition politician is also a member of polite society. This was a Danish signal to the Bosnian parliament, where the government party, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], has conducted a very crude smear campaign against Silajdzic and his attempts to democratize the political system.

Late yesterday Helveg Petersen traveled overland to Tuzla, where he will today meet Danish soldiers before leaving for home in the afternoon. If the unstable Bosnian weather allows.

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B-H: Ganic Says OSCE Looking Into Refugee Voting

AU3001165296 Paris AFP in English 1550 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 30 (AFP) — The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on Tuesday held a round of meetings with Bosnian Government and Serb officials to plan post-war elections for the country. [passage omitted]

The OSCE officials had met earlier with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and the vice president of the Moslem-Croat Federation [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation], Ejup Ganic, who said the officials had discussed the "creation of the opportunity for political parties to act freely, to do campaigns as the preconditions for free elections."

Ganic added that they also discussed the likelihood that many refugees and displaced persons might be unable to cast ballots in their home areas. "So we also envisaged that they might vote somewhere else, but this is to be organized."

OSCE Chairman Flavio Cotti and Hungarian and Danish Foreign Ministers Laszlo Kovacs and Niels Helveg-Petersen participated in the talks.

Under the Dayton peace accords, a provisional electoral commission must set rules for the preparation and holding of election campaigns as well as the elections themselves, which must be held within between six and nine months of the signing of the peace accord.

B-H: Serb Opposition Party Leader Views Elections

AU0102124396 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Milorad Dodig, head of the Caucus of Independent Deputies in the Assembly of the "Serb Republic," by Goran Rosic; place and date not give: "New Census for Elections in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Elections in Bosnia, which should be called by the middle of June, will be held under the international community's strict control. We spoke about election rules, members of the Electoral Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the media reporting during the preelection campaign with Milorad Dodig, head of the Caucus of Independent Deputies in the Assembly of the Serb Republic [RS], and, by since end of last week, leader of a new political party in the RS, the Independent Social-Democrats of the RS.

[Rosic] You took part recently in a conference in Stockholm devoted to the elections in Bosnia.

[Dodig] In order to assess all the conditions for the elections in Bosnia, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the Swedish Government, that is, the Swedish Foreign Ministry, had organized the conference that was devoted exclusively to the upcoming elections. The conference was also attended by the representatives of the OSCE, the United Nations, the Muslim-Croat federation, and the RS. Apart from us from the Caucus of Independent Deputies of the RS, the conference was also attended by Radomir Lukic, deputy foreign minister, and Gaso Mijanovic, head of the Constitutional Court.

The conference concluded, among other things, to set up by the end of January a commission for elections, which, on the basis of to the debate held in Stockholm, will present to the public the election rules by 15 February at the latest. The official name of the commission will be: The Commission for Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Rosic] Who will the commission consist of?

[Dodig] Experts from the OSCE, the United Nations, and a number of people from the RS and the Muslim-Croat federation, who will be elected according to their own criteria.

The elections are expected to be called by 15 June. The Commission for Elections will assess whether the necessary conditions for the elections exist 30 days before the elections. What is certain, however, is that, if the conditions do not exist at that time, the elections will be held by 15 September this year at the latest.

Elections will also be held for the RS Presidency, RS Assembly, and the delegation for the joint Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Elections will also be held for the Assembly of the Muslim-Croat federation and the state leadership, that is, the Parliament and Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There will also be municipal elections, but, according to the information that was heard at the conference in Stockholm, the organization of these will be given to the entities.

[Rosic] There are rumors that the rules that the Commission for Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to set will be very strict.

[Dodig] The election rules will most certainly ban the promotion of hatred, lies.... It is also envisaged that, if a party exceeds a certain limit with its behavior, that is, if it insults and lies excessively, the party will be disqualified. So, the Commission for Elections will have the right to exclude such a party from the race. Everything that is in line with the norms of election campaigning in the West will be accepted. Any campaigning that does not fall in line with that will not be permitted. [passage omitted]

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[Rosic] The representatives of the Muslim-Croat federation also took part in the Stockholm conference.

[Dodig] The conference was attended by government representatives led by Minister Sacirbegovic. They were by far the most numerous delegation. There were 24 of them and four of us. This was perhaps a mistake of the organizers, or this was perhaps the result of the Muslim-Croat government's insistence on the size of the delegation. The representatives of their opposition parties were also there, the Liberals, Durakovic's former communists, and Selim Beslagic's Bosnian Social Democrats.

The conference indeed showed that relations between the Muslims and the Croats are irreparably bad and that there will be many difficulties in their integration. I concluded this from my talks with them.

[Rosic] Did the Muslims and the Croats have different views on the rules for the elections?

[Dodig] Yes. The Muslims insisted that the three members of the Presidency of Bosnia be elected from the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croats did not agree with the Muslim proposal. The Dayton Agreement stipulates that the three members of the Presidency must be elected by the entities.

[Rosic] Did you have any private contacts with the Muslim representatives at the conference?

[Dodig] I had much polemics with them. Objectively speaking, the Muslims are the ones who have lost most in this war. I told them on that occasion that they had chosen the wrong ally at the very beginning of the war! The polemics was more or less about that issue.

I also noticed that there are significant rifts among the Muslims themselves. There are a number of problems in Durakovic's party. One wing is for Durakovic, the other is for Zlatko Lagumdzija. I did not find out what the essence of their difference is. There is also visible competition between Durakovic's former communists and the Social Democrats led by Beslagic from Tuzla. The Liberals' Rasim Kadic is thought to be collaborating with the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] because his party has become the youth organization of the SDA.

[Rosic] At the end of last week, you founded a party, the Independent Social Democrats of the RS.

[Dodig] I was elected president at the session of the party's Initiative Committee. Andjelko Grahovac from Banja Luka is vice president. So is Momcilo Micic, who is member of the Caucus of Independent Deputies in the RS Assembly. We will have five vice presidents.

The party, objectively speaking, has evolved from work of the Caucus of Independent Deputies. Our activities are primarily directed toward preserving peace, and we will try to preserve peace in every possible way, but without endangering the vital interest of our people.

[Rosic] What parties will be involved in the main political battle at the elections in the RS?

[Dodig] I think that the biggest political battle at the election in the RS will be fought between, tentatively speaking, two blocs: the right-wing bloc, which is made up of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Radicals, and the left-wing bloc, which will rally around the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] of the RS, us, the Independent Social Democrats, and some other parties with a leftist orientation.

I hope that in the days ahead we will meet these parties of leftist provenance to discuss the elements of joint action. I think that it would be realistic, regarding the candidate for the president of the Union and the president of the RS, that we coordinate our work and come up with a single candidate, but to go to the parliamentary elections separately.

[Rosic] Will any of the parties in the RS win an absolute majority?

[Dodig] Our estimate is that no one will get an absolute majority. What we are now aiming for is to secure the support of about 25 percent of the electorate. This would, in a way, be our election goal.

[Rosic] Do you expect the support of any parties from Serbia?

[Dodig] I expect the support of all the forces that strive for the preservation of peace. Our priority interest is the RS, that is, political activities in the RS. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 9]

Special Voting Places for Refugees

The ballots for the elections will be printed by the Commission for Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ballots will be numbered to avoid any kind of misuse. The same commission will name electoral committees. It has not been decided yet who will carry out a census in Bosnia, but is almost certain that it will be under the control of the above mentioned commission, Dodig said. For instance, a Serb from Zenica who now lives in Bijeljina will vote in Bijeljina. His ballot will then be taken out of the ballot box and sent to Zenica. In Germany, where there is a large number of refugees from Bosnia, special voting places will be opened during the elections. A similar thing should happen in other towns with a large number of refugees. The refugees

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who live in smaller places and in the countryside will receives their ballots through the post.

B-H: Silajdzic Resignation 'Commitment to Democracy'

BR3101140996 Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jan 96 p 4

[Interview with former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Remy Ourdan; place and date not given: "My Decision is a Commitment to Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ourdan] Why did you refuse to form the new government?

[Silajdzic] Because a law has been adopted in an anti-democratic way. At a session of parliament, there were two proposals for the formation of the government, the number of ministers, etc. The Bosnian proposal, which was also mine, was for a strong central government, whilst the Croatian proposal was for a weaker central government. My proposal got a majority support. At that stage, some members of parliament called a break, put pressure on their colleagues, and changed certain procedures. The majority was muzzled by a few persons, which in my view symbolizes the tendencies toward non-democracy.

Some tendencies are resurfacing which remind me of earlier days. During the war, when we took decisions without consultation, this was understandable. But not in peacetime. We are in an extremely sensitive period. If we authorize the manipulation of policymakers, how will we be able to establish democracy here? My decision is not an evasion of my responsibilities but a commitment to democracy.

[Ourdan] Did President Izetbegovic support the members of parliament who brought your government down?

[Silajdzic] I do not know. The president is at the center of power. I do not know if he has anything to do with this parliamentary vote. On that day I called him because I knew what was going to happen. He replied that he feared the same thing. Within the two parties, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina], there were people who wanted to get rid of me.

[Ourdan] You had already considered resigning in July, but you decided not to under pressure. What is the difference today?

[Silajdzic] The war is over... This time I told my friends that it was finished. They understood. During the war, it was important that quarrels remain internal, and I did not talk about them. Right now, it has become clear that a handful of people believe that they can lead the dance, as if Bosnia-Herzegovina were a private territory.

[Ourdan] Who are the owners?

[Silajdzic] Those who are able to muzzle 50 or so members of parliament, those who have silenced them using the visceral fear that prevailed during the Communist period. The fear which is in their bones, fear of those in power, fear of authority... I will not allow people to play with that fear. There are totalitarian tendencies here.

[Ourdan] What is the Army's position in this political battle?

[Silajdzic] Last summer there was a secret letter against me, written by an intelligence officer from the former Yugoslav Army and intended to be read in the barracks. This is a communist method. Certain officers refused to read it. The idea is to transform the Army into a political instrument, whereas, in my view, it ought to remain outside politics.

[Ourdan] Are you now in opposition?

[Silajdzic] In a certain way I have been a member of the opposition, a dissident, for a long time. One has to be a dissident, different, if it is for a just cause. In this country there will always be someone who is ready to say: "Stop, Bosnia does not belong to you."

[Ourdan] Elections are scheduled next summer. Are you going to join an opposition party, set up your own party, or retire?

[Silajdzic] I am going to think about this... I have received a lot of requests to set up my own party, particularly from SDA members or former members. I am not interested in the SDA or in any other party, I am interested in democracy. But how can you hold elections when the prime minister does not have access to state television? And then the opposition parties are undoubtedly not ready for the next elections. They need to affirm themselves.

[Ourdan] Are you satisfied with the future which the Dayton Accord traces out?

[Silajdzic] I approved the signing of the peace plan. The Dayton Accord stopped the war and I believe that the just cause will win much more quickly with peace than it would have with the war. We must give peace a chance, give normal people a chance."

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B-H: SDA Elects New Members of Executive Committee

AU0102083596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "New Members of the SDA Executive Committee"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new members of the Executive Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] are: Tarik Arapcic, a doctor from Lukavica; Nedzad Brankovic, director general of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Railroad Organization; Ahmed Hadzijamakovic, director of Bosnia-Herzegovina Television; Azra Idrizbegovic, a doctor from Bugojno; Dzemaludin Latic, editor in chief of LJILJAN; Fatima Leho, director of the Privredna Banka [Commercial Bank]; Brigadier General Sahib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Hilmo Neimarlija, professor at the College of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo; and Enver Kreso, head of the SDA deputy caucus, who has been elected on the basis of his post.

Also elected to the Executive Committee on the basis of their posts were Teufik Velagic, representative of the association of the SDA branches in Europe, and a representative of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, who is yet to be named.

There were 12 candidates on the list. The following were not elected: Asim Egolic, head of Kljuc Municipality; Nihad Imamovic, head of the Executive Committee of the Sarajevo district of Stari Grad; Sead Residbegovic, a businessman from Gracanica; and Vedad Spahic, editor in chief of ZMAJ OD BOSNE.

B-H: Article Calls For SDA To Change Course

AU0102120096 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 95 pp 2, 29

[Article by Dzemaludin Latic: "What Can the Party of Democratic Action Do?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] is the strongest Bosniak and Bosnian political party, and developments in and around this party will certainly have a considerable influence on the situation of the Bosniak nation in the near future. That party has de facto not had the time to show what it can do in peacetime; the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina came before it had managed to assume that part of power that, by the election results, was its due. The SDA is really the only Bosnian party that militarily defended Bosnia in an organized way. Before that, it had politically organized the Bosniak people, won the elections, and carried out the census, the opinion poll on language, nationality and religion, and then the referendum, on the basis of which the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was internationally recognized. Such immense political and military actions could not have been carried out without both exceptional successes and — failures, but the former have certainly been more than the latter. The latter have more or less been conditioned by the cadre policy, although not only that.

Now the SDA is really at a crossroads; it must capitalize on its results, come out with a new program and new cadre, and get rid of the weaknesses that have accompanied it. It is now confronted with the biggest and the most delicate rift as a result of Haris Silajdzic's latest moves and his leaving the party. (True, it is not known whether Silajdzic has formally left the SDA, but things are as they are.) The SDA must expect success at the elections, not on its own account but much more on account of the people, over which there still hangs a catastrophic shadow, and which have had to pay a high price for every rift up to now. I am thinking of the rift involving Adil Zulfikarpasic, who, accusing the SDA of distributing weapons and of Islamic fundamentalism, almost managed to prevent multiparty elections and have the party's leaders put behind prison bars once more. The rift involving Fikret Abdic was, unfortunately, revealed too late and claimed enormous Bosniak victims.

With Silajdzic's Departure Some Others Should Leave As Well

In order to prevent the rift caused precisely by Silajdzic from having unpleasant consequences, the SDA, in my opinion, needs to do the following: Along with Silajdzic's departure, the party should remove from office all officials behind whom there are political and moral failures. There are such people in the current Executive Committee, but also in the posts of ministers, mayors, presidents of SDA municipal boards, presidents of various commissions, and so on. Up to now the SDA has not set a "sharper tone" politically, the people perceive it as well-meaning, but not as a strong party with enough self-respect. (In one wall slogan in Sarajevo, the SDA was called "pitari" [slang term, "pisspots"] — obviously a sign of revulsion at its endless yielding, goodness, bewilderment....) People want to follow the strong and the proud, those who know what they want and who know how and with whom they will get it. If the SDA eliminated from the Executive Committee all those who by their failures helped Silajdzic's success, if it fought nepotism and corruption in the hard postwar times, with new prime ministers who would really do the job, solve social issues successfully

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and not build their careers by distancing themselves from the Islamic identity of the Bosniak people — then the chances of Silajdzic's departure having serious consequences would be minimal; the SDA would prove to be a strong party that has able people whose political platform is broad and democratic, a party that has enough self-confidence and self-respect and knows what it wants. The SDA's final fight against such members and against weaknesses, particularly corruption, at this very time, would bring the party so much support from the people that nobody could oppose it at the elections. No one is indispensable; confidence is gained on the basis of criteria and of results!

SDA Should Choose a New Course and a New Name

Mr. Silajdzic should not be proclaimed a national enemy and a victim of "one-party totalitarianism" but instead — even without his case — one should think of the future course. For example, if up to now the SDA, according to its program, has been a Bosnian and a Muslim party, and if the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the distant prospect, cannot be achieved only with the Bosniaks, why should a new, clear political course not be offered, in which the SDA, which is the basic central force of Bosnia, gathers all Bosnian patriotic forces? Why would the SDA not attract those distinguished Bosnian Croats and Serbs, and their political parties, who at conferences, promotions, and the like, do not wish to come to a desk unless there is a Bosnian flag on it? Would such a course hurt the Bosniak people who have suffered so much from their neighbors? I do not think so. These people possess more political instinct than rational political calculation, an instinct that recognizes friends and interests, and that instinct, in my opinion, would approve of such a course.

For that purpose, the SDA should change its name. For example, if it accepts such a course, it could be called the Bosnian People's Organization. And if forecasts showed that such a course, with regard to the strong Serb and Croat national homogenization, would lead to electoral collapse, then the SDA should change its name again and be called, for example, Muslim People's Organization (that is the name of the first political organization of this people this century), or the Bosniak Muslim Organization or the Bosniak People's Party, or something similar. The present name, SDA, was the product of that time when we had to hesitate, and yet there was no time to wait and to be late in political organizing. (So that on the eve of the elections the posters suddenly read, below the name SDA written in big letters: Muslim Party.) Now there is no reason for such hesitation.

SDA Should Go Out Into Parliamentary Europe

The biggest barrier for the SDA is in the imposed image of a religious party that propagates Islamic fundamentalism (with the meaning this notion has in the West.) The SDA must work to present itself to the domestic, and particularly to the foreign public as a democratic party that is equally recognized in Europe and in the Islamic world. For example, the SDA should associate itself with left center political parties in the Croat, Serb, and Slovene nations (which are less prejudiced towards Muslims than the right-leaning parties in these nations), and in western European countries those connections would probably be with parties of the moderate right, particularly Christian democrats. In any case, the SDA must go out into parliamentary Europe and thus counter the prejudice about its profile and its objectives.

But the biggest domestic barrier is contained in the cultural model of the future Bosnian society. There is no doubt that Haris Silajdzic will found his own party, or that he will stand at the head of the opposition left block, and that, expressing his commitment to a civic society, to the European cultural model, to Bosnia as a bridge between West and East, to pacifism, to privatization and the like, he will win a considerable percentage of Bosniak votes. Unfortunately, the spiritual crisis of the Bosniak people is so big, and their awareness of tradition and of the importance of tradition for survival and development is so small — equally small as their real knowledge about the West and its culture — that the declarative cry for modernness, which is in fact nothing but cultural provincialism, will lead Bosniaks to Haris Silajdzic, the master of make-believe and of a well calculated image. Most of the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the urban population are on the side of that model of society, and, of course, of Haris. The SDA might regret that, instead of criticizing LJILJAN, it did not direct its energy to initiating media that would not be lead by European spiritual provincialists, but instead, would be committed to that model of the future society of Bosnia- Herzegovina that would be open in the sense that it would consist of traditional Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish societies, and would not reject anything that in the sphere of technology and education improves the standard of living and the cultural exchange. Such a Bosnia, I am sure, is more relevant to a huge majority of its citizens than the "European" model that originated from people's illusions about progress, and will have no success here. The model that Silajdzic and the left block advocate is a bare copy, an expression of fashion and snobbishness, and it could attract a small percentage of Yugo-nostalgics, neocommunists, and snobs.

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B-H: IFOR, ICRC Officials on Arms Withdrawal, POW's

AU3001150996 Paris AFP in English 1447 GMT 30 Jan 96

[By Michael Adler]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 30 (AFP) — Bosnia's former warring armies began withdrawing heavy weapons from designated areas on Tuesday, a process that must be completed this weekend, NATO officers said.

Faction armies are to withdraw from areas slated for handover by one rival faction to another by midnight Saturday, a key deadline in the Dayton peace accord which ended Bosnia's nearly four-year war. Civilians can move up to 45 days later.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pernod of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said Bosnian Serbs moved two tanks — a T-55 and an M-84 — Tuesday at 8:00 a.m. through Sarajevo, the city they had besieged throughout the war.

Two more tanks will be moved Tuesday, and by Wednesday the Serbs will have evacuated eight or nine tanks, the French officer told reporters in Pale, 15 kilometres (nine miles) east of Sarajevo.

Bosnian government forces are to take five artillery guns off of Mount Igman, overlooking Sarajevo, as these are too close to already evacuated confrontation lines, Pernod said.

IFOR spokesman Major Mark Van Dyke said in Pale that all IFOR divisions "were reporting equipment being out of areas of transfer" by the factions, such as in the central region of Mrkonjic Grad.

"We don't expect any problems in areas of transfer," said Van Dyke, an American.

Since the 30-nation IFOR began its deployment on December 20, the military side of the peace accord has proceeded smoothly, except for isolated incidents.

The civilian side has not. The major sticking point so far is the three factions' failure to release all prisoners of war, despite a January 19 deadline set under the accord, calculated as 30 days after IFOR's deployment.

The new deadline Saturday, known as D plus 45, has spawned an additional problem because many Serbs are fleeing or planning to flee areas of Sarajevo that are to be transferred to the control of the mainly Moslem Bosnian government.

These Serbs are either afraid of living without their army's protection or have been told they must leave, humanitarian officials said, noting that some Serb neighborhoods had seen a quarter of their populations leave since December.

The most sensitive areas will be the Sarajevo neighborhoods of Grbavica and Ilidza, and the nearby towns of Ilijas and Vogosca. In central Bosnia, Croats are to return the towns of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo to Serb control.

The deadline will coincide with a first visit to Bosnia by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, amid continued U.S. pressure on all parties to comply with the letter of the Dayton accord or be shut out of reconstruction aid.

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said in Washington overnight that "If they (prisoners) haven't been released by Friday... it's going to be very difficult for the United States to engage in equipping and training the Bosnian military down the road in the next couple of months."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) spokesman Pierre Gauthier, speaking in Pale on Tuesday, said a total of 30 POWs were still being held by the three factions, excluding prisoners suspected of war crimes and held in accordance with the Dayton accord.

He said the Serbs were holding 20, the mainly Moslem Bosnian government six and the Croats four.

Gauthier said Washington's hard line of full release was "a very good sign" because "even if there is only one prisoner, compliance will not be there."

Bosnian Serb "premier" Rajko Kasagic accused the Moslems and Croats of failing to release all Serbs in their jails, as the Bosnians renewed demands for information on thousands of Moslems missing from their former enclaves in eastern Bosnia.

Kasagic warned that the Serbs would "link our participation in discussions to implement the Dayton accords with the fulfilment by the other parties of their obligations," the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA reported Monday.

The ICRC has said its work will continue even after full Dayton compliance and is demanding access to 110 unregistered Serb prisoners thought to be held in a government prison in Tuzla.

Angry Bosnian refugees in that northeastern town protested for a second day Tuesday against the ICRC, which they blame for the lack of information about the fate of thousands of civilians missing since Serb forces overran the eastern enclave of Srebrenica last July.

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Meanwhile, four Bosnian youths were wounded Tuesday by a live grenade they found in Sarajevo's western neighborhood of Dobrinja while an elderly man was wounded when he stepped on a mine in the northern area of Jagomir.

B-H: Croats Hold 50 POW's Near Mostar for War Crimes

LD3101190296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Americans said yesterday that they were not fully satisfied with the way in which the deadlines for the implementation of individual obligations arising out of the Dayton Agreement have been honored. They are dissatisfied most by the fact that the exchange of POW's has not been completed. The State Department has mentioned the Croat side in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ankica Posavljak has a report on the reactions in the wake of this statement.

[Posavljak] We asked Berislav Pusic, head of the office for the exchange of POWs of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, for his reactions to a statement by Nicholas Burns, the State Department spokesman, in which Burns said that neither the Croat nor the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina has respected the agreement on the exchange of POW's. He told us:

[Begin Pusic recording] At this juncture I can only say the following: The Croat side, when it began to work in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, is the only side which supplied proper lists of all POW's. It submitted a list of 212 POW's it said were being held in prison. It said it would release 162 of these POW's, but that it would continue to detain 50 POW's because they had committed war crimes. But the Croat side also said that these 50 POW's could be exchanged, because none of the adversaries has the right to pronounce any POW a war criminal — only The Hague court can do this. If we have 100 percent foolproof documentary evidence that someone really committed war crimes, we can hand them over to the Hague Court, and the court would then take over custody of that person.

The Croat side is currently holding 50 POW's who are in the Heliodrom prison [near Mostar]. They committed war crimes. Up until now the Red Cross spokesman and IFOR [Implementation Force] have, on several occasions, told the foreign media that only the Croat side has been respecting the Dayton Agreement. I do not know where the State Department spokesman got the idea that the Croat side has failed to respect it. This is not true. This is political pressure. We will not agree with this. We will send a letter protesting against Burns' statement, but I believe that there has been a mistake and that they were given misinformation and there was misinformation in the media, and we will request a public apology from them. [end recording]

B-H: UN's Rehn Views Investigation of Mass Graves

AU0102105596 Hamburg STERN in German 1 Feb 96 p 106

[Interview with Elisabeth Rehn, UN human rights rapporteur for ex-Yugoslavia, by Tilman Mueller; place and date not given: "We Must Guard The Graves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mueller] When you took office, you demanded that the fate of thousands of people missing in Bosnia must be clarified as quickly as possible. What has happened since then?

[Rehn] We now have access to the graves. But, because the ground is frozen, it has not been possible to begin the investigations yet. An enormous amount of work is in store for us. Above all, we need pathologists, who will work under the auspices of the Hague Tribunal.

[Mueller] U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR [Implementation Force] commander, speaks of between 200 and 300 mass graves. Is that an exaggeration?

[Rehn] By no means. We are still in for some nasty surprises. Right now, people are talking a lot about the atrocities in Srebrenica and forgetting those in many other locations. Recently, I received information about three mass graves near Vukovar that were dug after the Serb takeover in 1991. Between Banja Luka and Mostar, I have seen many normal cemeteries with fresh mounds of earth, some of them over 20 square meters in size. For me, these, too, are mass graves. Obviously they contain the bodies of people whose identities and circumstances of death no one knows.

[Mueller] Who is going to do the digging? Will it be IFOR troops, or inspectors from The Hague Tribunal?

[Rehn] First, the destruction of the evidence must stop. We need guards.

[Mueller] Have they been deployed yet?

[Rehn] No. One day, IFOR decides to guard the locations of graves, but, the very next day, the military people say they do not have enough people for this. This task should be assumed by a 1,700-strong international police force.

[Mueller] So far, the Bosnian Serbs have refused to offer assistance to The Hague investigators. Can you move around Bosnian Serb territory freely?

[Rehn] No one has hindered me and my 11 employees yet. We even have a bureau in Banja Luka now.

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[Mueller] The program of your visit to Srebrenica includes a meeting with Serb General Ratko Mladic.

[Rehn] No longer. First, I thought I would meet the devil himself if that would serve the cause of human rights. But now I am sure it is better to ignore indicted leaders like Mladic and Karadzic. However, one is not going to get the truth out of them yet. I expect that information to be provided by local leaders or people who experienced the torment themselves.

[Mueller] Have you also encountered cases where Serb civilians were the victims of Muslims or Croats?

[Rehn] Gruesome things occurred when the Croats overran Krajina in summer 1995. Months later, nine old people were found in one village with their throats slit open. That is just one of many examples. It would not surprise me if graves were discovered for which the Muslims or Croats are responsible.

[Muller] Your predecessor, Polish ex-Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, resigned in disgust following the Srebrenica affair. What are you going to do to prevent yourself from doing the same thing?

[Rehn] It must be made clear to the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims that they will only receive funds for reconstruction from the international community if they support the Hague Tribunal and the human rights campaign.

B-H: Silajdzic Attacks Assembly Over Srebrenica, Zepa

AU3101202496 Paris AFP in English 1851 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 31 (AFP) — Former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic slammed his former colleagues for indifference over the fate of thousands of civilians in eastern enclaves overrun by Serb forces, the independent weekly SLOBODNA BOSNA said.

In an interview, Silajdzic said he had offered his resignation in August because the Bosnian parliament then in session did not even have the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves on its agenda.

Silajdzic's statement comes ahead of Sunday's visit by Elisabeth Rehn, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, to the Srebrenica area to investigate reports of mass graves in the area.

Srebrenica fell to rebel Bosnian Serbs on July 11 and Zepa, another Moslem enclave, some ten days later.

The fall sparked a mass exodus of thosands of inhabitants, many ending up on an airport runway near the northeastern town of Tuzla after their ordeal.

Silajdzic said he had spent some time with the refugees at the airport before the parliament session in the central town of Zenica, and "experienced one of the most difficult moments in my life."

"Then I went to the parliament and was astonished to find out that Srebrenica and Zepa were not even on the agenda", Silajdzic said.

"I could not recover from such an indiference and I offered my resignation," Silajdzic went on.

An estimated 3,000 men of draft age have not been accounted for since the Serbs took the Srebrenica area.

Srebrenica refugees this week ransacked the Tuzla offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to protest the international community's failure to discover the fate of the missing men.

Silajdzic quit almost two weeks ago after falling out with his Moslem-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA).

It agreed with its Croat allies in the Croatian Democratic Community to weaken the central government of the Bosnian Republic, and strengthen powers of the Croat-Moslem federation and Serb Republic entities set up under the U.S.-brokered Dayton peace accord for Bosnia.

The central government will be responsible for virtually foreign policy only, the two entities in charge of most other important government portfolios.

B-H: Krajisnik: Search for Missing To Last 'Years'

AU3101215996 Paris AFP in English 2144 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 31 (AFP) — The search for people reported missing in the Bosnian war will probably take years, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, said Wednesday [31 January].

Speaking after meeting Manfred Novak, an international human rights expert, in the Serb stronghold of Pale, Kajisnik told Serb television he had proposed that a mixed commission of international experts and representatives of the former warring factions do the job.

"The process of searching for the missing will probably last for several years and we will be lucky to get information on anybody", Krajisnik said.

Novak said the Serb side accepted his proposal that a multilateral commission be established "where also the governments of the republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be involved."

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The search for missing from the Bosnian conflict is the next step in implementing the Dayton peace accord after the former warring factions released all prisoners registered by the International Committee of the Red Cross over the weekend.

But all three sides accuse one another of hiding more prisoners or destroying evidence on alleged mass graves.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted Krajisnik as saying after the talks with Novak that the Serbs are willing to grant international organizations access to areas said to hold mass graves.

The Bosnian Serb side claims their soldiers captured by the Bosnian Croats have been transferred to prisons in Croatia, which under the Dayton accord is not obliged to release the prisoners from the Bosnian conflict.

The Bosnian Government side is adamant about tracing thousands of people missing since the Serbs seized the former Moslem enclave of Srebrenica in July, as well as thousands of other Moslems from eastern Bosnia believed to be in detention in the rump Yugoslavia.

B-H: Karadzic Denies War Crimes Any Part of Policy

AU3101092296 Paris AFP in English 0056 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 31 (AFP) — Any war crimes committed by Serb forces during the Bosnian war were individual acts and not "a part of policy," Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said Tuesday.

Speaking to WTN television, Karadzic, who is under international indictment as a war criminal, said, "If there have been any atrocities they have not been committed as a part of policy but as a part of civil war, as a part of civilian fighting or revenge in connection with the second world war."

Serbs still bitterly remember Nazi and Croatian massacres from World War II when they fought as partisans against both Nazi Germany and its Croatian vassal state.

A somber-looking Karadzic, who meets the press much less frequently since the Bosnian war ended in December, spoke from his heavily guarded compound in Pale, 15 kilometres (nine miles) east of Sarajevo.

Sitting at a desk with two crosses and an icon on a shelf behind him, he described himself as very religious, a patriot and a family man. A videotape of the interview was made available to AFP.

Karadzic has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that sits in the Hague. NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) troops enforcing peace in Bosnia have orders to arrest him if they run across him.

IFOR officers refuse to meet him. His compound is only a few kilometres (miles) from the hilltop Hotel Panorama where he used to have his offices and where IFOR brass now hold regular press briefings.

Karadzic said his Serb government was "cooperating and we will cooperate" with the tribunal's investigations.

"Because, as a matter of fact, in (the eastern Moslem enclave of) Srebrenica ... more than 50 mass graves (were discovered) with Serb bodies in 1993," he told WTN.

The tribunal charges that there are mass graves in the Srebrencia region full of thousands of Moslems massacred by Serb troops who seized the enclave in July 1995, driving out the population. Karadzic's military commander Ratko Mladic was photographed at the time of the attack in Srebrenica reassuring refugees they would not be hurt.

According to reports, Serb troops disguised as UN soldiers then tricked Moslems into coming to them.

"I am perfectly sure that my police and my army did not commit any war crimes," Karadzic said.

"But if some individuals have committed some atrocities, we are ready fully to cooperate and we are already cooperating and we will try any allegations about war crimes in our national judiciary," he added.

Karadzic said neither he nor his people would allow IFOR troops to arrest him. He did not make any direct threats, as he has in the past, but said the "Serbian people are very proud and would not watch it peacefully, calmly."

He said he was "an elected president and I am backed by my people, my army."

He said anyone, even himself, would be questioned by Bosnian Serb courts if they were guilty of war crimes.

Karadzic claimed, as he has often in the past, that Serbs did not start the Bosnian war that began in April 1992 and ended with the signing in Paris last December 14 of the Dayton peace accord.

He said there had to be an end to "anti-Serb hysteria" as the Serbs had merely fought to keep from being dominated. In Bosnia before the war, about 40 percent of the republic's population was Moslem to some 25 percent for the Serbs.

"I will tell you that the Allies during the Second World War have made more destruction than Hitler but they

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haven't been tried. Hitler has been tried because he was responsible for the start of the war," Karadzic said.

The Dayton accord has divided Bosnia into Serb and Moslem-Croat entities in a federal Bosnian republic.

Karadzic said he wanted the Moslem-Croat federation to succeed because "we don't want them to fight again" as this would ruin the peace.

But he said the Moslems and Croats, allies who still fought each other in central and southern Bosnia, had been forced into their federation by the United States and that "anything that is created under pressure may fall apart."

B-H: Karadzic Announces Plans for Building Serb Towns

AU3101120596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Konjic Sprouting Near Visegrad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, has stated that "first of all, the strategic interest of the state and political leadership of the Serb Republic is to develop and rebuild all the lost places and municipalities wherever possible."

In an interview for the latest issue of Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI, he said that this geostrategic and geopolitical interest certainly implies the development of a new Serb Sarajevo simply because "at all costs one cannot allow the east part of the Serb Republic to be left without a significant concentration of people and without a strong economic and cultural-educational center."

Otherwise, he said, "children and young people from that area would look for education and work in Podgorica or Belgrade and not, say, in Banja Luka, the economic and university center of the Serb Republic."

Karadzic presented a map for rebuilding the lost places and municipalities, according to which, in addition to a new Serb Sarajevo, there are plans to build Srpski Kljuc, between Donji and Gornji Ribik; Sanski Most, between Ostra Luka and Kozarac; Krupa na Uni, in the Jara and Hasani area; Jajce, in the Jezero area; and Srpski Konjic, which would be rebuilt near Visegrad.

He said that the location is still being sought for the building of the Serb municipality of Mostar in which there used to be 44,000 Serbs. "This town should be located somewhere on the Serb part of the sea coast, if the Serb side gets it, or near Trebinje."

[Box, p 7]

Election Hopes

The president of the Serb Republic has said that, regarding Serb Sarajevo and Sarajevo's 144,000 Serbs, the town should be built by expanding parts of Pale and Lukavica, where there are some 55,000 Serbs.

Karadzic has stated that regarding the status of Serb Sarajevo, the leadership of the Serb Republic will try to achieve that Serb control of these municipalities is retained "at least until the elections."

"If the present Sarajevo is organized through the efforts of the international community as a district of Serb, Croat, and Muslim municipalities, then there is every chance of the Serbs retaining their municipalities even after the multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, in the Union of the Serb Republic and the Federation of Muslims and Croats."

B-H: Serbs Complain IFOR Moved Borders on Maps

LD3001182596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1330 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bileca, 30 Jan (TANJUG) — In Herzegovina, IFOR [Implementation Force] has moved the borders of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and Croat-Muslim Federation set out in Dayton by 117.8 square km to the detriment of the Serbs, the command of the Herzegovina Corps announced today.

According to the Corps command, this is highly fertile agricultural land with hydroelectric power potential, communications, and strategically very important heights around Stolac and in the region of the Nevesinje municipality.

In the Trebinje municipality, the borders have been moved to the detriment of the Serbs on IFOR maps by 30 square km, in the Nevesinje region by 54, around Stolac by 28.3, and in the Ljubinje municipality by 5.5 square km.

In Popovo Polje IFOR has taken away from the Serb Republic 15 square km of land planted with fruit orchards. Experts consider the land in this region to be particularly fertile and comparable only with the Nile Valley.

In this region are the Serb villages of Cvaljina, Cavas, Rujev Do, Gornja Zijemlja, and parts of Orasje and Poplata. In the village of Do near Stolac the border has been moved so that two houses and the Orthodox cemetery remain in the Croat-Muslim federation.

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In the direction of Konjic, under the Dayton agreement, over a distance of about 15 km from Crnovic to the village of Ljubisici the border runs along the Neretva, but on IFOR maps there has been an adjustment here as well.

According to the command of the Herzegovina Corps this enables the Muslims to have unhindered use of the hydropower potential of the Neretva and opens up the possibility of the construction of a hydroelectric power station without agreement with the Serbs.

On the Hrgud hilltop above Stolac IFOR has moved the border so that the Serbs lose all strategically important locations. The same is true of the region around Zijemlje, some 25 km northwest of Nevesinje.

The borders have only been moved in the Serbs' favor in the Radimlja valley near Stolac. This, however, is a case of one and a half square km of rock and scrub without any strategic significance.

Immediately after the IFOR representatives delivered their maps with the lines of separation, the command of the Herzegovina Corps and Bishop Atanasije of Zahumlje and Herzegovina protested to the official bodies of Yugoslavia.

Complaints were also sent to the representatives of IFOR, from whom no response has yet been received.

"It is not a question of imprecision; it is a clear case of removal of territory from the Serb side and failure to observe the separation which was agreed and signed by all warring parties in Dayton. We therefore call for this injustice to be urgently rectified," the Corps command statement said.

B-H: Official Opposes Mixed Police Force in Sarajevo

LD3101000396 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the first two of the more important deadlines of the Dayton Agreement, called D+7 and D+30, the first deadline, D+45, expires in four days. [passage omitted]

Although this issue is quite clear in the Dayton agreement, in the last few days Carl Bildt's office has been trying to propagate the idea of some kind of a mixed police force, which presents a violation of the peace agreement and is completely unacceptable.

According to the Dayton agreement, as of 3 February control over the temporarily occupied parts of Sarajevo, which are part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, will be taken over by the international police force. In practice, this means the withdrawal of the Serb entity's military forces from these territories. The legal city authorities are in constant negotiations. [passage omitted]

In this segment of the Dayton Agreement's implementation, representatives of Bildt's team are offering solutions that were not agreed upon in Dayton.

[Begin Sefkija Okeric, president of the executive committee of Sarajevo, recording] We are constantly asked about certain issues that were not provided for by the Dayton Agreement and which are not regulated by the constitution of the Bosnia-Hezcegovina Federation. These issues refer to the interim period. [passage omitted] [end recording]

We do not need to mention how dangerous consequences would be of a change in the text of the Dayton Agreement. That is why the policy of the international players regarding the D-Day 90 of the interim period is surprising.

[Begin Okeric recording] They want to say that some new form of police organization should be a mixed police force, which in any case is unacceptable. The legal federal police should enter these territories on the 91st day and take over the control and functioning of the police in these parts of the city. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Tensions 'Slowly Rising' in Bihac Municipality

AU3001212796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the Dayton agreement in the Una-Sana Canton is progressing according to plan. The cooperation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and IFOR [Implementation Force] is satisfactory. All the deadlines for the withdrawal of forces and separation have been met. However, the endless games surrounding the southernmost Bihac municipality of Kulen Vakuf are continuing and threatening to escalate.

What is happening? Following the liberation and the lifting of the blockade of the Bihac region, when the members of the 5th Army Corps launched a final liberation battle for Bosanski Petrovac, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, the Croatian Army forces entered this town [words indistinct]. Since then its population currently in exile has been having problems over returning home [words indistinct]. The Croatian Army [words indistinct] deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, following two IFOR ultimatums, it withdrew on the 24 January. As it

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withdrew, the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] moved into Kulen Vakuf from central Bosnia and some from Herzegovina. The situation has deteriorated since then. This marked the great cleansing of Kulen Vakuf as everything from the houses was taken away and now half of them are uninhabitable. There has also been some settling in into the houses according to strange criteria, and so on. Understandably enough, this kind of behavior made the situation more complex and added fuel to the fire since the return of some 6,000 people has been brought into question.

We have recently tried to get some answers from several quarters, but to no avail. Why is this happening? The state border is at least 6 km from the center of Kulen Vakuf [words indistinct] In the Una-Sana Canton, that is, in the Bihac municipality, they still do not have an official view on this, except the standard reply that there should not be any problems since the situation concerning Kulen Vakuf is completely clear even by the Dayton agreement. We got no replies in the municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bihac and the HVO Headquarters, and that is not surprising when we know that all this has nothing to do with them.

While everything is moving in a vicious circle, tensions are slowly rising [words indistinct].

B-H: Army, HVO To Cooperate on Information Activities

AU3001203296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today a meeting was held in the Joint General Staff of the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation in Sarajevo between the delegations of the Department for Political Issues of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, led by deputy departmental Chief Mustafa Music, and the political department of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], led by departmental chief Brigadier Ignac Kostroman.

They analyzed previous experience in the sphere of information and reached concrete conclusions for future coordinated activities by the information services of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO in this sphere. Apart from a series of coordinated proposals and initiatives for further promotion of the positive results achieved in cooperation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO, it was assessed at the meeting that all the conclusions reached today would give a positive impetus to the overall process of implementation of the military part of the peace agreement, reports the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

B-H: Future Intelligence Service Discussed

AU0102120896 Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 95 pp 7-9

[Unattributed interview with Bakir Alispahic, resigned minister of internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and designated manager of the newly established Agency for Research and Documentation; place and date not given: "The Bosnian Mafia Does Not Exist, But There Is Organized Crime of Our Neighbors in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first man of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bakir Alispahic, is soon to exchange the hot minister's chair for the position of manager of the newly established Agency for Research and Documentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (AID). The announcement that the AID will be established has in the Bosnian public (and we assume also in the secret international diplomacy) already aroused great interest and speculation, of which the latter is primarily a product of insufficient information. A conversation with Mr. Alispahic thus fulfills our obligation toward the public as well as providing a good opportunity to hear answers from this ingenious and influential Bosnian politician to questions related to all major problems, not only those closely connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which Minister Alispahic relatively successfully mastered during this war. The coming days will show whether he has "the feeling for reality" in his new function, which was his characteristic as the chief of the Bosnian police.

[FOCUS] You have recently been appointed manager of the Agency for Research and Documentation. What is hidden behind the naive name of AID?

[Alispahic] With the establishment of the Agency for Research and Documentation, the AID, Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained an institution very similar to modern international intelligence and security systems according to its concept and organization. From the strategic point of view, the Agency for Research and Documentation was established with the aim to protect and develop factors of integration in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, the implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace treaty should be made possible through various research and documentation projects and a minimum level of the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unique state, which was signed by the parties to the conflict, protected. This is the general orientation, and in practical terms the Agency will have all the powers within the scope of internal affairs that were not defined by the recently adopted Law on Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Agency will primarily take

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over the tasks that have up to now been the responsibility of the State Security Service and, in addition, the tasks of the National Interpol Office.... Apart from that, it will also work on the documentation of war crimes and the creation of the conditions for instituting criminal proceedings against war criminals.... I would like to point out that part of the Agency's tasks will include the study of sociological, political, economic, and other phenomena in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the international community decided to create a kind of laboratory of "Realpolitik" here, in which we — if we want to survive — have to find solutions that are favorable for our people and our state.

[FOCUS] In the institutional and legal sense, is the AID a replacement for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which institution will this agency be subordinated to?

[Alispahic] Bosnia-Herzegovina has been retained as an international entity by the peace treaty, which also applies to our membership in international organizations, institutions, and associations. Let me give you an example: All Interpol members are internationally recognized states, and the AID is in that sense the legal successor to a part of the legal responsibilities of the present Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is not the substitute of the former ministry of the Republic. To be direct, the Agency's tasks are intelligence and security. Time will certainly bring new tasks and challenges to which the Agency will respond by establishing specialists' teams of experts from various fields of social and natural sciences; teams that will follow certain social phenomena and problems with scientific methods, proposing at the end of their research certain solutions to the state institutions in charge. The agency will regularly inform the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina about its work, and the lawfulness of its work and proceedings will be assessed by the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[FOCUS] When establishing the Agency, did you use the experience of foreign countries and their comparable services?

[Alispahic] We have had a Western-type organization in mind, like in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and some other big countries. This is certainly a concept that should fully satisfy the needs of the country.

[FOCUS] With the establishment of the new federal government you are leaving the position of minister of internal affairs. What positive and what negative things are you leaving as a heritage to the next minister?

Non-Viability of Federation — the Biggest Burden

[Alispahic] The new minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not have an easy task, since the ministry of the Republic has to be reorganized into the ministry of the Federation. The problem lies in the fact that our federal partner will do everything it can to make the reorganization detrimental to the federal and advantageous to the cantonal ministries of internal affairs. I am afraid that all those values we have succeeded in creating in these three and a half years of aggression will disappear in such a development. We have succeeded in raising the complete organization and efficiency of work to a satisfactory level. Taking into consideration the war circumstances, this has resulted in an exceptionally high degree of personal safety and safety of citizens' property. Apart from that, human rights and freedoms were fully protected, as can be proved by the completely preserved religious and historical monuments of the Serbs and the Croats, the undisturbed work of their political, humanitarian, and cultural institutions, and finally, the exceptionally high number of radio stations, independent televisions, newspapers....

There was no repression regarding the freedom of opinion and press, not even in those cases when lies were obvious and when the supplied information undermined the defense power of the country. In the application and implementation of regulations we decided to protect the individual, and in cases of crime we tried to protect human dignity and enable legal institutions to perform their tasks impartially and neutrally. I think this is the most valuable element the new minister of internal affairs will inherit.

On the other hand, it is certain that he will not be starting from scratch. We have succeeded in raising the technical equipment to a respectable level, beginning from the motor pool and telecommunications to computer equipment and the creation of a data base that enables the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service to fulfill international criteria in recording and collecting data about war crimes. I think that the fact that the Federation has not started functioning in the field of internal affairs during my mandate is the biggest burden, so that the first task of our new minister will be to overcome the present situation. [passage omitted]

[FOCUS] Will the present State Security Service in any form remain at the level of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Alispahic] It will not. This is foreseen neither by the Constitution nor by the Law on Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The state security is in our past.

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[FOCUS] To what extent will the AID make use of the experiences of the present State Security Service?

[Alispahic] I would like to point out that since the very beginning of the war the State Security Service has only had its old name, but even at the beginning of the war this organization completely changed the contents and the object of its work, it introduced new, more sophisticated methods and procedures thus creating conditions for becoming an independent institution, as is the AID today. With the establishment of the AID, single organizational forms have been added and many changes have been made that will, I hope, bring even better results. The establishment of the former Yugoslav Security Service [UDBA] and later on of the State Security Service was motivated and determined by the ideology of that time and not by the interests of citizens and especially the state. Therefore will the State Security Service be remembered by many people as pre-war Serbian domination, the persecution of Muslims only because they dared to think what they were.

[FOCUS] Our Interpol department will obviously have a lot of work in the near future. How many warrants of arrest for fugitives who committed war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina have already been sent to Interpol on the basis of requests filed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina? Could these people organize themselves as subversive emigres — if we want to use the communist terminology?

Interpol's 46 Warrants

[Alispahic] The term subversive emigres from the point of view of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state is relatively unclear and this is not one of our Interpol department's responsibilities, unless it starts working on terrorism and other crimes within the responsibility of that international police association. Among those who left or fled the country there will certainly be some who work against our state in various ways. When we identify them, we shall be able to speak about subversive emigres. Interpol will be an exceptionally important organizational unit within the AID. It is first of all important that warrants of arrest will be sent through it against those who have committed war crimes against humanity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, our state will, through Interpol, have the opportunity to return a part of the stolen property, to protect existing property, and to claim the damage caused in this way. Interpol, as an international police association, is especially creative in the struggle against terrorism and organized crime. Since terrorism and robbery were the motives and methods of the Serbian aggression, we can expect good cooperation between Interpol and the police of the countries in which the criminals are trying to hide. The arrests of Serbian criminals in the countries of Western Europe, especially in Germany, made to date confirm such expectations. Regarding concrete indicators, I can say that our National Interpol Office has upon an order by the International Court [for War Crimes] issued 46 warrants of arrest for persons indicted for genocide and other war crimes. Regarding crimes, we are at the moment looking for the identification and extradition to our courts of 11 persons suspected of various crimes including business crimes.

[FOCUS] Is the term "Bosnian Mafia" used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and does it really exist anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina or outside it? Is there organized crime in Bosnia?

[Alispahic] The crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not at such a level and of such an extent that it could be said that there is a "Bosnian Mafia" as the most dangerous and the best organized aspect of associations of criminals. There is organized crime among our neighbors in Bosnia, however, and the chance for profit has also been recognized by international crime bosses who deal with strategic commodities, weapons, and drugs.... These crimes are supported by the aggressor, and by some members of the international community, too, whom we cannot consider our friends. You can see what is happening now: Whole factories are being moved away in parts from the vicinity of Sarajevo. This is nothing but crime organized by the Serbian Mafia in which the Serbian regime is directly involved. Everything happens with Milosevic's and Karadzic's knowledge, and this is only a continuation of the already seen robbery of "Golf" cars in Vogosca and robberies performed in the pre-war period by the officials of the terrorist Serbian Democratic Party.

As far as the Croats are concerned, I can say that the situation is getting better. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not participate in stamping out organized crimes in the territories controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. They have succeeded in establishing law and order to some extent, but it cannot be claimed this is yet satisfactory. I hope that this process will continue, since the organized crime on the Croatian side is one of the biggest impediments to the functioning of the Federation. [passage omitted]

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B-H: December HVO Shooting of Five Mujahidin Examined

96BA0089A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 95 pp 9-11

[Interview with Muhamed Filipovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Great Britain, by Nebojsa Taraba, background supplied by Antun Masle and Gordan Nuhanovic; place and date not given: "The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina Will Expel the Mujahidin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ilija Vidovic, chief of police in Zepce, at first refused to talk about "the incident" on the Zenica-Zepce road, in which five mujahidin were killed and two policemen from his station were wounded. He referred me to the Superior Court in Vitez, where, he said, we would find the officials authorized to make statements to journalists. Later, however, after we had waited nearly two hours in front of the police station in Zepce, as we left the building, he described as we walked, in the briefest terms, the event which in recent days has been at the center of attention of the world public.

On 14 December, at about 1130 hours, there was a shoot-out on the Zenica-Zepce main highway, at the approach to Zepce; it resulted in the deaths of five people, and two policemen from the Zepce Police Department were wounded. This was the vehicle of a humanitarian organization which did not stop at the Brezovo Polje checkpoint, where all vehicles must stop. At the turn for Zepce, the vehicle was stopped by the next patrol, which demanded that the five travelers put down the long-barreled guns, which they were carrying in violation of regulations. When the travelers in the vehicle saw that our policeman was getting back up, they began to fire, wounding policeman Pakovic. Special police from the Zepce Police Department returned the fire, because the policeman was wounded in the exchange. When the conflict was over, it was found that the five persons in that vehicle had been killed, three of them still in the vehicle, and the others outside. This was an attack on the police, but it is hard to say what the motives were.

"An agreement has been signed in this area prohibiting the travel of persons without escort and advance notice when they are armed with what are called long-barreled weapons." But this is not the first time that mujahidin have tried to cross territory under our control without honoring that agreement. Recently, other mujahidin tried to pass fully armed, in a vehicle with the insignia of a humanitarian organization. That happened a few days ago, and when they were stopped, they said they were on a secret mission and therefore did not want to stop at the checkpoint.

"I repeat, they were in the vehicle of a humanitarian organization and armed to the teeth. Their weapons were confiscated on that occasion," Vidovic said.

Chief Vidovic said about the vehicle containing the five mujahidin only that it had Sarajevo license plates, but he did not want to tell us the license plate number or allow us access to the vehicle. He added that they were investigating who the actual owner of the vehicle was.

Dr. Drazenka Rados, director of the hospital in Zepce, gave us confirmation that the bodies of those killed had been in the morgue for a short time, and that personnel of the Zepce Hospital had provided assistance to two policemen. Policeman Ivica Talajic was slightly wounded in the neck region, and policeman Stipo Pavkovic received a light wound in the head region. Both were released for care at home. No autopsy was done on the five who were killed, and their bodies were forwarded to Zenica.

Our attempts to talk to the wounded policemen were not successful, because Ivica Talajic had left Zepce for family reasons, and Stipo Pavkovic said he could not make any statements without the consent of the chief of police, and the chief was not willing to give his consent.

Silence About the Conflict

People are reluctant to talk about the skirmish on the main highway that connects the territory under control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. One elderly man from Zepce, under the condition that he remain anonymous, explained why:

"This is a very busy road on which both sides depend. Zepce is between two areas under control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and every contact with Herzeg-Bosna must go through the Zenica area, which is controlled by our federal partner. So, Zepce depends on good relations with the other side. But that is not a one-sided relationship, and the other side depends on us, because the connection between Zenica and Tuzla can be maintained only through Zepce. Accordingly, the two sides depend upon one another, and it is in everyone's interest not to allow a spark like the skirmish referred to to become a fire, and thus close the road to traffic. To tell the truth, at the time of the conflict with the Muslims, Zepce was being supplied across Serbian territory, but that is in the past."

How has the skirmish, in which five mujahidin were killed, affected traffic on this highway? Ilija Vidovic, chief of police, says that since the conflict not a single mujahidin team has tried to pass the checkpoint, but traffic has passed freely in keeping with the agreements reached to date.

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False Registration?

The fact that the five mujahidin (Abu Hamam, Abu Abdel, Mohamed Abdul, Abu Sehid, and Djebari Serif) were killed in a Toyota Land Cruiser all-terrain vehicle with the license plate number SA2142 AA puts this incident in a different light. That is, the registration states that this off-road vehicle registered in Sarajevo is owned by the humanitarian organization *Menschen helfen Menschen—Kriegsopferhilfe* [People Helping People—Aid to Victims of War], whose headquarters is in the small German town of Bad Zalzuflen.

We tried to check the information about the ownership of the vehicle, in which the mujahidin from Sarajevo were traveling toward central Bosnia, with the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Zagreb. The embassy sent us a written reply that so far the humanitarian organization *Menschen helfen Menschen* has not contacted the German Embassy in Zagreb.

Nor were we able to obtain any details at all in the Zagreb office for coordinating German humanitarian aid.

The atmosphere of mystery which has enveloped this German humanitarian organization jogged us to contact their headquarters in the northwestern German town of Bad Zalzuflen directly. In a telephone conversation with one Galib Hadzijusufic, that organization's secretary, a displaced person from Bosanska Gradiska, we learned that, so far, the association *Menschen helfen Menschen* has sent humanitarian packages to Bosnia-Herzegovina at least 15 times, especially to Tuzla, Zenica, and Zivinice. In answer to our question of how it happened that mujahidin from Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria were cruising through Bosnia in a vehicle owned by their organization, Galib Hadzijusufic told us that, as far as he knew, no automobile owned by their association was registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the entire motor pool had German license plates.

In a second telephone conversation with Allan Jetkowski, director of the humanitarian organization *Menschen helfen Menschen*, who is a German from Bad Zalzuflen, we learned that the documents were most likely forged. Mr. Jetkowski was very definite: "No vehicle of our association is registered in Bosnia, so it is obvious that someone found out our address and other information and in that way registered the vehicle falsely."

Director Jetkowski said that his humanitarian organization usually sent humanitarian aid to Zenica, more precisely to the Bosanska Gradiska Opcina authorities in exile. Through them, the aid is distributed further, and they are the only ones in Bosnia who had information about the humanitarian organization *Menschen helfen Menschen*.

No Comment

In Zenica, whence the mujahidin started out toward Zepce, none of the military or civilian structures wanted to comment on the tragic event. The public relations representative of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headquartered in Zenica and under the command of General Sakib Mahmuljin, rejected any possibility of contacting the mujahidin unit, which is stationed in the village of Tetovo, which is unquestionably part of the 3d Corps. He also refused to make any official comment or statement.

During the last month, the mujahidin unit has been the target of all the media whose journalists are stationed in the Tuzla area. At least some 50 of the best-known world television networks, newspapers, and agencies have been "on the hunt" for the Islamic fatalists. This was accentuated by the arrival of the American contingent of about 25,000 men at the Dubrave Airport in Tuzla, and the assessments of American intelligence circles that nearly 3,000 mujahidin are stationed in the Zenica area, fewer than 100 km from the American soldiers?!

Many, like CNN [Cable News Network], have tried to film the mujahidin, according to their own formula and at their own risk: One of the CNN cameramen put on a mujahidin uniform and cruised the Zenica area for days with his camera in a vehicle, but without success.

Zenica military-political structures are very much inclined toward the mujahidin. Asked whether it is true that there are as many as 3,000 of them, they answered: "If only there were many more of them." But among ordinary people in Zenica the "mudjosi," as they call them, are not exactly popular, and many can hardly wait for them to leave Zenica under the pressure of the Americans:

"They are a different world. Some of them do not want to understand that Bosnia is a part of Europe. They insult girls in miniskirts on the street, they try to establish Islamic standards in this community, and some of the events in which they have taken part have sickened all of Zenica. For example, cutting off the hand of the young man who was a refugee and stole a pistol from a mujahidin," we were told by an educated man in Zenica.

In Zenica, the mujahidin are considered the founders of the 7th Muslim Brigade, the most elite unit of the 3d Corps. The top political leadership in Sarajevo is very much inclined toward that unit. Alija Izetbegovic has reviewed that unit several times during his visits to Zenica.

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The present commander of the brigade is Brigadier Halil Brzina, famed Bosnian warrior whom some of the HVO leaders accused of war crimes against Croats in the Lasva Valley. When we asked Brigadier Brzina to talk about the conflict near Zepce, his associate Sulejman efendija Celikovic told us that Brigadier Brzina was not familiar with the details of the event at Zepce and was not competent to speak about it.

However, in the opinion of Marinko Jurcevic, district prosecutor of the Superior Court in Zenica, there is no doubt as to which military unit the five killed mujahidin belonged to, on the basis of the articles and documents found in the inquest. That is, from what we were told by Jurcevic, all five had papers of members of the unit 56/89 of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stationed in Zenica. Prosecutor Jurcevic did not say what unit that was, but it is well-known that this is, in fact, the 7th Muslim Brigade.

Identity of Those Killed

Mr. Jurcevic told us the identity of the five men killed:

—Abou Hamam Nejashi, born 2 February 1967 in Tebuk (country not known), member of the military unit 56/89, bearing the seal of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

—Abou Abdel Rahman Ahmed, born 14 December 1956, Egyptian national, living at Vatrostalna in Zenica, member of the unit 56/89;

—Mohamed Abdul Vehab Yousef, born 11 November 1958 in Weset, Libya, member of the military unit 56/89. In addition to his military card, he also had a personal identity card of Bosnia-Herzegovina bearing record number 1111958190042, issued in 1995;

—Abou Shehid Ali, born 10 July 1966 in Tunisia, member of the unit 56/89, no address;

—Djebbari Sherrif, born 6 April 1961 in Anaba, Algeria, member of the unit 56/89; he also had an international driver's license.

Possible doubts about which unit they belonged to were completely cleared up by Gen. Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps, who personally came to Zepce to escort the bodies of those killed.

Prosecutor Jurcevic says this about the circumstances of the confrontation:

"What I will tell you is the result of a joint investigation by a mixed professional team. That is, as soon as I was informed about the confrontation near Zepce, without consultation, on my own responsibility, I called Sefik Dzaferovic, chief of the Security Service Center in Zenica, and asked that he designate two police crime specialists to join the team. Aside from these policemen, Dr. Faruk Turkic, specialist from the Zenica Hospital, was also part of the team. On the Croatian side, I was present, along with the investigating judge and a criminalist. We established that the five men in the Toyota did not stop at the checkpoint, but continued toward Zepce. At the entrance to the city, they were stopped by another policeman, who asked for their travel documents. He then noted that they were all in uniform and were holding guns. The person next to the driver held a gun aimed at the policeman. The policeman checked the rear license plate, then came back and told the driver that under the agreement armed military personnel could not travel without an order and without an escort, and that they could not go any further unless they presented an order. Because they did not have it, the policeman said that they must wait for Croatian police to escort them to Zepce in order to work out those formalities. He called for back-up from the station in Zepce. When help arrived, the travelers were again told that they must wait for an escort, because they were armed with long-barreled guns. The driver answered that they did not recognize the Croatian police in Zepce, but wanted to go to Maglaj, which is under control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The Armed Encounter

"After that, the policeman called the special unit of the Zepce Police Department, and 15 minutes later four members of that unit arrived; two stood in front and two behind the vehicle at a distance of some 15 meters. The policeman from the patrol repeated that they must go to Zepce, and that the Special Police would escort them to Zepce. After that, the man next to the driver began to shout in Arabic, and the man sitting behind the driver fired a round at the policeman and grazed his neck. The bullet grazed the artery in the neck.

"The policeman jumped and crawled into the ditch alongside the road. Both sides began to shoot, another policeman was wounded in the head above the temple, and when it was over, it was found that all five travelers in the vehicle had been killed. According to our finding, the police reacted in self-defense," Jurcevic said.

"When the team arrived for the inquest, we found that all five had pistols, ammunition clips, and they all had hand grenades and rifles. It was established on the spot that there was no need for an autopsy. We established their identity on the basis of documents found on their persons. There are indications that Interpol is seeking one of them because of international terrorism."

Prosecutor Jurcevic could not answer the question of how many rounds were fired at the travelers in the

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vehicle, but he referred us to Dr. Turkic, the pathologist. According to his report, the five mujahidin died as a result of the following:

—Abou Hamam Mejashi, one entry wound in the eyebrow, exit in the back of the head, three piercing wounds in the chest;

—Djebbari Sherrif, one entry wound in the forehead from a range of less than a meter, so that the surrounding skin was burned by gunpowder gases, three entry wounds in the right side of the chest;

—Mohamed Abdul Vehab Yousef, two entry wounds in the chest, one in the arm, one in the upper arm, three entry wounds in the right shoulder blade;

—Abu Shehid, one entry wound in the mouth, two entry wounds in the left cheek, exit wound in the eye, two entry wounds in the stomach on the left, one entry wound in the left calf;

—Abou Abdel Rahman Ahmed, one entry wound in the left shoulder, one entry wound in the right shoulder, four entries in the left shoulder blade, one entry wound in the left forearm, two entry wounds in the right knee.

More than 250 rounds were fired from automatic weapons into the completely riddled Toyota Land Cruiser.

According to reliable sources, the number of mujahidin is not even close to the number of 3,000. It is assumed that there are about 300 of them on the territory of Zenica and Travnik, mainly stationed in Mehoric near Travnik, and in Tetovo near Zenica. It has been observed that they are gradually leaving.

The motive of the group killed near Zepce in causing the conflict has not been established, but in view of the increasingly frequent traffic of mujahidin on that route just before the confrontation, their ultimate objective can be established with a certain level of confidence. They were going to Tuzla, where groups of Americans assigned to prepare for the arrival of thousands of soldiers had just disembarked.

A newsman for GLOBUS who was working on this case twice saw two groups of four or five uniformed bearded men with dark complexions in the same type of off-road vehicle in which the five mujahidin were killed.

So far, the Bosnian authorities have tolerated their false representation, but under pressure from the United States, this practice will have to be stopped, and the mujahidin will have to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We talked about when and how that might happen with Muhamed Filipovic, ambassador for Bosnia-Herzegovina to Great Britain.

[Taraba] You have certainly been informed about the serious incident which occurred last week not far from Zepce, when forces of the HVO Special Police killed five mujahidin, foreign nationals who are members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What consequences might this have for the Croatian-Muslim relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are already sensitive?

[Filipovic] The question of the presence of the mujahidin in Bosnia is very complicated. At one point in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was difficult to refuse anyone who wanted to help and join the fight. But at the same time, it was clear to everyone that the arrival of the mujahidin in Bosnia would have far-reaching political consequences. The situation was compounded following the decision regarding their repatriation, within one month after the arrival of the IFOR [Intervention Force] in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, they need to be neutralized as a military entity, as an element which could be disastrous for the implementation of the peace agreement. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will now find itself in a particularly difficult situation.

[Taraba] Why?

[Filipovic] Because it is the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that bears the responsibility for carrying out the provision concerning their removal from the territory of Bosnia. At the same time, there is a question as to whether the mujahidin will cooperate in this. Most of them simply have nowhere to go, because judicial proceedings have been initiated against them in almost all countries, or they have already received serious penalties. There are few countries who would receive them after repatriation from Bosnia. Complicated diplomatic and technical preparations are necessary to carry out such an operation. So, the possibility remains of somehow winning them over to leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina voluntarily, which will be very difficult. A certain number of them have married in Bosnia and have acquired citizenship, so they ought not to be a problem. I am very concerned by all of this, and I think that our government should urgently request international aid in order to solve this problem as painlessly as possible.

[Taraba] What are the possible consequences?

[Filipovic] If the government in Sarajevo resorts to a more radical solution of the problem of the mujahidin, the countries of the Islamic world, which have aided Bosnia-Herzegovina a great deal, will take an essentially different position toward Bosnia. Unless the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina effectively discharges its obligations that were accepted in the peace agreement, it could fall into disfavor on the other, Western

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side, upon which the future of Bosnia depends to the greatest degree. .

[Taraba] Is an armed conflict between members of the IFOR and the mujahidin possible, and on what scale?

[Filipovic] I hope that will be avoided precisely by the effort of our government, but I am aware that an atmosphere of fear is being created, especially in the United States and Great Britain, in which the mujahidin are seen as particularly dangerous opponents of the IFOR, even to a greater degree than the extremist Serbs. U.S. Senator Sam Moynihan [as published] recently issued a sharp criticism of Congress for sending troops to Bosnia before the presence of the mujahidin was eliminated.

The Mujahidin

[Taraba] Even now, there are differing estimates of the number of mujahidin in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the government in Sarajevo says there are slightly more than 1,000, some foreign intelligence services say there are 4,000 of them. What information do you have?

[Filipovic] I think that at the moment there are about 2,000 of them, 2,200 at the most, depending on how many have been killed so far.

[Taraba] Will the deadline of one month given for the departure of mujahidin by Gen. Shalikashvilli, commander of the combined NATO forces, be sufficient?

[Filipovic] Once an obligation is assumed, and the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina did that by signing the Dayton documents in Paris, then it simply must be respected. But how that will be done...it is hard for me to forecast anything at this point.

[Taraba] Are conflicts possible between the regular units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mujahidin, when they start to discharge the obligation assumed? According to some reports, even the commanders of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has authority over the strongest mujahidin point of support, Podbrijezje, cannot move around freely there.

[Filipovic] I think the reports you have are fairly reliable. That is why I do not preclude unpleasant situations, indeed even conflicts between the mujahidin and other members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mujahidin are behaving according to their own rules, and they have a high degree of hierarchical autonomy.

[Taraba] The mujahidin killed near Zepce included Imam Shaban of Milan. The newspaper AL HAYATT, which is published in Arabic in London, has in recent days been publishing the messages of the Islamic group *Gama a Islamiyya* in which it calls for revenge against the Croats. In October, Croatia was already exposed to an attack by this organization when a car bomb was placed in Rijeka. What are the dangers of new attacks?

[Filipovic] I know something about that, but it is all related to Sheik Abu Talla, which your newspaper has written about in detail. I do not know of any details linking *Gama a Islamiyya* to the event near Zepce, but I would not make a big problem out of this, because I personally am convinced that the Islamic terrorist potential is nowhere near as strong as people try to portray it.

[Taraba] Imam Shaban of Milan was directly responsible for the murder of a leader of the moderate Algerian Islamic resistance in France. He was also responsible for the first of a number of explosions in the Paris subway. How do you explain the fact that such a man came to Bosnia at all and had with him proper papers of a member of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Filipovic] I think the infiltration of such people into Bosnia is the work of foreign intelligence services. The entire attention of those services is concentrated on causing conflict between the Croats and Muslims, in order to place the war in Bosnia exclusively in a religious context.

[Taraba] Who or what part of the ruling structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina is most responsible for the mujahidin coming and staying in Bosnia?

[Filipovic] I think that no one in particular can be singled out here. This is mostly the product of a certain moment of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of that moment when Bosnia depended on the aid of certain foreign political and financial circles. To be sure, however, I think the greatest responsibility should be borne by those who organized the armed resistance.

[Taraba] That is the military commanders?

[Filipovic] Well, certain civilian political circles too.

[Taraba] Which ones?

[Filipovic] I do not think it would make much sense to name them and count them at this point.

Islamization of the Army

[Taraba] A strong Islamic religious element has been felt recently, even in the ranks of the regular units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is declaratively of multiethnic composition. How do you explain that?

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[Filipovic] It might be expected that the long-standing suppression of religious sentiments would have a counterreaction. And certain exaggerations then occur as a matter of course. I am convinced that in the coming peacetime period our Army will manage to balance out and avoid the adverse influence of those bringing that religious element into military ranks.

[Taraba] According to our rather reliable sources, a large number of officers responsible for information and political activity in the most elite units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are imams, that is, priests. Is that true?

[Filipovic] I do not know. You know yourself that Bosnia-Herzegovina had difficulties with its military personnel, but I think the present personnel are very rapidly becoming professionals, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina will soon be professional, lay, and an army responsible only to the institutions of the state.

[Taraba] The review of units of the 7th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina last week in Zenica ended with several thousand soldiers shouting at the top of their lungs the *Tekbir* (motto)—*Allahu ekber* (Allah is great). All of this disturbed quite a bit the already distrustful Croatian population of the Lasva Valley. How would you comment on that event?

[Filipovic] I think this is a kind of letting off of steam, and it does not indicate the aim of Islamization of the Army. You know yourself that there is a pronounced religious element on the other side as well—various blessings, prayers, masses, etc. I do not think we should draw any very radical conclusions or assessments from all this. All of that should not have any major impact on the development of more successful Croatian-Muslim relations.

[Taraba] The Croatian public has been disturbed in recent days by the report that Bosnian judicial and police authorities have filed indictments for war crimes against 82 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The report has been confirmed by Muhamed Sacirbej, and was refuted on 19 December in a statement given to OSLOBODJENJE by Hasan Balic, president of the Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They did not cite any details about the names and positions of those supposedly indicted. What do you know about that?

[Filipovic] I have no information whatsoever about that, and I must admit that that news report literally shocked me.

[Taraba] Could this disagreement between Sacirbej and Balic threaten the process of establishing the federation?

[Filipovic] It will certainly cause certain difficulties. All the participants in the case should be very cautious and extremely selective. Every accusation must be individualized, they cannot be produced as on an assembly line. This way, one gets the impression that an entire political establishment, an entire political structure, is being put on trial.

[Taraba] What is your comment on the behavior and position of the Croatian political leadership after the recent indictments were filed in The Hague against Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, and four other Bosnian Croats?

[Filipovic] I think this is completely logical behavior. Setting aside the question of the soundness of those indictments, if we concentrate solely on the assessment of the Croatian political leadership that all those people took part in carrying out the policy of that same leadership, then Croatia must come to their defense.

[Taraba] Have the authorities in Sarajevo recently received signals of any kind from The Hague that indictments might be filed against Muslims suspected of atrocities?

[Filipovic] I personally am acquainted with the president of the court in The Hague, Cassese; we are frequently in contact, and I know the general position that indictments will be filed against all those against which solid evidence is gathered of crimes committed. I really do not know whether anything has been gathered against people in the Bosnian ranks. But I think it would be tragic to begin to exchange accusations now. In that case, the accusations should include all those who have participated in the political events in this region over the last four years. Karadzic, Kljuic, and Izetbegovic won the elections in Bosnia together, as a coalition. People trusted them, they gave them power, and you see what happened later. If we now work from that fact, if we find that the crimes are the results of their policies, then they all come under the same heading. That is why we should avoid any attempt at petty political ethnic showdowns and investigate the facts about every individual crime committed. Otherwise, there is no justice.

[Taraba] If an indictment in The Hague is soon filed against a Muslim, and if they are positioned like the central Bosnian Croats indicted, how will the government in Sarajevo behave?

[Filipovic] I think it will behave similarly to their counterparts in Zagreb. Nevertheless, all of this functions according to the law of the siphon.

[Taraba] Muhamed Sacirbej, foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, made some rather unpleasant charges against you two days ago that have been at the center

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of attention. He accuses you of unlawfully taking a loan in Switzerland, of buying suits worth 7,500 German marks, of renting an excessively expensive apartment in London, of nepotism....

[Filipovic] Those are all notorious lies. I issued an order for the purchase of three tuxedos for three top officials of the embassy, as prescribed by the protocol of the Court of Saint James for ceremonial occasions, of which there are eight every year. I took the loan referred to in Bern, and, according to the regulations of the MIP [Foreign Ministry], because I did not have a residence, I had acquired the right to it and used it to furnish an apartment which was completely empty when I moved in. I have paid off that loan. Nowhere is a financial debt of that kind treated as immoral or a misdemeanor. Sacirbej has no clue about elementary things.

As for the apartment in London, there was a loss when the ministry decided to cancel the contract because of the level of the rent and before I moved into it, and so penalties were paid to the landlord. All the officials of the embassy discharged that jointly and severally....

[Taraba] What about nepotism?

[Filipovic] How does Sacirbej have the nerve to accuse me of nepotism when his brother has been working for him in the mission for four years now, and he has now appointed him a minister, counselor, in the Foreign Ministry? The children of almost all Bosnian officials are working in embassies of Bosnia-Herzegovina everywhere in the world. Trnka's daughter is in Washington, Izet Serdarevic's daughter is a personal secretary.... Why does Sacirbej not reproach Izetbegovic, who named his daughter his chief of staff? My condition for appointment abroad was that my son go with me. My wife and I are too old to be able to operate alone under conditions when we do not have the right to hire a maid. The late Ljubijankic agreed to my request, but the promise to employ my son was never carried out. They are now discriminating against my son because of me. He spent two and a half years in Sarajevo, he is qualified, he knows languages, and he has the same right to work as Sacirbej's brother. But I will not back off, I hired my son as a technical secretary, and I told Sacirbej to just try to prohibit it.

Diplomat of the Year

[Taraba] Muhamed Sacirbej has recently been in open conflict with Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why?

[Filipovic] What is one to say about a man who refuses to communicate with the prime minister in whose government he is a minister? What is one to say about a man who is continually denouncing his boss? He came to Bosnia as an American citizen and began political assassinations of the most prestigious people.... I solemnly declare that Haris Silajdzic and Muhamed Filipovic are the most prestigious people in Bosnia. I am the greatest and best-known Bosnian intellectual, I am a political figure with no mortgage. And that bothers them.

[Taraba] How will that dispute of yours end?

[Filipovic] I have ordered my lawyer to file charges against Sacirbej for making false assertions. I have asked to be given the opportunity to state my version of events before the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the Presidency, and before the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Taraba] Is what Sacirbej says about you the consequence of political differences, or is he the front man for someone who is politically stronger?

[Filipovic] I assume that someone is behind him, and who it is will soon become evident.

[Taraba] You already suspect who it is?

[Filipovic] I will go to Sarajevo and talk about all of this with Mr. Izetbegovic, whom I consider absolutely responsible for my destiny. He knows very well what I have done for Bosnia and for him personally.

[Taraba] Immediately after this interview, you will be presented, in London, with the "diplomat of the year" award of the international magazine DIPLOMAT. What kind of award is this?

[Filipovic] This is the award of the most prestigious world journal covering diplomacy and diplomats, and it is published in London. I received the most votes in their poll for the best ambassador in the year which is now ending....

[Taraba] In London or in the world?

[Filipovic] In the world. The last issue of DIPLOMAT was devoted to me and my work. My picture is on the cover, and after this interview I am going to a small ceremony arranged in my honor, at which I will be presented this recognition.

[Taraba] So, while the world is proclaiming you the best ambassador, your boss wants to fire you.

[Filipovic] Right. My boss wants to kick me out. But that will not be so easy. I fought one totalitarianism for 45 years, and I will fight another one for the next 45 years. That is, I intend to live at least that long.

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Croatia: Bebic To Head National Security Office

LD0102115596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 11:00 GMT 1 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In line with Article Five of the National Security Office Law, the president of the Republic [Franjo Tudjman] has passed a decision appointing Luka Bebic head of the National Security Office. The decision comes into force on 1 February 1996.

Since the first multiparty and democratic elections, Luka Bebic has occupied the following posts: president of the chamber of municipalities of the [Croatian] assembly; half way through 1991 he was appointed president of the southern Dalmatia crisis headquarters; shortly afterward he became [Croatian] defense minister. Today he is chairman of the [Assembly] committee for internal affairs and national security and member of several other committees. He has been a member of the Croatian Democratic Union since 1989 and of its central and main committee.

Croatia: Potential for 'Explosion' in Mostar Viewed

AU3101202096 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 96 p 2-3

[Commentary by Fran Visnar: "Mostar on a Dangerous Brink"]

[FBIS Translated Text] American and German military intelligence sources claim that the dispute between the Croats and the Bosniaks over Mostar is a place where an "uncontrolled explosion" could break out because there is potential for tension on both sides "in abundance." The examination of the situation on the ground leads the intelligence officers to the conclusion that such tendencies must be stopped as soon as possible because "the consequences would be fatal and go in chain sequence."

Deliberate murder on the road along the demarcation line (or an "accidental" provocation) could provoke larger-scale shooting and sniper activity in all zones of contact. After some time small arms fire usually gets mortar support. Mortars are only an introduction to artillery fire, and a gun salvo rarely goes without the rapid-fire support of multiple-rocket launchers and tank movement. It started in that way in Beirut, and continued for almost 15 years throughout Lebanon. Today that is the fate of Kabul and Afghanistan. Such conflicts begin like an isolated fire in the prairie, and later on, gaining strength, the firestorm spreads at the speed of wind.

Both of Them Ask Too Much

Regarding Mostar, both interested sides have been blowing with might and main into their own sails. Explaining the existing balance of power to Washington, the Americans deployed on the ground sometimes unnecessarily simplify things, but in essence they give an accurate picture. They usually start from the statement about what each of the sides asks for and wants in Mostar.

The Muslims-Bosniaks want a united city, full freedom of movement, joint police forces, municipal services, and so on. They agree that Mostar should consist of six town municipalities, but not based upon ethnic criterion (three Croatian and three Muslim municipalities). They agree over the demarcation of municipalities but not by the factual lines of military separation.

The Croat side prefers the division of the town de facto and de jure, that is, the absolute control over its own part of town (the municipalities with the Croat majority), with the minimum of common services or relying upon them only in protocol and symbolically. The stands are so contrasted that in some other time at this point they would already be on the dangerous brink of open military conflict.

The Americans, but also the Germans, think that something like that can be prevented by international mediation but also by a stronger influence of the main negotiators, primarily of Zagreb. The Bosniak side expects that Croats must give way regarding Mostar, and the Bosniaks themselves are not ready to make considerable concessions because they think they have lost too much in the war. The political disagreements and the power struggle within the leading Bosniak political party (SDA) [Party of Democratic Action] also reflect on Bosniak state policy, which at the moment finds it suitable to assume a "firm stand" toward the Croats in Mostar.

Of course, armed conflict by the two communities would be disastrous for the Dayton peace, and it would have an overall domino effect. Radovan Karadzic would (triumphantly) reactivate himself, and Milosevic would prove that no nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina can live together any longer and thus appease the critics from abroad that he "mostly poured oil on fire" in person.

In case of a conflict the Croats are without doubt stronger in Mostar. However, now that the Serbs have withdrawn from the strategic hillsides around the town and from all other important positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] is afraid that the Muslims could turn all their quality military units, which had earlier been engaged in the fighting against the Serbs, toward western Mostar and jeopardize

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Croat vital interests. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has in eastern Mostar and around it deployed some 5,000 men in five infantry and one mountain brigades (the Bosniaks are capable of tripling that number very quickly).

The HVO, on the other hand, has over 10,000 men in the town, better armament and organization, and more military and civilian police because, among other things, Mostar is considered the capital and the center of life of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among Herzegovina Croats the dominant opinion is that Mostar is the only one of the larger towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina at all (the Bosniaks have Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica, and the Serbs control Banja Luka), so that they think it is superfluous to talk about how significant Mostar is as the most important political, cultural, industrial, and commercial center of Herzegovina.

Painful Traumas, Deep Scars From War

In the opinion of American and German intelligence analysts, in such a situation both Sarajevo and Zagreb will have to invest additional efforts to prevent the clash, accompanied by the statement "that the local factor is not always prone to listen to reasonable and pragmatic advice." Mostar is important to both sides. For instance, many in Herzeg-Bosnia and the HVO itself do not understand why it has to be different when so many people have died to defend the town, and the Croat units have obtained through struggle what they have. On the Muslim-Bosniak side, on the other hand, nobody understands why the whole town cannot be used as it was before the war. The traumas are painful, and the scars of war still very deep.

Frequent incidents and the activity of the criminal underground (which is often out of any control) have only been intensifying negative emotions, and they are similar to the moods which were dominating at the peak of the Lebanon crisis in divided Beirut. American and German military intelligence officers are also concerned about something else. One can check the domino effect and the tactics of reciprocity in practice. The Bosniaks think: "If you, the Croats, are stronger in Mostar, we will be stronger in Usora, and we will put pressure on that point." Amassing troops, maneuvering units, lingering of the majority of mujahedin (who all together behave in a particularly hostile way toward the Croats), provocations of bloody incidents and ordered assassinations, restrictive control of persons and frustrating harmless passage are the measures the Bosniaks have taken on one end of the scales to unburden the other, for them weaker, end. But that is a risky tactic which paves the road not to cooperation but to conflict and miniwar.

What if that eventually happens? Then both the United States and Europe, gathered in NATO, will have no choice. They will start to behave and act like a real protector. Those critics here who easily spit on the Zagreb official policy and accuse it of "betrayal" must take care about it.

The Americans are a moral, political, and logistical initiator of the creation of the Bosniak-Croat Federation. They will certainly not, at this stage of their own involvement (and in Bosnia they have gone further than in Lebanon and Somalia), tolerate any kind of significant disturbance of the peace process and the agreed agenda of the implementation of the agreement reached in Dayton and publicly signed in Paris, or leave an unclear situation in Mostar, which will as early as tomorrow get out of their control and become an unbridgeable stumbling block.

Therefore also the final stands of Zagreb will play a crucial role in Mostar. Washington puts its trust exactly in that. On the other hand, for Croatia, the economic and military cooperation with Germany and the United States is a general Croatian interest, so it is far above what this or that mayor says, thinks, or feels. Therefore Mostar must become the link which will integrate the Federation, and which will not be the unpleasant (sharp) nail which will tear something over which an agreement was hardly reached, and which has been implemented step by step. After all, peacetime is the best time to raise destroyed bridges. Of course, by following adequate rules and an appeasing order of moves. And, naturally, under an assumption that the bridge is being raised from both ends simultaneously.

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FYROM: Army Officer, Turkish Delegation Meet

LD3101190096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1744 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 31 Jan (TANJUG)—Colonel General Trajce Krstevski, General Staff chief of the Army of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today received Col. Gen. Yasar Muzdezi, head of a delegation of the Military Academy of the Turkish Armed Forces and Air Force, it was announced in Skopje.

The talks emphasized "the successful cooperation achieved so far between the two armies in several domains, particularly in military training." They also spoke about military cooperation this year in the domain of training and education.

Col. Gen. Muzdezi, the deputy commander of the Turkish Military Academy, is visiting FYROM for several days at the head of a delegation made up of teachers, 30-odd students, and three foreign officers who are studying in Turkey.

A statement issued by the Defense Ministry reports that the visit by the Turkish Military Academy delegation "is part of a program of cooperation with countries that send officers for military training in Turkey."

An expert military team from the British Armed Forces Military Academy is also paying a visit to the FYROM Army.

In the course of its visit, the British military team will "exchange experiences with their colleagues in connection with military training and education of officers."

FYROM: Commentary Views Skopje-Belgrade Relations

AU3101194396 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 31 Jan 96 p 3

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Skopje-Belgrade Via Brussels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Europe was ready to establish normal diplomatic relations with Belgrade on 29 January in Brussels. Belgrade had a lively interest in this. Only Greece, although a member of the EU, had the usual reservations and it threatened with a veto, as usual. As we know, normalization of relations was not established. The reason for this, although it may look overpretentious, was the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. That is, on the one hand it was the unprecedented strong support that the EU this time gave to our country, on the other it was Belgrade's unpreparedness to let go of the "Macedonian trump card" in further bargaining with the international community, and finally it was Greece's fear that it will definitely lose the battle for the name if Serbia recognizes the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. This was exactly the condition that the EU made for reestablishment of diplomatic relations between its member countries and Belgrade.

This entanglement, which basically contains a positive outcome for Macedonia, and which was created with the first step that the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation made on the post-Dayton road to its comeback to the international community, was probably hardly expected by anyone. First, the most important international factors, helped by the Dayton agreement, showed a barely disguised intention to return the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation into all international organizations and institutions and to place it in the vacant spot of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Second, it was the inconsistency and nonadherence shown so many times before in interpreting the effective principles and defined norms of international law according to their own interests, which are frequently controversial. After Dayton, Belgrade gambled on the one and the other card. Although one of the "minimum" conditions for its comeback to the international community was the mutual diplomatic recognition with Macedonia, Belgrade was postponing the beginning of the negotiations for as long as it could, that is, as long as some member countries of the Union did not "press" it to embark on them. When the negotiations on normalization of relations finally started, it became clear that there is no bigger problem in Skopje-Belgrade relations except the question of state continuity to the former collective federation. According to what we could squeeze out of the very introverted teams of the two countries, the name of the Republic of Macedonia was allegedly never a disputed question and this is exactly what was written down in the text of the agreement.

As far as continuity is concerned, the same sources say that at Serbian insistance an "historical formula" was finally accepted, by which the continuity of the Macedonian state dates from the National Liberation War and the Serbian from 1918. Time and the legal experts will determine the precise text of the agreement and whether this formula, which has been communicated in such a way and extracted from the full text, will become a hybrid or not. In any case, the text of the agreement was agreed upon, but Milosevic was not in a hurry to sign and make this document official, internationally valid, and binding. Instead, he sent his Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic on a "private" visit to Greece to explain to the "traditional friends" why he has to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name. In other words, he

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wanted to check if he could obtain the much desired privileged status in Thessaloniki's harbor. In return, he would delay the possible mutual recognition with Macedonia and thus—helped by Athens—he would open another "European dispute" over the name. It was only on the morning of 29 January, while the ministers of the EU member countries started to gather for the Brussels meeting, whose main topic was reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Belgrade, that the federal government in Belgrade adopted the draft text of the agreement. Milosevic had hoped that this act and this unsubstantiated paper would have given sufficient evidence about his good intentions and promptness and that he would have lured the EU and the Republic of Macedonia. That same morning, the telephone lines between Skopje and Rome (the present EU chair person), and Skopje and Bonn, were heated from the frequent use of consulting about the possible consequences for the Republic of Macedonia and for the stability and peace in the southern Balkans, if the international "rehabilitation" of Belgrade starts without previous normalization of relations with Skopje.

Greece played an interesting role in the complex event that took place two days ago. It showed anger for Belgrade's preparations on normalizing relations with the Republic of Macedonia, and its new Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos left his Yugoslav counterpart strolling around "privately" in Athens for three days before receiving him. He did it only after the Belgrade press (why did it do it exactly at that hour?) had published the letter that Milutinovic had sent to Karolos Papoulias, the former Greek foreign minister, in which he resurrected the request for privileged use of Thessaloniki's harbor, which Greece had formerly rejected. After the meeting of the two ministers, there were no released communications and the public was not informed whether the bargain on "the name in exchange for the harbor" ended with success. Athens did not hide its anger with the EU which, once upon a time, was even ready to change our name under Greek pressure, and now it presses Serbia to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name.

The Greek pro-government press threatened that Athens would use its veto in Brussels if this happens. There was no possibility of checking whether this threat was uttered with any authority or whether it was simply empty speculation by the press because the reestablishment of EU-Belgrade relations has not yet taken place. However, diplomatic sources in Brussels say that Greece behaved like a "blown-up balloon" there, aware that many of the European countries have not yet pardoned the disgrace it once imposed on them by involving them in the "dispute" over the name and over the illegal and unilateral blockade of the Macedonian border. It is also aware of the gravity of the present assessments of NATO circles, according to which, had it not been for the Greek obstructions in the alliance's policy in favor of Serbia, the Bosnian crisis would have been solved in the same way and with the same means at least a year ago.

It is no wonder why Athens, surrounded by "hostility" from its own partners in Brussels, was relieved—while the ministerial meeting was going on—after U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated "not to hurry" with the recognition of Belgrade. The warning from Washington is very indicative considering that it was the main author of the Dayton peace agreement: It can be interpreted in many ways, even as a reminder to the European allies that diplomatic, but also (enormous) military means personified in the presence of 60,000 NATO troops, are at their disposal for the solution of the crisis in the Balkans.

It will be interesting to monitor the further development of the events in relation to the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation's comeback to the international community. The Republic of Macedonia, which has this time done its job to perfection, judging by the outcome of the EU meeting in Brussels two days ago, can now afford the luxury of being tranquil. Its international position is good and stable: Macedonia's membership in international organizations or its access to the main financial institutions does not depend on the mutual recognition with the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation because it is already there. Only its normalization of relations with Belgrade depends on this, and it is something that is important to it and something that it has been waiting for so long. It can afford to wait a little longer....

FYROM: Trade Union Warns of Grave Economic Position

AU3101130496 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 30 Jan 96 p 9

[Commentary by Dj. Vasilevska: "We Have Hit Rock Bottom—There Is No Going Beyond"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The exceedingly unfavorable and objectively restrictive material and financial circumstances have contributed to a considerable reduction of economic activities, to a fall in production, to losses in the current undertakings, to a severe decrease in the number of employees, and to an increase in the unemployed, to a continual decline in the real level of salaries, which, in contemporary society—economic ambience—have created an intolerable fall in the standard of living and a poor quality of life, causing difficult social traumas. All this makes the whole state a social welfare

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case," said Nikola Dodev, secretary of the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions [FTU] of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in his introduction at the latest Council session. It was a session dedicated to the material and social position of the workers.

This "vision of life" in our state, which was "cast" through trade unionists' spectacles, was created from a factual analysis, made by the FTU on the basis of official data, which they believe gives a full and true account of the real situation in the state.

Data

What do these facts and data say? The real level of the gross product in the total economy is falling from 10 to 15 percent per year, so that this fall amounted to 50 percent over the period between 1989-95. In the same period, industrial production has also continually fallen, this time by 38.4 percent (in 1995 it was "only" 9.9 percent, compared to 1994).

The real income level (1995 compared to 1994) has fallen to 3.6 percent, the rate of unemployment is 28.6 percent, and thus we head the unemployment list in Europe. The retail prices in 1995 compared to 1994 have increased by 15.9 percent, which presumes a rise in the cost of living in the last years, to stand at 15.7 percent in the period between 1994-95.

The Trade Union calls last year the "year of liquidations." In the employment office over 22,000 registered workers faced redundancy, and by the end of last November about 8,000 liquidation applications were submitted, from companies that are employing 60,000 workers. This year is also called the "year of workers facing redundancy" (around 16,000 workers are facing redundancy, 13,000 of which were affected by the Law on the 25 biggest lossmakers)....

On the other hand, there has been an increase of 6 percent in the total public consumption income (over last year compared to 1994). This is incongruous with the declining economic trends, and therefore the Trade Union believes that it has to be solved in the best possible way, but not at the expense of the social parameters for public consumption, as is now the case with us.

Living Standards

What is life like for people in a long-term economic crisis, that is, what is their material and social situation like? Naturally, the Trade Union starts with salaries, as one of the most important determining elements for this situation. Their rise (in the public companies) has been limited by law, but despite this, last year (excluding December) 204,195 workers received salaries that are 7.9 percent lower than regulated by the law. The average salary "has stopped" at about 8,700 denars, which can only satisfy nutritional needs (according to the costs of a consumer basket, calculated either by the Statistical Institute or the housekeeper). As for other needs (electricity, water, clothing)—there is not enough!

On the other hand, the real fall in salaries that was caused by the rise in the cost of living (1995 compared to 1994), in which rent, water, and so on were the ones that were increased the most (90.6 percent), have lowered the family budget to such an extent that a great number of people are obliged to choose between meeting the needs for food or keeping the household. It would have been fortunate if the people had received at least the average salary. However, the Trade Union underlines that nearly one-fifth of the total number of employees earn a salary that is 50 percent lower than the consumer basket, while one-third earn even less than the level for social protection, which is far beyond the average.

Moreover, the salary payments are not even regular: Out of 130,000-140,000 workers, 34.8 percent receive their salaries with a delay of one or more months, and what is most alarming, nearly 100,000 (67 percent) workers have had to wait for their salaries for over three months, which implies problems connected with the pension and health security payments. Those who are "left hanging" in the Employment Office must live the month with little more than 3,000 denars, which is the average sum of the social and protective level of welfare, depending on the number of family members. This is how the workers are being "transformed" into social cases and it is an army that has been rapidly "multiplying" in the last years. The present state social program comprises about 57,000 households with 228,000 members.

This is a difficult, unbearable, and traumatic social situation—say the trade unionists. It is really a fact that, in this period, our state has been waging the most difficult struggle for survival, but it has to overcome the limits of "bare" living and show the seeds of development, prosperity, and introduce some optimism.... For its part, the Trade Union will continue to expend "all its time and energy" in its day-to-day activities for the solution of the problems in the material and social sphere. However, it also has to develop a more critical relationship toward the authority, from which it expects to be treated with more respect as a partner in the social dialogue. In contrast, they announce, the strength and power of the Federation of Trade Unions of Macedonia will incorporate experience.

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Poland: Kwasniewski Names Cimoszewicz Prime Minister

LD0102101796 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1003 GMT 1 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 1 Feb—President Aleksandr Kwasniewski has told journalists that he has today designated Deputy Sejm Speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz as prime minister and asked him to form a new government. Cimoszewicz is the candidate of the ruling coalition.

The president said he decided to designate Cimoszewicz after yesterday's talks with the leaders of the coalition and with the Freedom Union candidate, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. Kwasniewski is convinced that Cimoszewicz will succeed in forming a government that will win the Sejm's approval. The president added that, in his view, the deputy Sejm speaker is well prepared to assume the role of prime minister.

Poland: Biography of PM Designee Cimoszewicz

WS0102112596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by "G.S": "The Coalition's Candidate for Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy speaker of the Sejm, was a deputy during the 10th term of the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic and in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. He was born on 13 September 1950. He was graduated with a law degree from Warsaw University, where as a student he joined the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. Also in his student days he was chairman of the Socialist Union of Polish University Students. In the years 1977-78, he underwent special training at the UN in Geneva, where he updated his doctoral thesis. In 1980-82, he was a Fulbright fellow at Columbia University in the United States.*

In the mid-1980's, he and his family moved to Bialystok voivodship. He took up pig breeding on a farm owned by his wife's parents in the village of Kalinowka Koscielna.

He was not recognized as a politician before 1989. After the dissolution of the PZPR in 1989, he did not join the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic but came to head the parliamentary club of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. In the fall of the same year, he ran as a representative of the postcommunist left in the presidential elections but did not make it past the first round. In June 1992, his name was placed on the so-called Macierewicz list [named after the former interior minister who attempted to carry out the vetting of public figures who had collaborated with the secret services].

He was chairman of the SLD National Campaign Staff in 1991. In Waldemar Pawlak's Cabinet, he was justice minister and prosecutor general; he announced at the time that he would eliminate corruption from Polish public life. He thus launched the very controversial "clean hands" campaign, as a result of which a list was compiled of officials who concurrently occupied high state offices and were members of supervisory boards of companies under the proprietorship of the State Treasury. He was also chairman of the National Road Traffic Council. He headed Aleksander Kwasniewski's campaign staff. In 1995 he became chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly.

Poland: Proposal of Cimoszewicz To Replace Oleksy

MS0102110296 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 1 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Anthony Robinson: "Polish Parties Choose New Candidate for PM"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An early end to the Polish political crisis was in sight last night after the leaders of both parties in the ruling coalition proposed Mr Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz from the ruling Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) to replace Mr Jozef Oleksy as prime minister.

The emergence of Mr Cimoszewicz as the man most likely to lead Poland's left-wing government could be the first step towards healing the political wounds reopened by the recent presidential election campaign and the forced resignation of Mr Oleksy.

The 45-year-old lawyer is one of a number of former Communists who turned over a new political leaf when the party disbanded after its humiliating moral defeat in the semi-free elections of autumn 1989.

But, while most other former Communist supporters joined the Social Democratic party led by Mr Alexander Kwasniewski when it was formed in 1990, he remained outside it.

This unwillingness to join the main successor party to the Polish United Workers' Party—the full name of the old Communist party—while remaining on the left of the historical dividing line of Polish polities, reflects his determination to maintain a degree of political independence.

This distance from the mainstream post-Communist party makes him more acceptable to the Peasant party (PSL), the junior coalition member, which had earlier

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proposed one of its own candidates as prime minister. But in practice the PSL, a single issue party which serves the interests of farmers, is more interested in retaining power than retaining the premiership.

The PSL's grudging acceptance of Mr Cimoszewicz as prime minister is likely to be paid for by concessions in other areas. It wants more influence over key ministries such as privatisation, currently held by Mr Wieslaw Kaczmarek, a strongly pro-privatisation SLD member.

Mr Cimoszewicz could also be more acceptable to those within the opposition Freedom Union, the former Solidarity party, who argue that Poland needs a political re-alignment to replace historical divisions with new alliances based on and common interests.

In key areas such as European Union and Nato membership, privatisation and free trade, the reform wing of the SLD has more in common with the free-market wing of the Freedom Union than with the protectionist and xenophobic Peasant party. If he manages to win sufficient support from the current coalition to win a vote of confidence within the next 14 days, Mr Cimoszewicz could cautiously move towards a Polish-style "historic compromise".

In 1990, when the memory of Communist rule was still fresh and left-wing prestige at a low ebb, Mr Cimoszewicz stood as the left-wing presidential candidate, but it was a quixotic gesture. But the former lawyer became minister of justice when the former communists returned to power in September 1993 and then deputy speaker of parliament.

Poland: Commission: UOP Acted Lawfully in Oleksy Case

LD0102103896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0912 GMT 1 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 1 Feb—The way information on Jozef Oleksy was obtained by the State Protection Office [UOP], including foreign sources, does not point to unlawful activities—this is the conclusion of the draft initial report by the special commission investigating the legality of actions by state bodies in the case of the prime minister's alleged contacts with a foreign intelligence service.

This morning, the text of the report was made available to deputies and journalists. The Sejm is to debate the issue later in the day.

In the seven-page document, signed by Commission Chairwoman Lucyna Pietrzyk, the commission states that it found no grounds for saying that "information concerning Jozef Oleksy was prepared by UOP officials." The commission makes it clear that this position does not mean a substantive and legal assessment of the credibility of the information, as this was not its brief.

According to the commission, passing the information on Oleksy to the president of the Polish Republic without telling the prime minister in this case did not break the law. There is reference to the appropriate article of the penal code that a suspect—in this case the prime minister—can familiarize himself with the documents after charges are presented.

The commission recognised that there was justified suspicion that on 21 December of last year, while delivering information on Oleksy to the Sejm, which also included details obtained during operational work, former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski had violated an appropriate clause of the law on UOP. The commission recognised the need to further investigate the issue.

The report states that, as it transpires from the questioning of Andrzej Milczanowski, choosing the date for sending the motion to the chief military prosecutor to launch an investigation was prompted by circumstances of a political nature. But this does not provide any grounds for saying that the law was broken.

The commission stressed that its findings should be treated as initial. It is difficult to specify a date for the conclusion of the commission's work and for presenting a final report to the Sejm.

Poland: Kwasniewski's 'Threats' to Poland Explored

WS2501130096 Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 7 Jan 95 pp 6-7

[Article by Aleksander Smolar: "The Poland of Kwasniewski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In democracy, elections are periods of intense verbal wars that are kept in check by legal boundaries and, though not always observed, good manners. And here you get all the trappings of war: storming marches, ambushes, tricks, propaganda. However, it would not be a good thing if our ability to comprehend the reality were impaired by our own propaganda. One should see threats posed by Aleksander Kwasniewski's presidency where they really exist. Humiliating an adversary or making an absolute evil of him can perform therapeutical functions, but it is not helpful in better understanding the situation.

Polishing the Concrete

Kwasniewski can take credit for real achievements. They concern a part of Poland whose views and political

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convictions are alien to me; but what is going on in that part is important for our democracy. The SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] made a significant impact on transformation of the former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. Under his leadership, the party underwent a generational change. Most of its compromised members, at least those on high, left the party, and people who were obscure in PRL [Polish People's Republic] times started to occupy leading positions in it.

The SdRP adjusted itself to the democratic environment without breaking with the PRL and the PZPR, which helped it inherit the favors of hundreds of thousands of party veterans and garner the votes of millions of people badly stricken by the inevitable changes. Its dowry also included buildings, cars, cash, economic influence, and thousands of professionals, people who since their youth were taught the art of organizing a party, building support, and launching joint efforts. These are all attributes that the democratic opposition activists desperately lack.

One of Kwasniewski's achievements is something he calls "polishing the hard cases" [reference to hard-liners]. He himself, easily and without complexes, accepted the conditions of democracy and the market and faced up to the uncertainties and troubles of the early years of transformations and the anticommunist opposition rule. He taught democracy to his party colleagues and voters, those who, for various reasons, were painfully parting with the past. He was supposedly ready to wait 15 years to return to big politics. Mieczyslaw Rakowski predicted that the leftist comeback would not happen sooner than the next generation.

Some of Kwasniewski's supporters viewed him, as Zbigniew Siemiatkowski [National Security Bureau chief] put it, a true Moses: He led them across the Red Sea of political limbo to success in a democratic Poland. This success is even more stunning because it all happened in a country where communism was not only defeated but also ridiculed; in a country where, more than anywhere else, communism proved a flawed and corrupt system; and in a country that used to be seen as chronically anti-Soviet, anti-Russian, anticommunist, and anti-Catholic.

Kwasniewski also has contributed to the economic discipline of his camp. Ever since the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] gained power, he has warned that the Alliance will have to pass a test of its ability to continue reforms, keep inflation down, and enforce budget discipline. The SLD-PSL [Polish Peasant Party] coalition undoubtedly is taking advantage of the capital that was painstakingly accumulated by the present opposition, which failed to use this capital for consolidating popular support. However, there is no denying that, at present, the growth rate is high, unemployment is falling, foreign trade is in good shape, the budget deficit is low, and so forth.

However, let us talk about the threats because this is the topic of our article. I will leave out the large and broadly covered sphere of perils connected with the SLD victory in 1993. Those perils can dramatically gain force after the election of Kwasniewski. They include increasing the influence of the party on the state; filling all conceivable positions with fellow members; strengthening corruption mechanisms as a result of the symbiosis of politics and economy; restraining processes intended to curb the state's omnipotence, including privatization and decentralization; and curtailing the independence of the NBP [National Bank of Poland], the National Radio and Television Council, state-controlled media, and so forth. The charges against Prime Minister Oleksy strengthen the hand of those who believe that the SLD cannot be Poland's guide on the way to the West.

Let us focus on the central problem of Kwasniewski's presidency—the problem of legitimacy, truth, and integrity, as well as the threats it poses for the stability of the state.

Supply Trains Full of the PRL

Steering his camp toward democracy, Aleksander Kwasniewski took along supply trains full of the PRL. The stock stored there fed—and it still does—his camp and his election campaign. All of his policies in the past years are based on dualism. On the one hand, he apologized, but, on the other, he acclaimed the PRL, touting himself as the leader of the only party that does not distance itself from the past. He sees both crimes and greatness in the PRL. He is a democrat, remaining at the same time an adamant advocate of "good things" from the period of dictatorship and national dependence.

Notably, in the book of his interviews published before the election, Kwasniewski believes that the only good reason to say he is "sorry" is the need to give a guarantee to the people who fear a revival of the PRL. The SdRP leader, however, does not appear to be convinced that the system based on national oppression and civil incapacitation is fundamentally corrupt.

Of course, if you fail to notice this factor, you can draw a balance sheet, putting the country's restoration, universal education, and full employment on one side and murders and censorship on the other. It should be said here that the intellectual and moral justification for this kind of historical accounting was provided by the article by Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Adam Michnik (GAZETA WYBORCZA No. 210)

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Kwasniewski is remarkably insensitive to the problem of responsibility for the past. The truth is that he can get away thanks to the late birth excuse: When he occupied ranking positions, mass murders, torture, and ideological crusades had long been gone in the PRL. In politics, however, you are held responsible for the political community you voluntarily join. Taking over the PRL and the PZPR legacy, Kwasniewski and his political organization assumed responsibility for the period 1944-89. You just cannot accept only a portion of the bequest; you can accept it entirely or reject it. And proof of thoughtlessness, which testifies to the shallow thinking about Poland, is when someone likens one's own moral and political—even if not guilt—responsibility for the PRL and the PZPR to the responsibility of Lech Walesa for a car accident caused by his son.

The concept of legitimacy is one of the most difficult in political thinking. It is easier to see its absence than its presence. Legitimacy can be compared to savings deposited by millions of small investors. If they lose even a bit of confidence in the security of their deposits, they would, by withdrawing their money, ruin even the soundest financial institution.

The Deficit of Legitimacy

Aleksander Kwasniewski has secured an unshakable political legitimacy. At the same time, we know—and he himself must feel it—that he is beginning his five-year term with a serious legitimacy deficit. This deficit has two, although unequally serious, reasons. Both are connected with the issue of truth and morality.

First, several cases were revealed in which the presidential candidate did not tell the truth. The president should be an example of respect for the law, and he should embody civic virtues. Does Kwasniewski have the moral right to talk about respect for the law and the need to strengthen it? Does he, considering that he started his fight for the presidency from untrue statements regarding his education, from different versions of the story about his wife's shares in the Polisa [insurance] company, and from controversial reports about his voting on the bill banning a statute of limitations on cases involving crimes committed in PRL times? Does Kwasniewski have the moral right to represent all of Poland at a time when the Polisa case and the cover-up of [former Customs Office Committee head] Ireneusz Sekula against justice show the strength of mutual party links inherited from the PRL past?

This should raise anxiety over the incorporation of mechanisms into our flawed democracy, thus adding to its corrosion. Kwasniewski will have to prove that he does not put parochial solidarity above state interests and the moral and legal order in the Polish Republic. His rally-type and hasty assurances of solidarity with and confidence in Oleksy are not a good sign.

The trust and legitimacy deficit will be hard to eliminate, particularly because it coincided with an even greater and more dramatic legitimacy deficit: A part of Poland denies Kwasniewski the moral right to represent and symbolize the country because of his political past. The publicly voiced treason charges against Oleksy, an unofficial nominee for SdRP and SLD leader, can only deepen this moral revolt. While accepting the logic of democracy, this part of society is resentful of its results. This situation is dangerous not only for Kwasniewski's presidency, but also for Polish democracy. A young democracy is always hurt by heady conflicts between reality and morality, as well as conflicts between law and morality. Mature democracies withstand such strains better, although they also pay high costs.

The Multistrand Polish Identity

The president is not chairman of the joint-stock company Poland. Our country is not only a demographic or territorial fact. As any other nation, the Polish people are a historic, cultural, and moral community, with a millennium-long and often tragic history. The continuity and unity of the nation was guaranteed by the common culture, language, and—for most people—religion, as well as by the myths and stereotypes. The historical identity of modern Poland has been formed by oppression, revolts, resurrections, longing for freedom and independence, and a romantic challenge to the entire world. This identity has been formed in a tight relationship with Catholicism and in a mixture that very often contained messianic elements. Does anyone have to be reminded how much rebirth and confirmation of this Polish identity the Solidarity revolution in 1980-81 contained?

This identity is made up of various faults, about which much has already been written. But if Poland exists in the world as a distinct community—often admired and often ridiculed—this is because of the national syndrome that cultivated our identity: Kosciuszko, Pulaski, Jan Henryk Dabrowski, Pilsudski fighting the Bolsheviks, Polish troops on all World War II fronts, Walesa with the Holy Virgin [badge] on his lapel. On the other hand, there are our national testament prophets: Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Norwid, Krasinski, Milosz, Herbert, and, of course, Pope John Paul II, who is a great successor of the romantic tradition. These are the most conspicuous Polish symbols on the historic map of the world.

A strong impact on our national identity was made by other experiences and traditions. These are traditions of

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coping with subjection and dependence, as well as those of seeking a niche, breaking the ceiling, and laboriously moving upward. Noble and less noble attempts to grapple with the oppressive and imposed reality and to "measure one's strengths against one's goals" were countered by the realism of "measuring one's goals against one's strengths" [quotations are passages from a verse by Mickiewicz], while the bird-flight perspective, often accompanied by a too easy divorce from reality, was thwarted by the frog's vision or a bear's strategy of sticking to one's ground.

This broad tradition consisted of different strands: both patriotic threads, which included integral work and a civilized restoration of the oppressed country in oppression, and those of open collaboration.

Paradoxically, communism partially fitted in with both traditions. At its utopian and totalitarian stage, it "measured its strengths against its goals," seeking to build a perfect society on earth. That project had, of course, nothing in common with the patriotic tradition. By concept, it was universal and antinational in nature.

In its postideological phase, communism was increasingly assuming a different slant. For some, it was collaboration and, for others, integral work and positive activities in the interests of reality within the limits set by geography and history.

Using hindsight, we can clearly see Lech Walesa becoming part of Polish history because of both his greatness and his smallness. He was a great hero of our romantic history and sometimes, promising hundreds of millions [zlotys] for everyone, a fairy-tale king. Sometimes, accompanied by [former closest aide] Mieczyslaw Wachowski and the Reverend Franciszek Cybula, he was also King Ubu from a grotesque play by Jarry.

In the deeper sense, however, he was an advocate, whether intentionally or unintentionally, of integration of the Polish tradition with the liberal-democratic-market-oriented modern times. Primarily by instinct and often by coincidence and as a result of compromises and pressures of various traditions and groups, a combination was born reconciling the need for continuity with aspirations to be modern.

Amid all setbacks, off-key notes, the braying of donkeys, and the clucking of hens, a new synthesis was gaining ground. It was (still is?) some kind of a chance for Poland to return to history and the world without losing what was crucial for the Polish nature and its strong presence in history.

Heroes of Aleksander Kwasniewski

The survival of an individual or community depends of its ability to remember and learn. What identity, what elements of the Polish tradition, and what historical values can Kwasniewski offer us? What construction element does the new president want to use to build Poland?

A NEW YORK TIMES correspondent gives a stunning answer to this question. Asked about his heroes, Kwasniewski named Jozef Pilsudski in first place. Let us leave this without comment; this statement so jars the SLD leader's biography, and especially other "heroes." After Pilsudski, the president of the democratic state, which overturned dictatorship and regained full sovereignty, declared that his heroes are Wladyslaw Gomulka, Edward Gierek, and Wojciech Jaruzelski.

The three first secretaries of the PZPR Central Committee should become targets of an impartial study. One can and should make distinctions among them and describe conflicts of values and dramatic choices. But, from the present perspective, can the scholarly deliberations about some "Polish road to socialism"—a totalitarian socialism, not the idea of Daszynski or Ciolkosz—be a matter of pride for someone? Can you wash out Gomulka blood stains of people murdered in the 1940's and on the Baltic Sea coast in December 1970? Is it possible to wipe the disgrace of 1968 out of his biography?

And take the other hero, Gierek! The squanderer, who ruined the country, resolving social conflicts by inflicting debts on generations to come. The man who turned the homespun communism of his predecessor into the kleptocratic communism of the 1970's, where the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" was replaced by the more realistic "Steal and let others steal." A hero? Because, through ignorance and intellectual and moral weaknesses, he contributed to the destruction of Polish communism?

Wojciech Jaruzelski... He has style and a natural dignity. But calling a loyal pupil of the Red Army, a Warsaw Pact general, and the engineer of martial law a hero? I have no doubt that on 13 December [1981, when martial law was declared] he was sure that he was protecting Polish interests. One can understand that, but why make a hero out of him? Because he was the author of the "Round Table talks"? Indeed, he should take credit for that. But what has he done for Poland, except for the fact that he gave it the chance of breaking a tight hold over it—imposed by him and his camp?

Pinochet still has many supporters. Some praise him for the fact that he averted communist domination in

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Chile, others for his economic achievements. No one, however, thanks him for the fact that he gave up power and let democracy back! No one makes heroes out of Greek colonels or Argentine generals! People still remember—at least remember!—the numerous victims they left behind.

In his presidential address, Aleksander Kwasniewski adds to Jozef Pilsudski people cultivating "traditions and practices of Polish resourcefulness," such as Stanislaw Staszic, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, Edward Lipinski, and Oskar Lange. The list is made up in a random manner.

A Poland of Kwasniewski, or Whose?

The president's mission has a great time significance. The president should be a symbol and a guarantee of the continuity of the Polish Republic and the firmness of its moral foundation. He should serve as a link between the present, the heritage of the past, and the future Poland. He should be a symbol of solidarity and responsibility of generations. Poland must not be suspended in the fictional void lit by advertisements of the kitschy present. The problem of traditions and the present offered by Kwasniewski is by no means trivial.

During his campaign rallies, the SLD leader paraphrased Kennedy's words: "Ask not what Poland can do for you; ask what you can do for Poland." What Poland?

Theoretically, Kwasniewski could be an example of the republican way to organize public life as opposed to the purely liberal or Christian vision. It would be a Poland, Res Publica, of responsible and active citizens involved in community life. But it is obvious that the new president is not a supporter of this ideal.

From this perspective, his appeals to go back to work after the elections sounded very funny. Enough of politics! Holidays are over. People with a long memory recalled the famous Gomulka speech of 20 October 1956, when he, taking power, called upon people to return to their everyday business. Politics is for the elite; politics divides. The nation should be united. The efficient authorities will take care of all of our problems.

People voted for Aleksander Kwasniewski because they no longer wanted to see Walesa, but also because of his intelligence, his young age, and his eloquence. For some, he represented the dear past, for others the blue color of the future. But who won if some want to [word indistinct] the historic-mental formation that can be deemed the victor? Kwasniewski's success is not, of course, the victory of communism. Such species do not exist any more. It is the victory of a dependent and obedient Poland over an independent and disobedient Poland, the Poland that chose not a revolt but the adapting, kowtowing, and taking advantage of opportunities offered by limited sovereignty or broad nonsovereignty. It is the victory of a submissive, fearful, and timid Poland, which always, as every normal society, tried to adapt itself and maneuver. Kwasniewski represents the social groups whose lives were shaped by the conditions of dependence and submissiveness.

This, in fact, is what the protection of ordinary people means when one degrades the PRL—a theme that the new president often took up. No reasonable individual ever questioned the everyday work and achievements of millions of people in 1944-89. After all, for PRL daily life, Lech Walesa, a rebellious and persecuted worker coming from the country, was a more typical figure than Kwasniewski climbing the career ladder. Defending the PRL, the latter not only exploits the present-day fear, which is very human, of changes and their high price. He also suits the consciousness and subconsciousness of those who used to kowtow and now want no one to rebuke them for anything.

I am writing these words and realize that they cover only part of the truth because a vote for Kwasniewski was also a voice of the revolt against the new orthodox representatives in public life and the protest against paternalism of the church, treating half of Poles as pagans. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain the massive support for the SLD candidate.

I also know that today the thread of dependence is not connected with the threat of Russification or sovietization of Poland. Paradoxically, the lack of vision and specific ambitions for Poland, the struggle with the church, the ridiculed traditions, the kitschy reality modeled on "supermarkets" of a provincial Western town—all this is pushing us to the caricature of Poland in the West known from sermons by parish priests and bishops. We will have a Poland of the vulgar, not noble, liberalism; and we will have an accelerated secularization, for which the church will be largely responsible.

I am writing this with genuine sadness because I see that Poland may waste its chance for greatness—the greatness whose wonderful manifestation was Solidarity. Today the NIE weekly runs on its first page a drawing with the words "The End" [published in English] written with the Solidarity font.

The Principal Problem of the President

The principal problem to be encountered by the new president is winning support of the Poland that voted against him rather than for Lech Walesa. It will not be an easy task. It may even prove impossible. Aleksander Kwasniewski failed or did not want to use the exceptional opportunity offered by his swearing-in ceremony

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and the subsequent address to the nation. One, however, can imagine what he should do to give himself and Poland a chance.

He should clearly and resolutely own up to his own sins against the truth—as befits a man and without the arrogance he flaunted after his vacations in Spain. Poland will understand. It is more considerate toward sinners than toward hypocrites. He should apologize to all citizens, not only to his own electorate. Acting that way, he suggested that he is going to be the president of half the country—and perhaps the Second and a Half Polish Republic [reference to the PRL].

He should find the proper tone and language so that the formal giving up of his SdRP membership card could mean the actual act of breaking with the PRL and the PZPR, the act of identifying himself with the Third Polish Republic. He should address Poland with words that would elicit confidence in his intentions. He should convince us that he understands those who fear his presidency and that he understands the anxiety many people feel over his biography, as well as the possibility of the revival of old practices and blurring the thick line separating the dictatorship and national dependence of PRL times from independence and democracy. The eruption of the Oleksy case brings a new, dramatic spin to the anxiety over Poland's fate.

He should also show that he understands that the presidency is some sort of blank check made out by citizens that he is supposed to fill out. On the other hand, he should realize that, even if [he was] popularly elected to a democratic position, society has various tools to declare the First Citizen bankrupt and insolvent. He should ensure the feeling of security for those who feel threatened by his election and assess the PRL clearly, decisively, without trickery, or without bending the truth. Only the truth, one and indivisible, can unite the nation.

This act of courage and breaking with the past will have another value: It will relieve the president of the pressure coming from his natural political environment. He then will really become president of the entire Poland. This will allow him to play the role of an arbiter and a factor of control over the present ruling coalition, as well as create the possibility of adopting impartial attitudes toward various legislative initiatives and practical activities of the ruling parties. Also, citizens will be confident that the colonialization of more state and, indirectly, economic institutions is not his goal.

Prophet Jeremiah Pattern

Andrzej Szczypiorski [Polish writer] recently spread an upbeat scenario of the next several years in GAZETA WYBORCZA (No. 286). He believes that Kwasniewski's election will not create any problems because, among other things, citizens do not care about politics.

Szczypiorski may be right. I, however, will try to picture an opposite outcome. Not because I consider it to be imminent, though. I base my assumption on an old Roman principle: If you want peace, prepare for war. Putting it less dramatically, be prepared for hard times. In addition, I know that forecasts made publicly are not all that innocent because they can have an impact on reality. Sometimes they increase the probability of the forecasted events, and sometimes they actually prevent them.

In my fear-ridden predictions, I take prophet Jeremiah as a role model and a guide. Actually, I am not doing it for the first time. Jeremiah used to predict events he wanted to avert. His words contained no approval for resignation. Spreading dark pictures of the future, he wanted to shake up his compatriots and warn them to head off the tragedy.

What will happen—an assumption that, unfortunately, cannot be rejected—if Kwasniewski remains the president of one-half of Poland and if he is viewed by a considerable number of compatriots as an alien? In stable times, you can rule even if you have little authority or social support. However, we do not yet live in stable times. The fact that a position is won democratically but its holder does not enjoy moral support from a part of the nation can quickly lead to a catastrophe. The part of Poland that voted against Kwasniewski will not forget or retreat in indifference and private business.

When the former KUL [Catholic University in Lublin] rector, Father Mieczyslaw Krapiec, says that we should unite around Radio Maryja [Catholic radio station], which he sees as the "only stronghold of Polishness and Catholicism," instead of scoffing at the weird nature of that proposal, we should rather think about the sources and intensity of frustration and alienation. When [Solidarity leader] Marian Krzaklewski talks about the fourth partition [of Poland], one should see in this statement a level of emotions and, perhaps, a growing hatred. When sociologist Jacek Kurczewski, a moderate man, writes: "Under the previous president, no one was afraid that undercover gentlemen would knock on the door in the night; today we see with suspicion if a familiar face of the gentleman who interrogated us in the past leans from behind the president's face, asking whether we really appreciate the solid achievements of

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the Polish People's Republic," this means that those currently ruling Poland should seriously think what causes these fears. These are not only historical reasons, but also other reasons explaining the present behavior of Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia.

The president's supporters misleadingly compare the emotions raised by Kwasniewski's election with the situation of [assassinated] President Narutowicz. True, Narutowicz was not accepted by the nationalist right-wingers, thus rejecting democratic rules, the liberal-democratic orientation of the state, and the principle of equality of citizens. The reasons for the present moral revolt of a part of Poland against Kwasniewski's presidency are the opposite: In its eyes, it is the SLD leader who represents the tradition of dictatorship, national oppression, and the exploitation of the country by the corrupt elite.

Without playing down or justifying the cases of hatred occurring here and there, one should remember that a dramatic outcome, which may assume various forms, can be averted only by addressing the sources of the political alienation currently experienced by the part of Poland humiliated by the election of Kwasniewski as president. This is a task to be done primarily by him and his camp.

What percent of Poles can actively refuse to recognize the new president? Ten? Twenty? Thirty? The rest, remaining far from politics in their everyday life, will return to politics in case of the slightest tension or crisis. It is easy to imagine the politicization of a referendum on the Constitution in which even the most reasonable and compromising draft of a new basic law will fall victim to the "third round of presidential elections" logic—for or against Kwasniewski. It will be a refusal to jointly plan the future. After all, what is the Constitution if not a plan for organizing a common life?

A President of Divisions

Kwasniewski's supporters emphasize his organizational skills and inclination for compromise. This may be his trait as an individual and a politician. As president, however, he immediately became the cause of a deep division of the country.

For all his shortcomings, Lech Walesa, despite his squabbles with politicians and parties, never posed such a threat. His presidency was not a source of deep social divisions. Intentionally or unintentionally, he helped heal conflicts of the past. Kwasniewski, more conciliatory in nature, almost inevitably causes such divisions, opening the healing wounds of remembrance. Kwasniewski, by contrast, vows political stabilization and faster decisionmaking processes, which will be secured by the legislative majority. Sinking into sweet fantasies, [SLD member] Jerzy Wiatr writes about the need to pave the way for a decades-long rule of the SdRP, citing the example of Israeli and Swedish Social Democrats. In practice, however, the policies of Kwasniewski and his camp can deeply divide and destabilize the country. Here is where the real drama is, not in the erroneous comparison to President Narutowicz.

We can expect different attempts, both planned and spontaneous, to disturb the present political arrangement. Efforts to forge a political counterbalance for the Kwasniewski camp are already being made. A pro-Walesa bloc is emerging, whose only natural goal is to kick the SLD out of the saddle at all levels of power.

Some consider this progress: In civilized Polish politics, a two-party system emerges, consisting of social-democratic and left-wing blocs. These two blocs, however, would not be divided on economic and social issues. Rather, a natural line of division would run across democratic policies. No matter what other politicians and observers say, a bloc comprising the ZChN [Christian National Union], the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], and other tiny right-wing groups—even if you add to this motley bunch the Freedom Union—will not be more reform-oriented and progressive than an SLD-PSL bloc. The scenario may even be the opposite.

This division line is a historic line, a moral line, and a line of remembrance. It cuts into old and new Polish wounds. It is a line of fear and revenge. Therefore, Kwasniewski's victory will not make politics more flexible or civilized, nor will it promote understanding and the ability to reach agreement. Walls will be rebuilt, bridges reconstructed, troops up in arms.

A Catastrophic Scenario

What consequences can the perpetuated polarization along the lines drawn by the SLD and Kwasniewski's success produce in practice? Let us let go of fantasies and hope that the below predictions will never come true. Paradoxically, it will not be politics, crippled by the SLD domination, where the major threats will lie. Sources of instability will move elsewhere—to the sphere of symbols, economy, and social life.

For 150 years, Poland lived in cemeteries, bemoaning its most often unhappy heroes. The role of nationwide funerals of Prince Jozef Poniatowski, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, Stanislaw Staszic, Romuald Traugutt, Jozef Pilsudski, and Father Jerzy Popieluszko was very significant. Poland will again find its way to its cemeteries. There will be more and more celebrations in memory of victims of domestic and foreign violence—numerous

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as it is. There will be less and less discussion about victims of Nazism, and more and more about Katyn [scene of mass murders of Polish officers by the Soviet Army in 1940], Siberia, UB and SB [former names of Polish security services] prisoners, victims of the June and December [who died at the hands of Polish police during street fights], shipyard workers, Wujek coal miners...

Neither the president nor the prime minister will be invited to participate in these events. Should they want to pay tribute to the victims, they will have to overstep a symbolic border separating two Polands—the border drawn by National Remembrance Priests. As a result, they will revere the victims secretly, behind the shield of the Army and the police.

Therefore, this will be a partly conscious and partly spontaneous effort to delegalize "their state." Of course, the overwhelming majority of Poles will not participate in this because most of the citizens will engage in symbolic politics, an important part of our traditions. This majority, however, will be one of the forces shaping the atmosphere in the country. There will be more and more Requiem Masses, maybe Masses for the homeland. Some already promise that they will sing "Lord, Please Return Our Homeland to Us." Treason charges against Jozef Oleksy will renew and give more purpose to the policy of identity and impotence.

To step up the opposition to the reality, a large part of Poland will retreat into the past and internal emigration [opposition to authorities not shown publicly]. This is how the modernism of Kwasniewski will push Poland to anachronisms! For open and hidden supporters of the new power, this will confirm the correctness of their choice.

People—students, high school students, political extremists—will again march in the streets, demonstrating, jeering, pouring red paint on the Cabinet of Ministers and the Namiestnikowski Palace [presidential palace formerly inhabited by Russian czar governors in Poland] to remind us of the origin of its name. They will carry posters with a gallows, a red pig, or red acid [Kwasniewski's nickname, "Kwas," means acid in Polish]. They will write obscenities on their slogans. They will picket different ministries, particularly the Interior Ministry, with [former Interior Minister] Milczanowski no longer inside.

What will the government do if the demonstrations go beyond the limits of acceptable verbal violence? And if it comes to shoving, attacks on the police, and attempts to break into state institutions? What will the authorities do if the above actions have the explicit intention of showing the impotence of power, ridiculing and humiliating it? Will Kwasniewski have the courage to send the police and the Army against them? Troops with tear gas and water cannons?

Will he realize at that point what it means in practice to give the ghosts of Gomulka and Jaruzelski the status of heroes and patrons of his presidency? Will he realize that people on the other side will have—but much sooner than he—the same associations? Will he realize that people, some deliberately and others because of fear and the feeling of impotence, will play a scenario—certainly, its more civilized version—written as part of a long litany of anguished Polish towns stained with blood in PRL times, and that the Polish martyr consciousness will make another flower cross of this?

And if Kwasniewski lacks the courage to protect public order by force, will he find other means to head off anarchy in Poland? To do this, he will need, among other things, legitimacy, whose dramatic absence at this point may badly hurt the SLD leader.

What will the authorities do in case civil disobedience starts to spread across the country? Or in case of refusal to pay taxes? To pay for apartments, water, gas, electricity? Will they throw people out on the street and strip them of the basic means of living? Or will they passively watch the state decaying?

What will happen if, following the liberalization of abortion laws, pledged by Kwaskniewski, Poland becomes a scene of a real antiabortion crusade against doctors, clinics, and hospitals? Such illegal actions happen in the United States and even in secularized France. In those countries, however, the state can cope with attempts to disturb legal order. In a state controlled by the SLD, the danger and probability of such behavior will significantly increase. Will the authorities have the guts to send police detachments against Father Tadeusz Rydzyk or Father Henryk Jankowski? Will they risk a confrontation with radical young priests—the Episcopate will surely be moderate—modeling on patriotic traditions dating back to the times of partitions, occupation, and Father Jerzy [Popieluszko killed by security police agents]?

Public opinion, influenced by pictures of violence and intolerance justified by the common good, may tilt even further in favor of visions publicized by the SLD putting guards of Law, Authority of the State, and Democratic, Liberal, and Humanitarian principles on the one side, and the forces of Intolerance, Darkness, Thick Conservatism, Province, Nationalism, Clericalism, and other unpleasant "isms" on the other [sentence as published]. Both sides will increasingly plunge into stereotypes, contempt, and fear.

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Is it that hard to imagine strikes staged by railroad workers, miners, metallurgists, or arms-industry workers? Something should be done about those industry branches that devour a large portion of the state budget. In a new situation, will the leftist government have the courage to do something? If it does undertake something and meets strong opposition, will it be capable of countering it?

There are so many possibilities and places where strikes can break out. How about the need to reform the pension system? And do not forget about benefits for the unemployed. Is the hypothesis that the authorities will pay money to bridge the painful credibility gap all that unrealistic? It is just like in the 1970's and 1980's, when the weak authorities bribed employees with financial concessions to diminish discontent—which was civil in nature.

I have already mentioned that Kwasniewski attached great importance to economic performance and the macroeconomic balance in proving the contemporaneity and responsibility of his formation, as well as its caring about finances and the budget. Indeed, it would be bitter irony if the achievements of the president's policies are ruined by his remarkable victory, as well as revenge—which may seem irrational—the feeling of being wronged, and people's memories.

A Joint, Although Diversified, Responsibility

Kwasniewski and his political camp are responsible for the possible consequences of the present national trial, which has become more dramatic because of the Oleksy case. They will not be able to shift the blame onto other people for the social and economic consequences of their strategy, aimed at seeking full power. More shrewd SLD representatives have warned against this for a long time now. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz pointed to the danger of a Pyhrric victory.

Their responsibility or, rather, the lack thereof for what may happen is no justification for the part of Poland that lost with Lech Walesa. Adopting a natural attitude of decisive opposition against the SLD and expressing its resentment over Aleksander Kwasniewski's behavior, it must not promulgate an oppositional attitude against the state and its popularly elected top representative.

All of us are responsible for curbing a possible crisis—camp in power, Lech Walesa, the political opposition parties, trade unions, and, of course, the church. We must display common sense and goodwill to maintain social peace, economic development, and civilized democratic relations.

Poland: Poland's Defense Potential Analyzed

WS3001131796 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 18 Jan 96 p 10

[Article by Dariusz Dukat: "Army at Crossroads"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Analysts of the Polish military potential note that, when it comes to such weapons as those embraced by the so-called Paris limits (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery over 100 mm, aircraft, and helicopters), the Polish Army has a slight edge over that of the former Czechoslovakia, is on a par with Belarus, and lags behind Ukraine, Germany, and Russia. They are drawing pessimist conclusions about Poland's defense potential. Taking into consideration combat units of operational armed forces and an armed conflict with a Western or Eastern neighbor (Russia), they estimate that Polish territory would be occupied in 10 to 20 days.

The awareness of this disproportion is quite common among the staff of our Army but, unfortunately, not among our politicians. Politicians, even if they wanted to, have enormous difficulty explaining to society that it has to bear an additional burden for defense. It is because a potential aggressor is undefinable, a threat—unspecified—and, on top of that, we are heading toward NATO, after all, the alliance that has safeguarded peace for decades. The military, in turn, after years of dictates from Warsaw Pact staff, find it difficult to democratically manage the entire defense system.

The Warsaw Pact period of the Cold War (including the previous independence efforts and 20 years between the wars) was a time of the military's domination over civilian structures. It has remained in the mentality not only of the generals. The military is convinced that no one is a better expert on defense than itself and that it is a waste of time to talk to those who are ignorant (which is how they regard politicians). Politicians are to allocate money only. [passage omitted]

I found out lately that only in May of last year, after four years of "peace," only a few dozen (!) college graduates were drafted to undergo military training. As if one forgot that it is the college graduates who will become the leaders of the economy, state institutions, and politics. The General Staff argues that the Army does not have enough money to take on more. But was it not worth it to save at least on the notorious rings [awarded to some 50 generals] to create a prodefense lobby? As we have written in the columns of GLOS SZCZECINSKI, those who did best in regional exercises in extramilitary territorial defense were those who had had military training. The expected solution was launching courses for managerial staff at

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the Academy of National Defense, but they are only a partial solution because they concern only the present staff and those who have the time and willingness to bear such additional burdens.

Let us come back to the Army's potential. Pessimistic assessments should have an effect on analyzing armed forces concepts anew. Experience coming from many armed conflicts make us take a closer look at the role of operational forces and that portion that in Poland is called the armies of territorial defense. If we are aware that the task of defeating an opponent is unreal, a natural course of events should be making the defense time longer and delivering the heaviest losses. International reaction and organizing resistance take time, and casualties create social reaction. If these factors are part of the calculation, is the conflict worth developing? [passage omitted]

Can we draw conclusions for ourselves? The military taught to work for operational forces are also at a crossroads: to strengthen tank brigades, armored units, air forces...or perhaps to allocate part of the means to smaller subdivisions of territorial armies that would act on their own territory. Such armies will not win wars but can inflict damage on occupation forces through guerrilla warfare. On top of this, it is important to note that territorial subdivisions require only basic training, which is shorter and cheaper, and less sophisticated equipment. [passage omitted]

Basic Weapons of Poland and Neighboring Countries

	Tanks	Armored Vehicles	100-mm Plus Artillery	Aircraft	Helicopters
Poland	1,730	2,150	1,610	460	130
Russia	6,400	11,480	6,415	3,450	890
Germany	4,166	3,446	2,705	900	306
Ukraine	4,080	5,050	4,040	1,090	330
Belarus	1,800	2,600	1,615	260	80
Czech Republic	957	1,367	767	227	50
Slovakia	478	683	383	118	25

Poland: Defense Official on Army Spending

WS3101145296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 Jan 96 p 4

[Interview with the head of the Finance Department of the Polish Ministry of National Defense, General Tadeusz Grabowski, by Pawel Wronski; place and date not given: "Quadrillions Not To Be Sneered At"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wronski] How much money is needed to make the Polish Armed Forces as modern as their counterparts in the West?

[Grabowski] Approximately 2 quadrillion old zlotys [Z] (last year's total budget revenues were some Z835 trillion—ed.) for equipment purchases alone.

[Wronski] Is modernizing our Armed Forces at all possible in this case?

[Grabowski] It is impossible to catch up with the most modern armies, such as those in Israel, the United States, and Germany, where approximately 40 percent of the equipment is new. The share of the gross domestic product allocated to the Army is similar in Poland and Germany, but their product is 12 times as big! No one who is realistic about increasing our defense potential wants us to catch up with the Germans. It is absurd to stockpile military weapons when there is no military threat in our region. Our partners in the West are not demanding this of us, but, in the future, at least 30 percent of the military budget should be allocated for modernizing the Army.

[Wronski] Yet the General Staff and the generals are demanding money now.

[Grabowski] Generals the world over demand money. What is unusual about that? If, however, you watch television and see a sick child with an IV drip who might die because there is no money to treat him and then you see a new tank model that could be purchased, what do you choose? People would choose the child, and they would be right. I myself am a general, but I would choose the child, too.

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[Wronski] How much money will the Ministry of National Defense [MON] receive this year?

[Grabowski] The sum of Z8.3231 billion [new], the budgetary reserve for salary increases inclusive. Salaries and pensions will devour 55.2 percent of this amount. This year, for the first time in a decade, the Army budget is higher in real terms by more than 4 percent.

[Wronski] How much will we spend on new weapons this year?

[Grabowski] Approximately 10.5 percent. This is 6 percent more than last year. We will purchase, among other things, 20 Twardy tanks, several helicopters, and some 1,000 field radios because the ones we have are no good. Our units in Croatia, for example, were unable to communicate with each other, and we had to switch to Western equipment. We have to spend some 30 percent more on spare parts and 1.5 times more on overhaul as compared with 1995. Many units formally had equipment, but it was stored in garages. Simple parts like car batteries and tires were lacking.

[Wronski] Who will pay for our mission in Bosnia?

[Grabowski] The government is laying out Z35 million [new] for the purpose. It still remains unknown what MON's contribution is to be—talks are still under way. After the first survey carried out by our officers in Bosnia, it seems that the costs will be higher than anticipated. Thus far, the UN has paid for everything whenever we took part in peace missions. Now we will have to cover the costs of accommodation, supplies, and any damage repairs. We will even have to submit fees for driving huge machines on roads. Ever since the locals and authorities learned that NATO troops would be stationed there, prices in those regions soared.

[Wronski] And you are saying that so calmly?

[Grabowski] Our credibility and big politics are at stake. We will find money for that. For us, it is an extraordinary experience: For the first time, we will know the real costs of sending our troops on foreign missions.

[Wronski] In 1989, in observance of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreements, we reduced our Army. How did we benefit from that?

[Grabowski] The Army was reduced by 40 percent, and we saved some 3.5 percent of our budget. Units working for the national economy were the first to go. We had, for example, 11 railway regiments. Our boys laid rail tracks all year round, and we got money from the Ministry of Transportation. Many of these units were financially self-sufficient. When we had bumper crops, commanders canceled military exercises and sped off with their battalions to dig potatoes at the State Farms [PGR]. The unit received something in return from the PGR; that is how it functioned. This was completely paranoid.

[Wronski] During the debate on state defense, you suggested that the size of the Army should depend on the financial condition of the state. How big do you think the Army should be?

[Grabowski] I do not decide about the size of the Army, and I am not the one to ask about this. During one of the MON sessions, I was asked whether I saw a possibility of increasing outlays on the Army considering the condition of the national economy. I said at the time that there was and would be no money in the immediate future. This is a hard fact we have to face. We have to focus on something. We should specify which units are to be developed and what type of arms should be purchased and manufactured so as to spend the money we get in the best possible way. That is why the idea of planning five years ahead at MON is so important. Politicians and the military alike would thus be able to clearly specify the direst needs. Besides, it would be much easier to exercise civilian control over the Army. Politicians could hold the military responsible for what was actually done. I believe there is no better way of controlling the Army than checking what it spends its money on.

Poland: Official Criticizes Kolodko's Economic Program

LD3101141196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslaw Pietrewicz, head of the Central Planning Office [CUP], said that Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko's economic program is focused too much on maintaining the financial indicators. In his opinion, the economic prospects for this year are good, but they could be spoiled by, as he put it, manipulation of financial tools.

[Begin Pietrewicz recording] If we decide that the main objective is to drastically reduce the budget deficit—please note: from about 2.9 percent last year to 1.7 in the year 2000—this would mean either a reduction in expenditure or an increase in income by approximately 9-10 trillion old zlotys per year. At the same time, it was announced that taxes would be reduced—two thresholds would be lowered, one would be abolished. Consequently, income would be reduced.

What would this mean? At least a very slow increase in expenditure or perhaps bringing the increase in expenditure in real terms to a halt. How, in this situation,

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can we resolve our most fundamental social and political problems, the priorities we are talking about? [end recording]

On 30 January, Pietrewicz, head of CUP and candidate of the Polish Peasant Party for the post of prime minister, resigned as a candidate for the post. It has been learned unofficially that the reason was the differences of opinion on economic policies between Pietrewicz and Kolodko.

Poland: Shadow Economy in Country Discussed

WS3101144496 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 16 Jan 96 p 5

[Article by Krzysztof Nielaba and Agata Pustulka: "Shadow Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *According to experts from the Central Statistical Office [GUS], the gray zone generates 18 percent of the registered gross domestic product [GDP] in Poland.*

Market activity, apart from legal regulations, also embraces those areas of human activity whose limits are hard to define. That is why it is often called the second economic circulation or parallel economy, unmonitored economy, untaxed economy, or simply the gray zone.

The gray zone includes, among other things, the activity of registered entities that conceal their income; companies lowering the volume of their production or services to avoid paying taxes and dues to the Social Security Agency [ZUS]; individuals and legal entities that are active but not registered, illegal imports and exports; dealings that aim to avoid restrictions on the financial market such as ignoring credit controls, exchange rates, capital flow limits, and other goods and services (drugs, alcohol, and prostitution).

The gray zone's biggest revenues were at the beginning of the 1990's. In just the years 1989-91, the Treasury lost 40 trillion old zlotys [Z] as a result of corrupt alcohol schemes in which alcohol, fuel, rubles, tobacco, and potatoes were illegally shipped to and from Poland.

The success of the underground economy stemmed from the overall economic condition of the country, especially a deep recession that made people engage in illegal undertakings. It was standard procedure that the unemployed who were on the dole would take jobs from time to time to replenish their household budget. The National Labor Inspectorate [PIP] reports that Poles working in the gray zone most often were engaged in the trade and...construction sectors. At private construction sites, gray zone estates were created, while bazaars were full of unlicensed traders.

The second economic circulation reached its culmination in 1992. The gray zone volume was calculated then at the level of almost 20 percent of the registered GDP. Since 1993, the offensive of the legal economy has begun, which dramatically lowered gray zone revenues. Many entrepreneurs of the shadow economy started to act officially and pay taxes.

Last year, the participation of the gray zone in the nation's economy totaled 15-18 percent of the GDP. Today, about 2-3 million Poles are working in the gray zone. For 1 million of them, working in this area is the only source of income, mainly in the villages of provinces situated on the so-called eastern wall, where the unemployment rate is the highest in the country. Residents of cities and little towns benefit from the gray zone, too. GUS estimates that 40 percent of the gray zone has been located in trade and only 6 percent in industry. Much of it is in transportation, and there is quite a lot in construction.

"If one taxed the gray zone, a part of it would disappear, whereas the remaining part's turnover would decrease. Thus taxes would not be as high as the theoretical estimates show," says Professor Leszek Zienkowski, director of the GUS statistics and economic research team. "One can say that the budget loses with the existence of the gray zone. On the other hand, if one liquidated the gray zone, it would lead to a growth of unemployment and a slowing of the pace of Poland's economic development." [passage omitted]

Experts say that liquidation of the gray zone should concern only criminal economic activities (for instance, producing drugs or alcohol). Its other aspects can become legal because they demonstrate Poles' entrepreneurship. Perhaps this is the reason the gray zone exists in such well-developed countries—for instance, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. In those countries, the gray zone "generates" 10-30 percent of the registered GDP.

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Romania: Engineer Battalion To Depart for Bosnia 20 Feb

96P20249A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 20-21 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Gabriela Stefan: "Six Million Mines Await the Romanian Engineer Battalion in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania will participate in the IFOR [Implementation Force] action in Bosnia with an engineer battalion consisting of 200 soldiers specializing in roads and bridges. Yesterday, the General Staff [of the Army], along with the General Staff of the ground forces, carried out a review of the battalion, a military activity which precedes the execution of a mission. Starting today, the Romanian soldiers are ready to be deployed at any time. Division General Ilie Marin, the spokesman for the chief of the General Staff of the Army, gave us the following details in regard to this action:

In light of the situation in the area and the needs of the IFOR leadership, the Romanian battalion will be called to Bosnia about 20 February. Until then, the Romanian soldiers will continue their training for this specific mission, which is not at all easy. It is estimated that there are 6 million mines of the latest generation on the ground in Bosnia. The Romanian engineers have very important work to do there, work upon which the execution of other missions, such as the construction of roads and bridges, depends. We are talking about military roads for penetration and footbridges for the movement of troops, and not highways or wide bridges.

Our battalion will be deployed in Zenica, approximately 60-80 km from Sarajevo, in the British protective zone whose control point is in Gornji Vakuf. The Romanians are subordinate, as a result of a limited transfer of authority, to the rapid reaction corps (ARRC) which has its headquarters in Kiseljak. This subordination has been specified, in exact terms, by international agreements to which Romania is party and this is necessary so that the military force will be able to take action.

The barracks in which the Romanian engineers will be billeted belong to the Zenica iron and steel combine and the rent is $50,000 a month, that is, $600,000 a year (only for the walls, without water, electricity, etc). All the expenses for this action are paid by each participating country. Between 10 and 15 January, a group of Romanian officers, headed by Colonel Constantin Teodorescu, made a reconnaissance visit to Sarajevo, Zenica, and Zagreb. The troops will travel by rail in February.

The commander of the engineer battalion is Col. Constantin Vartopeanu Graur, 43 years of age. Soldiers going to Bosnia are volunteers. The 200 soldiers, hired on a contract basis, were selected from the 500 tested. Their age is 25 or 26. The pay is the same as in Angola—$980 a month for a soldier.

The instruction consists of engineer training (the Romanians will be removing mines from the zone), firing with all categories of weapons, special training for each specialty, English-language and Serbian-language problems, and general information (Who are the Serbs and the Croats?; What are the customs of the people in the zone?, etc.).

Romania: Local Elections Scheduled for 21 Apr

AU3001175696 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Constanta Corpade: "Adrian Nastase Announces Local Elections for 21 April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It is very likely that the first round of the local elections will be held on 21 April and the second round at the beginning of May" said yesterday Adrian Nastase, president of the Chamber of Deputies, on a brief electoral visit in Alba Iulia Municipality. Coming from Focsani and on his way to Targu Mures, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] executive president, accompanied by Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila and Miron Mitrea, secretary general of the ruling party, stopped over for a few hours for talks with the leaders of the PDSR country organization and the leaders of that party's municipality organization. Referring to the electoral law, Mr. Nastase said: "In any case, the law cannot be finalized—considering that it involves mediation and promulgation—before the end of February. Thus, this means that, in effect, March and a part of April will be the election campaign period. Then, the Catholic Easter is celebrated on 7 April and the Orthodox Easter on 14 April; therefore, the first round of elections will take place after these holidays."

Romania: UDMR Not To Field Candidate for Cluj Mayor

AU3101093796 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 26 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Virgil Lazar: "UDMR Cluj Will Not Field Candidate for the Office of Mayor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lajos Molnos, president of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Cluj Branch, referring to the approaching campaign for local elections, expressed his belief that "the Romanians are also fed up with Gheorghe Funar [president of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR]" when it

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comes to local services. (...) Mr. Molnos said, "The considerable strengthening of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] organizations in this area and the spectacular rise of the Social Democratic Union [USD] in Cluj, as well as the known and confirmed existence of opposition parties are all against the PUNR's interest. If we add to all this the dissatisfaction of the Romanian population and the fact that he will obviously be rejected by the Hungarian inhabitants of Cluj (20 percent—editor's note), then Gheorghe Funar's chances of winning are nil." According to Lajor Molnos, the UDMR will not field a candidate for the position of mayor of Cluj-Napoca municipality because this would help the PUNR, which would use this as a pretext in the campaign to scare the Romanian population—as it has done before—with the so-called Hungarian danger.

Romania: PNTCD's Ratiu on Party, Electoral Issues

AU3101145896 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 23 Jan 96 p 6

["Exclusive" interview with PNTCD Vice President Ion Ratiu by Mihaela Iordache; place and date not given: "I Sacrifice Myself for Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Iordache] Mr. Ratiu, when you ran for PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] president, did you think you could win?

[Ratiu] I only ran for PNTCD president to give the elections a democratic character. I knew I would not win because, in 41 of the 47 polling stations, the leadership had been replaced recently. Therefore, all these people were in direct contact with the center.

[Iordache] Do you believe you did the party a favor by running for PNTCD president—meaning that the elections could not be contested?

[Ratiu] I hope so. I wanted the elections to be democratic and I wanted people to see that they are democratic, which is why I believed it was essential for me to run. I sacrifice myself for democracy. I sacrificed myself for democracy in 1990 when I came to Romania. I did not do it for some enormous benefit. Do you believe that I was so narrow-minded not to realize that I would not become Romania's president? I was sure that I would not be able to win. I fought as much as I could to bring about democracy. This has to be continued in the next elections as well. You do not necessarily have to win, but you have to fight and express your viewpoint, and if your viewpoint is not accepted, then you continue to support the same organization in the hope that maybe one day your ideas will be acknowledged as good ones.

[Iordache] Are you determined to run for Romania's presidency?

[Ratiu] If the party does not support me, I will not run for president.

[Iordache] Several changes took place in the PNTCD leadership at the party's recent congress, as well as changes regarding the promotion of some younger members. How do you view the election of the PNTCD leadership?

[Ratiu] I want to promote young people as quickly as possible. Young people understand me better than middle-aged people. Ion Diaconescu [PNTCD president] has actually been the one leading the party for the past two years. I knew that Corneliu Coposu [former PNTCD president] was terminally ill with cancer (I had this confirmed by physicians in Germany). I did not tell anybody because he did not want anybody to know about it. During that time, marked by Mr. Coposu's long periods of absence, Diaconescu led the party. Gabriel Tepelea (currently first vice president of the party) fulfilled the duty of the head of the entire study and research department that produced the party documents. Radu Vasile (currently general secretary) was the party's spokesman. Thus, we remained the same, but in different functions. In any event, no matter who is in the leadership, we must support it, and we will do so.

A party president must have a clear idea of the goals that we intend to pursue, as well as a succinct and intelligible program that can be easily assimilated by anybody in this country and can mobilize all forces, especially young people, to go to villages and campaign like they do in the West. In the West, you get the young people to put a party leaflet in every one's mailbox.

[Iordache] In the electoral campaign, the PNTCD will be supported by the Conservative Party in Great Britain. How will this support take shape?

[Ratiu] First of all, experts will help us. In other words, we are not talking exclusively of financial support (to the extent that the electoral law permits), but also of experts who help us to carry out the most effective possible campaign. I will probably think of other people who can support us; however, at the moment, I am not involved in these activities of our party. In general, the PNTCD will be supported by the Conservative Party in Great Britain.

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Romania: Diaconescu Outlines PNTCD Electoral Goals

AU3101100596 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 26 Jan 96 p 4

[Interview with Ion Diaconescu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, by Andreea Munteanu; place and date not given: "The PNTCD Does Not Dance to the Tune of Others"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Munteanu] Mr. Diaconescu, what priorities are on the agenda of the newly elected president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]?

[Diaconescu] First of all, we must reorganize the party's internal activity, beginning with the center itself. For a year now, the General Secretariat had to suffer because there was no general secretary and I had to also deputize for this absentee position, on top of my other duties. Therefore, two weeks from now we will hold a meeting of the Steering Committee, which is authorized to appoint the deputy general secretaries, the Honorary and Discipline Jury, and the Complaints Commission. There are many things yet to be done regarding our internal organization. Then follows the electoral battle. Within the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], we will have to establish the candidates for the positions of mayors and councillors at least in the big cities, because our local branches will appoint the respective candidates for the communes and smaller towns. Theoretically, everything is set, but we still have a lot to do in this respect.

[Munteanu] Since we have reached the subject of the elections, what is the message you will present to the electorate?

[Diaconescu] For the local elections, each candidate for the position of mayor will have his own message, depending on the specific characteristics of the respective locality and the people's needs. As far as the general elections are concerned, we will present a practical program, with which the CDR plans to directly address itself to the population. This address will resemble the "Contract With Romania." We intend to improve it before the elections. However, the Contract With Romania is an offer, not a political program. We are also preparing such a program, which will include our viewpoint on redressing our economy, which was brought to the brink of the precipice. This program, which is still being worked upon, will be our main asset in the general elections. Regarding the lists for the local elections, they will be finalized by 1 March, after the adoption by Parliament of the law on the parties and the law on the local elections.

[Munteanu] What is your opinion about the message sent to you by President Ion Iliescu, who hopes for cooperation with the PNTCD and calls upon it to join the "reforming democratic forces?"

[Diaconescu] This invitation to dance is not the first and probably not the last one either. What is certain is that we do not have the same definition for the term "democracy." From the way they say it, it is clear that they consider themselves "democratic forces," but we do not agree with that. If we wanted to join them, we would have done it a long time ago. After more than three years in power, their balance sheet profoundly negative, we do not intend to join the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] before the elections. We will engage in the electoral battle to win and lead the political game. We do not plan to join them and thus become their annexes.

[Munteanu] After the PNTCD congress, the party's leadership was substantially rejuvenated. Certain long-standing party members—I am particularly referring to Messrs. Ioan Lup and Valentin Gabrielescu—have lost their leading positions. How do you interpret this?

[Diaconescu] Ioan Lup no longer belonged to the leadership. However, he remains the president of the party's Senate. Regarding Valentin Gabrielescu, he was reprimanded by the Congress, as was only to be expected, for the way in which he behaved during Ion Iliescu's hearing by the December 1989 Commission. The reaction of the party members was harsh and even though Mr. Gabrielescu tried to gain back the party's trust, he failed to carry it off. We are very good friends, and I hope that the result of the voting will not make him distance himself from the party. He is a long-standing and basic member. Both of us did time in jail [during the communist regime] and I hope that he will stay with us, because there are also other ways to make headway within the party.

[Munteanu] Do you think that one should find a way of cooperating among all opposition parties to win the elections?

[Diaconescu] I believe that it would be ideal to find a way to coagulate the opposition by the CDR model. However, I realize that this target would be very hard and maybe even impossible to attain. As everybody knows, there were and still are problems within the CDR proper. There are differences within each party and an alliance among all those in the opposition would be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we will find a general formula for backing each other. I am primarily thinking of the technical supervision of the elections and of supporting the best placed candidates for the city hall, the presidency, and so forth.

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It is a pity that many opposition parties will not manage to exceed the 5-percent threshold, which means that many votes will be lost like that. It is very difficult to establish common lists for the elections. We are open to any discussions and we hope that we will eventually find a way to solve this problem. We do not turn down anyone, in principle. We would even agree to a return of the parties which have left the CDR at the beginning of last year, provided they do not cause trouble and accept our protocol, which stipulates the support for a single presidential candidate and participation in elections on common lists.

[Munteanu] Since you mentioned the presidential elections, it is known that the CDR will support Mr. Emil Constantinescu's candidacy. At the same time, it is known that Mr. Ion Ratiu also wants to run this year. Do you think it possible for Mr. Ratiu to run in the presidential elections as the candidate of another political grouping, which would conceivably request his services?

[Diaconescu] I know that Ion Ratiu is wise enough not to do such a thing. He has a good position in the party and he has repeatedly said that he would respect our decisions. With a past like his, it is a pity not to capitalize on it within the PNTCD, particularly since the people here respect and appreciate him.

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Slovenia: Replacements for Resigned Ministers Named

AU3101175596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's extraordinary session, the State Chamber deputies will be told about the resignation of the remaining three ministers from the United List. According to information from Liberal Democracy, the prime minister will propose the remaining three candidates as early as this week. However, their names have already been mentioned in public.

The candidate for new cultural minister will be Majda Sirca, a journalist at the cultural office of Slovene Television. According to what we have learned, she has already accepted the candidacy. The Liberal Democracy Executive Committee has endorsed Prime Minister Drnovsek's proposal for Dr. Ivan Svetlik as candidate for the post of minister of labor, family, and social affairs. We have learned that Dr. Ivan Svetlik, dean of the Faculty for Social Sciences and president of the National Council for Property Transformation of Schools, has turned down this ministerial post.

The name of the candidate for the minister for science and technology has also appeared in public. Professor Stane Pejovnik, director of the Ljubljana Chemical Institute, however, has so far not been officially informed about the proposal.

The Liberal Democracy leadership says that filling the vacant ministerial posts should not be a matter of party membership. The coalition partner, the Christian Democrats, agree and Liberal Democracy is considering candidates whose views do not oppose party policy.

The Christian Democrats expect the prime minister first of all to propose government work for the coming period and that the new amendment to the coalition agreement should be signed by the end of next month.

The names of the three candidates that have been publicly mentioned have not been coordinated with the Christian Democrats. In meetings held so far, the party leaderships have not discussed names. However, the Christian Democrats do have proposals for some vacant ministerial posts.

Slovenia: LDS Official on United List Departure

AU0102094696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Political parties are reacting today to yesterday's State Chamber session and the political situation in the wake of the United List's departure from the coalition. At today's news conference, Gregor Golobic, secretary general of Liberal Democracy [LDS], said that a meeting with the Christian Democrats on coordinating the future government program and filling vacant ministerial posts will continue in the afternoon. Sandi Frelih has the details.

[Frelih] According to the LDS secretary general, the prime minister's proposal on replacing the economics minister had nothing to do with the government parties' failure to fulfill budget agreements. Gregor Golobic is of the opinion that the no-confidence motion on Maks Tajnikar was in fact declared by the United List as it voted against the policy he had carried out in his domain, as if to say that rejecting amendments to pension laws would considerably weaken the economic situation.

Golobic pointed out that there are no reasons for pensions to increase more than wages and added that the United List's decision to leave the government was made in a hurry. In reply to Janez Jansa's remark that United List's departure has weakened Slovenia's international position, Golobic said that such assessments demonstrate lack of arguments and of capability of making analyses. In Golobic's opinion, government parties have a sufficient parliament majority for adopting regulations on current issues. At the same time, he said that the LDS does not want any harsh disagreements between the opposition and coalition but expects constructive cooperation. In this respect, it reckons with parties that are ready to support projects on which they already worked and they include foreign policy, functioning of the state, economy, and the like.

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Federal

FRY: France To Appoint Ambassador to FRY 'Soon'

AU3101213196 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Statement by (Gabriel Keler), charge d'affaires of the French Embassy in Yugoslavia, for the Radio-Television of Serbia; place and date not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] France is happy with the new situation created in the wake of the signing of peace agreements in Paris and the suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia by the Security Council. European Union countries can therefore reexamine their stance toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. Within the framework of such a reexamination, we, of course, agree with our European partners who think that normalization of relations between the FRY and its neighbors, as well as mutual recognition of all republics that have been created from the earlier Yugoslavia, including Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], are necessary for the final solving of the crisis. Therefore, we insist on the normalization and stabilization of the entire region.

One of the issues that should be solved is the succession of the earlier Yugoslavia, that is, the issue of division of assets and liabilities. We are of the opinion that all republics that have been created from the earlier Yugoslavia are equal successors to that state. It is for them to decide how that succession will develop and to do so within the working group that has already been dealing with the issue.

Moreover, as far as France is concerned, there is no legal necessity to recognize the FRY. We have not discontinued diplomatic relations with Belgrade. We only withdrew our ambassador in 1992, just as other European countries did. Since that time, we have been holding diplomatic relations at the level of charge d'affaires. According to French law, holding diplomatic relations with a country at the same time means recognition of the country. Due to the new situation that I have just spoken about, France will appoint and ambassador to Belgrade soon. It will thus be one of the first countries to do so, which is in compliance to the tradition of mutual friendship.

Appreciation will thereby be expressed for the efforts that the FRY exerted in the service of peace. This will at the same time make it possible to start a dialogue at the highest level, as Yugoslavia is a country that should become a full-fledged partner.

FRY: Opposition: Movement Needed on Kosovo, War Crimes

LD3101221296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2100 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 31 (TANJUG)—A Serbian opposition leader said on Wednesday that it must be realised that Yugoslavia's reintegration in the world depended on its dealing with the problem of the province of Kosovo-Metohija and cooperating with The Hague war crimes tribunal.

Speaking at a press conference, Democratic Party of Serbia leader Vojislav Kostunica said that the European Union's ministerial conference in Brussels on Monday [29 January] had failed to define a united policy towards Yugoslavia.

This was due, he said, to some E.U. states regarding the issue of Kosovo-Metohija as more important for the recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) than that of mutual recognition among the former Yugoslav republics.

Kostunica said that the West saw a solution for Serbia's southern province of Kosovo-Metohija as lying in giving the province wide autonomy.

He went on to say that there were many indications that The Hague tribunal for war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia was biased, but that nevertheless it must be cooperated with.

Cooperation with The Hague tribunal might give the world a truer picture of the developments in former Yugoslavia than the one painted in the past years, Kostunica said.

Vesna Pesic of the opposition Civic Alliance of Serbia also declared herself on Wednesday in favour of cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal, describing it as part of the Dayton peace accord and as useful and in no way detrimental to Yugoslavia.

Pesic told a press conference that it was in the interest of Yugoslavia to recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) under the name it had defined for itself in its constitution.

Opposition Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic said on Tuesday that his party's parliamentary club had moved in the federal parliament for a law on Yugoslavia's cooperation with The Hague tribunal to be passed in a summary procedure.

The tribunal's prosecutor Richard Goldstone has so far indicted 45 Serbs and 7 Croats.

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FRY: Telecommunications Modernization Reported

96BA0072A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 95 p 26

[Article by Z. Mihic: "Pulling Our Heads Out of the Sand"]

[FBIS Translated Text] High officials of PTT Srbija had an opportunity last week, for the first time in their country, to show off a bit, and nonchalantly pull a cellular phone from the pockets of their jackets because someone was making a wireless call to them right at that moment. Their joy at this new telephonic device was all the greater because they were able to display it in the TELFOR 95 annual telecommunications forum, which brought together more than 1,000 of the country's telecommunications experts. Radoje Kontic, federal prime minister, announced the main news from that professional meeting on the very first day when he said that by next March the government will submit the proposed version of the new Law on Telecommunications, which also means new rules of the game for this most competitive communications services market.

While we have spent the last three and a half years of sanctions like ostriches, with our heads buried in the sand so as not to see what was happening in Europe and the advanced world of telecommunications, today we are lagging far behind that development. The experts would say that the sanctions hurt our telecommunications system at the most sensitive moment, while it was preparing for the leap into new technologies. At the same time, foreign capital is already seeking opportunities to capture the Balkan telecommunications market, but there is no regulatory legislation or "rules of the game"—what this state is ready to relinquish and what it intends to keep in its own national offering. What we do know is that this state needs about $6 billion to achieve the optimistic average of 40 telephones per 100 inhabitants of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in the year 2005, while today that density is half as high (20 telephones per 100 inhabitants). To see how we stand in Europe: Sweden, for instance, has 71 telephones per 100 inhabitants, Switzerland 61, France 53, and so on, all in direct proportion to the per capita national income.

According to Kosta Mitrovic (investment director of PTT Srbija), for a normal return to the world of European telecommunications we need to invest $400 million every year and connect 300,000 new telephone subscribers. At this moment, given the rates at which it operates, PTT Srbija has barely one-tenth of that capital. That is why major changes in the conventional conception of the state-owned PTT are inevitable. The domestic market must be opened to those who would offer that missing capital.

Something of this was, in fact, suggested by Radoje Kontic himself at the ceremonial opening of TELFOR 95, when he used the word liberalization, that is, "eliminating the monopoly and making it possible for the private sector to participate in furnishing telecommunications services on an equal footing." The Law on Telecommunications, replacing the present Law on the Communications System, will regulate things so that we become "a part of Europe" even in this sector, the federal prime minister promised.

It is hard to say how the people in the Braca Karic [Karic Brothers] Company managed to foresee this piece of legislation as long ago as two years, but it is a fact that they are carrying out one of the most lucrative projects in this decade—mobile telephone system. The joint venture they have established with PTT Srbija, in which Braca Karic owns 51 percent and PTT Srbija 49 percent, was, in fact, given official approval at one time in the Government of Serbia. Last week, phones of the firm Srbija BK-PTT Mobile Telephony squealed experimentally in the TELFOR conference at the Sava Center in Belgrade.

There was, of course, no public invitation for bids on the project of introducing mobile telephony in Serbia. Elsewhere in the world, these projects are advertised, and an effort is made to get at least two bidders. Even if we accept the justification that because of the sanctions it was not possible to organize an international tender, a certain doubt remains. Will we make the transition from state monopoly over telecommunications services to some new "quasi-governmental" model (Braca Karic-Berlusconi), or will there be some other of the cheaper and more diversified operators of these services operating on the market? Incidentally, according to the offers being sent out now by BK-PTT, a mobile telephone, the connection, and all the charges for the coming year is about 35,000 dinars apiece!? Because the cost of investment in one mobile telephone connection averages about $2,500 (10,000 dinars) in the world at large, we logically wonder what the rest consists of?

In any case, beginning in the new year, mobile telephony will finally ring in the FRY, the last remaining country in Europe, and that is good news because it makes us less far behind than we have seemed to be all these years in the recent past.

Tardy Five-Year Plan

If we look at the period of the sanctions, the system has been maintained by sacrificing quality to the lowest limit. In the past five years, about $500 million have

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been invested in Serbia's PTT system, and, according to Milorad Jaksic, general director of that firm, our experts undertook certain projects during the sanctions which prove the vitality of the national intelligence. They are the opening of the third satellite station in Ivanjica (abandoned by the Japanese just before its completion), and the opening of the Alcatel office in Belgrade (abandoned by the French). The paging system of the Serbian PTT also went into operation this year, and mobile telephony begins in the new year. The optical fiber long distance line between Budapest and Belgrade went into service last year. Its branch to Nis will be completed by the end of this year, and in the middle of next year it will be connected to Sofia in Bulgaria. In communications jargon, this is a country's telecommunications "superhighway," and for the new FRY this is now the first long distance connection to Europe.

Looking into the future, all the development planned before the war up to the year 2000 is now being moved back one five-year period to the year 2005. In 10 years, the number of telephone subscribers in Serbia is to double from the present two million, to four million (plus the replacement of the outdated equipment of one million). In the organization of the telecommunications system, the conventional hierarchical scheme (local, intercity, and transit centers) is being abandoned for a switch to the new "loopwise" organization of traffic with six large-capacity junction offices. The domestic industry for telecommunications equipment is still looking to technology transfer because Alcatel and Siemens are interested in continuing the projects they began in Yugoslavia.

Optical fiber cables are supposed to comprise the basic infrastructure of this entire development, and plans call for laying them over a length of 1,000 km by the year 2005. Although at this point their capacity is mainly used at the minimum, optical-fiber technology allows for so-called multimedia transfer of information (video, TV signal, and computer data packets), which is why it is the infrastructure of the future.

All of this sounds very fine and attractive, but when you pick up a telephone today in the center of Belgrade do not be surprised if there is no dial tone. This is normal blockage in the telephone offices. A consequence of the sanctions and the low rates for the TV pulse. The lengthy absence from the world of modern communications has instilled some new habits in us. For example, doing some errands on foot instead of over the telephone. "Walking to the telephone" is actually neither irony nor sarcasm. Ask people in rural areas. There they have one telephone per 100 inhabitants. The state is assuming that in some places people will have to walk to get to a telephone....

What is lacking in the FRY is a consistent plan for the development of the telecommunications system. The development strategy in this area is giving in to the uncontrolled influence of the political factor. Finally, none of the 200 scientific papers presented in the TELFOR 95 forum will help us at the moment to make a call from Belgrade to Belgrade, but the authors of the new law in the federal government should listen to their recommendations carefully. The sanctions have been removed, and foreign companies are already knocking on the door of the national PTT organizations.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Local TV Begins Morning Broadcasts

LD3101184796 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1302 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 31 Jan (SRNA/FONET)—Montenegrin television this morning began to broadcast its own morning program which, for the time being, will go out every weekday from 0630 until 0900, MONTENA FAX reports.

Todor Pekovic, editor of the new program, said that the morning Montenegrin television broadcast will be a mixture of items—from the most important political reports to sport and interesting domestic and international news. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: EU Decision Not To Recognize FRY Noted

AU3101145396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Telephone report by correspondent Qani Mehmeti from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] News from Brussels on the EU ministerial debate on the recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia was received with great concern in Kosova.

On the eve of the EU Council of Ministers' meetings, the president of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, sent a letter to Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, who is presiding over this council. In this letter, Rugova draws attention to the consequences that the normalization of the EU relations with Belgrade would have for the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, if other aspects of the regional crisis are not to be considered.

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In this letter, President Rugova also wrote that the recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia would run in opposition to the Dayton document, which demands that the exterior wall of the sanctions against Serbia should remain effective until a series of issues, including Kosova, is resolved.

This is what President Rugova wrote to the EU ministers. However, as the world media report, many factors of international importance also declared themselves against the recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia.

Brussels' decision not to recognize the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia was, of course, received with pleasure in Kosova. Meanwhile, official Belgrade is deeply distressed by the decision taken by the European ministers.

The Serbian official press remained completely silent about this decision, not even publishing the news on the holding of this meeting despite the fact that, a day ago, the meeting was announced with great fuss.

Brussels' decision to postpone recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia on the part of the 15 European members left official Belgrade out of things and left it to think that, wherever it goes, it will be confronted with Kosova.

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